Key Points and Summary: Russia’s T-14 Armata main battle tank program, intended to revolutionize its armored forces, has faced significant setbacks.
Initially planned to enter service in large numbers, the Armata has been hampered by cost overruns, technological challenges, and corruption within the Russian defense industry.
-The program’s ambitions have been scaled back, with the Russian military instead relying on upgraded T-72s. While the T-14 incorporates some modern features, US experts argue it is not revolutionary and lags behind Western designs in several areas, including crew survivability.
-The Armata’s limited production numbers and questionable reliability further cast doubt on its effectiveness.
The Reality of Russia’s T-14 Armata
A decade ago, in 2015, it was clear that Moscow’s grandiose plans for its UralVagonZavod T-14 Armata main battle tank (MBT) fell into the category of “more will than wallet.”
Yuriy Borisov, the deputy defense minister for procurement at the time, stated that the Russian military grossly underestimated the cost of acquiring new Armata tanks, which were supposed to total 2,300 in service by 2020.
As he told a Russian paper at the time, “The money allocated for that project turns out to be too little.” The estimate wasn’t even close, and Borisov acknowledged that production costs were a whopping 250 percent higher than initially projected.
The Armata was the centerpiece of Putin’s massive military modernization program that began in 2010-2011 and was supposed to run for a decade. Upon completion of that effort, the Russian military was to be equipped with 70 percent new equipment. The Armata was supposed to symbolize the Russian armed forces truly becoming a 21st-century force.
T-14 Armata: Backing Off of Ambitions
The Armata was supposed to show that Russia could break out of the Soviet-style mode of tank design.
The T-90 design that preceded it was an incremental improvement over the T-72—a design of more than 40 years at the time the Armata was in the prototype stage.
However, the Russian planners discovered the ability to move into a new generation of weapon systems was more complicated than they had imagined. Not only was the technology not forthcoming—unless it was acquired from the West in the form of components and electronic systems that Russian industry could not build—but there were other barriers to progress.
One of those barriers “in the path to achieving such aspirations is endemic corruption,” said one of the leading members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s economic team, Aleksei Kudrin, which eventually led to his fall from position. In 2011, he was forced to step down over disagreements about projected plans for defense spending.
Given the economic realities, He concluded that military modernization plans were not feasible.
Older Models Instead Of New
In the end, Armata’s production was delayed, but without Borisov admitting that it was because the original plans for its production were unrealistic. Instead, the then-MoD procurement official stated, “Well, why flood the all Armed Forces with the Armata tanks? We have the T-72s in great demand in the market; they take it all, compared to the Abrams, Leclercs, and Leopards, for their price, efficiency and quality.”
“We don’t really need to for this (mass purchases of new tanks – ed.), these models are quite expensive in relation to existing ones,” he continued.
In theory, what he had to say about the T-14 is correct regarding its capability. Its technical specifications are consistent with the capabilities of most other modern MBTs, but as some US specialists point out, it is nothing revolutionary.
“You see many of the same aspects in the Armata design we developed decades ago when we did the Abrams,” said a retired US Army flag rank officer who worked on the M1 tank’s design and development.
“The layered, ceramic armor, the defensive systems, the smoothbore gun, etc. The main point that many focus on is separating the crew from the ammunition compartment. This is something we made a priority because it showed the average tank man that we were concerned with the survivability of the crew. That the Russians have figured out how to do this is interesting, but they are decades behind what we have been doing since the 1970s.”
The other factor, pointed out by the same retired Army officer, is the small production numbers. There are also questions about the reliability of its design.
“Field conditions in the Russian Army being as they are, there will be any number of situations where the superior technology, the higher level of education of the average American mechanic servicing these tanks, etc. These are all evidence that the Russians still have a long way to go before the Armata is a real challenge to the western models that are its real, analogous counterparts.”
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is now an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw and has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments and the Australian government in the fields of defence technology and weapon systems design. Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.
