India’s Big Navy Nightmare: Buying An Old Aircraft Carrier from Russia

Key Points and Summary: India’s acquisition of the Admiral Gorshkov from Russia, rechristened INS Vikramaditya, is a saga of missteps and lessons learned.

-Originally a hybrid cruiser-carrier, the Gorshkov required extensive—and costly—modifications to serve as a full-fledged aircraft carrier for India.

-The deal, struck in 2004 for under $1 billion, ballooned to $3 billion due to delays, poor maintenance, and unanticipated technical challenges.

-Faulty boilers and a lack of spare parts plagued its early years of service, underscoring the risks of overreliance on Russian defense contractors.

-Despite its operational challenges, Vikramaditya serves as a stark lesson in managing ambition and defense procurement.

Why India’s Aircraft Carrier Deal With Russia Became a Cautionary Tale

India has always executed an unorthodox military strategy. 

It is equipped with nuclear weapons but depends heavily on conventional forces to thwart its arch-enemy, Pakistan. It was non-aligned during the Cold War and still maintains its flinty independence. India is also known for purchasing significant numbers of arms systems from Russia. 

For example, it has around 2,500 T-72 tanks. One purchase it would probably like to reconsider would be the acquisition of an aircraft carrier from Moscow that has been a big disappointment over the years.

The India and Russia Aircraft Carrier Story Is Painful

The INS Vikramaditya is a cautionary tale in the Indian Navy. The Indians wanted their own aircraft carrier in the early 2000s and looked to Russia for help.

However, the resulting ship has been afflicted with schedule slips and cost overruns. The saga has been a trail of tears for the Indian Navy. 

This story started in 1988 when the Soviet Union built the Kiev-class vessel named the Baku. This was an interesting hybrid ship. The front of the ship reminded one of a heavy cruiser with anti-ship missile launchers and two deck guns. The rest of the vessel was a helicopter carrier. 

So far, so good.

Admiral Gorshkov Was a Cursed Bucket of Bolts

Then the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. The struggling Russian navy did not have much funding or the desire to feature the old Soviet navy flagships. 

Baku was renamed the Admiral Gorshkov. It remained a part of the Russian maritime force until 1996 when the trouble started.  Since the Russian maintainers were not careful there was an explosion in the boiler room. This was the beginning of the carrier’s heartache, and the Russians decided to retire it.

Meanwhile, the Indian navy had a problematic choice later that decade. They were also going to retire their only carrier, the INS Viraat. This ship was going to be removed from active duty in 2007, and it would leave a big hole in the navy and keep the Indians from projecting power in their neighborhood.

INS Vikramaditya (R33) with a Sea Harrier aircraft in the Arabian Sea.

India Was in the Market for a New Aircraft Carrier

India looked around and there were just not any carriers available that the country could afford and the only bargain that it could find was in Russia. 

By 2004, the Indians were ready to finance a deal with Moscow. The government in New Delhi agreed that year to spend a whopping $974 million on the clunky Admiral Gorshkov.

 But since it was under a billion dollars, the Indians thought they made a prudent purchase and had a potential hit on their hands. They should have known better.

The biggest problem was that the Gorshkov had been inactive all those years. As I explained above, the Russian Navy is not known for its maintenance prowess. 

This artifact was going to need some love and attention.

India Was a Demanding Customer

India wanted an entire aircraft carrier, not just a hybrid aircraft carrier-cruiser. That meant a large flight deck supporting jet fighters – not just helicopters. Twenty-four MiG-29K fighters and 10 Kamov helicopters would be on board.

Russia also promised to supply new radars, arresting gear, and improved elevators. India re-named the refurbished carrier Vikramaditya after an old-world term for regality.

The Old Russia Bait and Switch Ploy

But once again, the Russians failed. 

The work wasn’t complete by 2007, and Moscow wanted more funds to finish to the tune of $2.9 billion. Sea trials were going to cost $550 million.

It became clear that the Russians wanted to bleed the Indians dry. By 2008, employees were only halfway done with the refurbishment. The Russian defense contractor had never worked on a carrier before, and it showed.

India was in for a penny and in for a pound. It had already spent the first billion dollars, and it was too late to give up and extricate from the deal.

The Russians stopped working on the carrier for another two years until India coughed more money. New Dehli agreed to pony up another billion dollars to sweeten the pot. It took an additional three years, but the carrier was finally delivered to conduct sea trials in 2012 and then commissioned in 2013.

The Vikramaditya at anchor in the White Sea (Off Russia).

Then, more difficulties ensued. Spare parts were hard to come by. The boilers were thought to have been newly replaced, but they were faulty and kept the propulsion system from working correctly. The boilers broke down at least once.

The carrier had no air defenses, so the Indians tried to retrofit some anti-aircraft systems. Other updates require the Vikramaditya to be in drydock again, which could take another three years.

The Indians had to learn how to purchase aircraft carriers from the Russians. This is likely a valuable lesson taught at Indian naval academies and command and general staff schools. The Indians may have been able to build at least a helicopter carrier on their own, but they were blinded by ambition and wanted the full deal. They will likely never depend on the Russians again for such a big purchase.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.