Could Canada Actually Fight a War Today?: Canada’s military history is defined by moments of remarkable warfighting capability.
In both World Wars, Canada punched far above its weight, fielding some of the world’s most lethal naval and air forces and earning a hard-fought reputation on battlefields from Vimy Ridge to Juno Beach to Kapyong to Kandahar. These were not marginal contributions; they were substantial manifestations of an ability to mobilize economic, political and manpower resources to fight – and often win – major wars.
Yet today, a stark question looms: could Canada still mobilize resources to fight a war as it has in the past? The answer is far from reassuring. Unlike its not-so-distant past, when Canada could mobilize entire divisions, deploy capable naval squadrons, and sustain extended air operations, the current state of the Canadian Armed Forces suggests a stark inability to fight where it matters. To be sure, Canada can still muster the occasional battle group to support NATO operations in the Baltics.
But this represents the ne plus ultra of its warfighting capability – and that’s a far cry from its warfighting ability in previous generations.
The harsh reality is this: Canada’s capacity to engage in meaningful combat operations has eroded to the point of where it is no longer serious. The forces that once mobilized entire generations for war have been hollowed out by persistent underinvestment, political apathy, and a strategic vision chronically disconnected from contemporary threats. Where once Canada could commit divisions and brigades to European battlefields, today it struggles to sustain even a modest forward-deployed battle-group in the Baltics.
This is not an abstract concern. During the Second World War, Canada fielded one of the world’s most formidable armies, navies and air forces. Today, the Royal Canadian Air Force relies on CF-18 Hornet fighter jets first flown in the 1980s. Meant to be retired years ago, these obsolescent warplanes remain in service because Ottawa has repeatedly kicked the F-35 procurement down the road. Unlike the robust squadrons that supported NATO operations during the Cold War, Canada’s air fleet today cannot guarantee sovereignty patrols or meet alliance obligations. And it certainly can’t fight a serious 21st century war – either in Canada’s sovereign space or in support of its allies abroad.
The Royal Canadian Navy’s decline tells a similar story. In 1945, Canada’s navy ranked third largest globally. Now, the Halifax-class frigates – still the backbone of the fleet – are obsolescent. The Victoria-class submarines, purchased secondhand from the United Kingdom, spend more time in maintenance than under the sea. This leaves the Arctic passages and North Atlantic routes unpatrolled. The much-vaunted Canadian Surface Combatant project remains years behind schedule, bogged down by bureaucratic inertia and political indecision. Gone are the days when Canada could sustain blue-water naval operations; today, the RCN’s ability to execute its basic mission is minimal at best.
These equipment failures are compounded by a critical manpower crisis. In the past, Canada mobilized entire generations for war. Today, the Canadian Armed Forces are thousands short of required personnel. Recruitment drives have faltered because the federal government refuses to confront the cultural shift needed to frame military service as essential to national survival. Even among existing forces, underfunded training programs mean new recruits are not combat-ready. Reserve forces lack proper preparation, and regular forces suffer from high attrition. The reality is stark: in marked contrast to the experience of the two world wars, the armed forces today would be hard-pressed to recruit and sustain a credible combat formation in any consequential armed conflict.
Even if the material and manpower gaps were somehow resolved, the most significant deficiency would remain: political will. Military capability is ultimately a projection of national commitment. In the Twentieth Century, Canada definitively demonstrated that political resolve in Normandy, at Kapyong, and in Kandahar. Yet Ottawa today continues to embrace the fantasy of being a global middle power, stretching scarce resources across diplomatic initiatives with little relevance to Canada’s core security. While Russia militarizes the Arctic and China extends its influence in the North Pacific, Canada remains distracted. The truth is stark: no credible grand strategy prioritizes distant commitments over regional imperatives. The Arctic is becoming a geopolitical battleground, yet Canada’s northern infrastructure – airfields, deepwater ports, radar stations – remains inadequate. Surveillance capabilities lag behind adversaries, leaving critical gaps in early-warning systems essential for national defense.
The Canadian Army’s warfighting credibility has similarly diminished. The fleet of Leopard 2A4 tanks, acquired secondhand, is insufficient for sustained, high-intensity operations. Artillery units lack modern self-propelled howitzers, leaving forces immobile and outgunned in contemporary combat scenarios. Integrated air and missile defense systems—critical in modern warfare—are nowhere to be found. Furthermore, the lack of heavy-lift capability for rapid deployment and logistical shortfalls in sustaining extended operations further diminish the Army’s relevance in any high-end fight. Unlike the operational depth seen during deployments in Korea or Kandahar, today’s forces would falter beyond limited battle group contributions.
The consequences of these failures extend beyond Canada’s borders. NATO allies are growing less patient. Canada risks being seen as a security free-rider, undermining its credibility and potentially weakening the integrated defense relationship with the United States. As Washington pivots toward a more transactional approach to alliances, Ottawa’s hesitance becomes a liability. If the U.S. perceives Canada as unable—or unwilling—to defend its own territory, the integrated North American defense architecture could fracture. That would be a disaster for Canadian sovereignty.
Yet, these issues are not insurmountable. What is needed is clarity of purpose and bold action. Canada must exceed the 2% NATO spending benchmark, but that funding must be directed toward meaningful capabilities: Arctic infrastructure, modern air defense, and operational readiness in the North Atlantic and North Pacific (not pensions and similar not kinetic expenditures). Procurement systems must be streamlined to end the cycle of delays and cost overruns. Recruitment must become a national priority, framed not as a career choice but as a vital component of national survival. Investments in cyber defense and unmanned systems are also essential to restore warfighting credibility in a modern context.
Canada’s strategic focus must narrow. The Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific are where Canada’s future will be contested. Engagements elsewhere may sometimes be necessary (as in the Baltic battlegroup deployment), but they distract from the core strategic imperative.
Canada must also leverage alliances strategically. AUKUS, for example, offers a chance to access high-end military technology without being drawn into Indo-Pacific commitments that do not serve Canada’s core interests.
(Dec. 12, 2011) The Royal Canadian Navy long-range patrol submarine HMCS Victoria (SSK 876) arrives at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor for a port call and routine maintenance. The visit is Victoria’s first to Bangor since 2004. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Ed Early/Released)
The ability to fight a war remains the ultimate test of a nation’s sovereignty. Canada has proven capable of meeting that test before—from Vimy Ridge to Kapyong to Juno Beach to Kandahar. But today, it would simply not be able to fight where it matters.
Sustained combat operations, meaningful regional defense, and robust alliance contributions are now beyond Canada’s reach. While Canada might still muster a battle group for NATO’s eastern flank, the hard reality is that such a contribution would be its ceiling, not a floor. The time for self-delusion is over. Canada’s future as a credible, sovereign power depends on its willingness to confront the truth that, today, it simply cannot fight a war — and to act before the next test arrives.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
