The Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider represents a generational leap in strategic aviation, a stealth bomber designed to evade the most advanced air defenses and strike deep into enemy territory. The U.S. Air Force touts it as the backbone of future long-range strike capabilities, with a price tag to match. But does the B-21 Raider fit within a prudent grand strategy for an era of multipolarity and great power competition? Or does it reflect the inertia of a defense establishment still tethered to a hegemonic vision increasingly at odds with reality?
The Case for the B-21 Raider
There are compelling reasons to support the B-21 program. First, it provides a credible deterrent against nuclear-armed adversaries. With China and Russia modernizing their own nuclear forces, the B-21 offers a flexible and survivable means of delivering strategic payloads—whether nuclear or conventional. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are locked into a use-it-or-lose-it dilemma, or submarines, which are harder to recall once launched, bombers provide escalation control. The ability to deploy and recall them sends a potent signal in crises without committing the United States to immediate war.
Second, the B-21 aligns with a core principle of a restrained grand strategy: leveraging technological advantages to deter aggression without committing to permanent forward deployments or endless interventions. Stealth bombers enable the United States to project power selectively, without requiring massive ground forces in contested regions.
Unlike aircraft carriers, which are increasingly vulnerable to hypersonic and anti-ship missile threats, the B-21’s ability to penetrate advanced air defenses ensures that U.S. strike capabilities remain credible in a world where access to key regions is no longer guaranteed.
Third, the B-21 could reinforce the balance of power in key theaters without necessitating direct American military dominance. In Europe, it strengthens NATO’s deterrence against Russian aggression without requiring an expanded U.S. ground presence. In the Indo-Pacific, it contributes to an asymmetric approach that does not depend on overwhelming naval superiority. A grand strategy of restraint does not mean unilateral disarmament—it means structuring forces to maximize deterrence without overextension.
The B-21, along with complementary airpower assets like the F-15EX Eagle II and the F-35, is necessary to ensure that restraint does not become synonymous with weakness.
The Case Against the B-21
Yet there are strong reasons for skepticism. The first and most obvious is cost. The B-21 program is expected to cost over $200 billion across its lifecycle, with individual units priced at around $700 million. While cheaper than the B-2 Spirit, the risk of cost overruns is high.
The history of U.S. defense procurement suggests that even the most optimistic price estimates are rarely met. In an era of fiscal constraints and mounting domestic priorities, should the United States be investing in an exquisite platform when alternative force structures might offer greater flexibility at a lower price?
Second, the B-21 may be a weapon designed for the last war, not the next. The logic of stealth bombers was built around penetrating Soviet air defenses to deliver nuclear strikes. While the same rationale applies to China, the military-technological landscape has changed.
Advances in passive radar, quantum sensing, and artificial intelligence-driven targeting systems may render stealth less effective over time. Meanwhile, the proliferation of hypersonic and stand-off weapons raises questions about whether survivability in contested airspace is even feasible in the long run. The B-21 may enter service just as its core advantages begin to erode.
Third, the B-21 risks reinforcing an American strategic posture that is at odds with a more multipolar world. While great powers require credible deterrents, the United States should avoid structuring its force posture around the assumption that it must engage in deep-penetration strikes against nuclear-armed adversaries.
A more restrained approach to grand strategy would emphasize regional balancing, burden-sharing with allies, and investments in denial capabilities—such as anti-ship and anti-access systems—rather than global power projection.
The B-21 is an offensive platform designed for power projection, not defense.
Restraint Requires Strength
Despite these concerns, a restrained America still requires a credible deterrent. The alternative to maintaining advanced airpower is allowing regional hegemons—China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe—to expand their spheres of influence unchecked. A grand strategy of restraint does not mean ceding strategic initiative to revisionist powers. If the United States is to avoid permanent military entanglements while still preventing aggressive power shifts, it must maintain capabilities that keep adversaries uncertain about their ability to win wars on their terms.
This is where the B-21 fits. Alongside the F-15EX, which provides cost-effective air superiority, and the F-35, which integrates into a networked multi-domain force, the B-21 gives the U.S. military the flexibility to deter conflict without requiring permanent forward-deployed forces. It serves as a hedge against technological surprises, a critical component of a deterrent force that convinces adversaries they cannot win a war without unacceptable costs.
An artist illustration depicts a U.S. Air Force extended-range B-21 Raider escorted on a mission by armed unmanned next generation air dominance platforms. This fictional bomber features longer, wider wings, and a deeper fuselage that accommodates larger fuel tanks and dual weapons bays that enables the bomber to carry a much larger and varied payload. Mike Tsukamoto/staff; Greg Davis/USAF
For a grand strategy of restraint to work, the United States must avoid two extremes: reckless overextension and naïve underinvestment. The B-21, along with the F-15EX and F-35, ensures that Washington can maintain a favorable balance of power without succumbing to the ambitions of other countries—whether to assert regional spheres of influence or to assume a more hegemonic global role.
Restraint does not mean weakness, and without these capabilities, it risks becoming just that.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
