Key Points and Summary: The Seawolf-class submarines were supposed to revolutionize U.S. undersea warfare, but budget cuts in the 1990s left the Navy with just three instead of the planned 29. Designed for deep diving, high speed, and stealth, the Seawolfs were superior hunter-killers with advanced sonar and weapon capabilities.
-However, their high price—over $3 billion per unit—led to their cancellation in favor of the Virginia-class.
-Now, with China and Russia rapidly expanding their submarine fleets, some experts question whether cutting the Seawolf program was a strategic blunder that left the U.S. Navy struggling to keep pace in the modern era of naval warfare.
The Seawolf-Class Dilemma: Was Cutting the Program a Costly Mistake?
It would have been nice if the U.S. Navy could have acquired 29 Seawolf-class submarines as planned, but they had to settle for only three.
Submarine commanders and naval battle planners would like to get as many boats as possible into the waters of the Pacific to thwart Chinese warships.
The Seawolf-class can carry up to 50 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, and they are hunter-killer boats able to harass enemy shipping and find and sink their submarines.
It was left to the Virginia-class submarines to pick up the slack after the cancellation of the Seawolf-class in the mid-1990s.
The ‘Peace Dividend’ Killed the Seawolf-Class Program
Times were different then. The end of the Cold War saw the beginning of the “peace dividend” phase of defense strategy in which the U.S. government wanted cuts to expensive weapons programs to save money after the Soviet threat ended.
This was a foolhardy choice as the subsequent Global War on Terror necessitated endless land attack cruise missile strikes aimed at insurgents and terrorists.
The Geopolitical Environment Has Changed
Plus, patrols were needed for nuclear deterrence. Now, revanchist powers like Russia, North Korea, and China are building more submarines – both fast attack and nuclear-capable – and the United States seeks to blunt the rise of these countries.
The “submarine deficit” worries naval strategists and policymakers who wonder if the Navy can keep up with submarine acquisition.
Russia has an excellent undersea force and China’s is not too shabby. North Korea can deploy submarine-launched nuclear missiles and Iran just introduced their drone and helicopter aircraft carrier that will eventually have anti-submarine capabilities.
The Virginia-class Submarines Needed to Step into the Breech
This has left the onus on Virginia-class submarines to answer the call of duty and conduct worldwide deployments for long periods.
These need to have the same firepower as the Seawolf-class and be able to deposit U.S. Navy SEALs for secret missions and collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data.
The Seawolf-class are great boats with many redeeming attributes. They can move fast and run deep with their HY-100 steel, which can endure high water pressure at greater depths.
An artist’s concept of the nuclear-powered submarine SEAWOLF (SSN-21).
That leaves the Virginia-class with their Virginia Payload Modules on the Block V Virginia subs. This addition gives them the ability to carry up to 40 Tomahawks.
Seawolfs Could Better Find the Find, Fix, and Destroy
Meanwhile, the Seawolf’s larger “spherical sonar array, wide aperture array and new towed-array sonar,” is highly effective when sniffing out enemy submarines and surface warships.
But the High Price Tag Was a Problem
One problem with the Seawolfs was their high price of procurement. This was because of worker obligations that required crews to be re-trained to build the submarine for each subsequent unit ordered.
This also made the Seawolf-class cost around $400 million more per unit over the total expense of $3 billion per boat – an astronomical price tag for the 1990s when major end item budgets were slashed.
This made Congressional members worry that the Navy was not getting much bang for the buck. Then, Senator Joe Lieberman was concerned about the Seawolf program and predicted acquisition problems.
The first of a revolutionary new class of fast attack submarine, the Seawolf (SSN-21). Shown during construction at the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, Conn. She was christened by Margaret Dalton, wife of Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, on June 24, 1995.
“Ending the Seawolf program would place the Navy’s premier attack weapon system in harm’s way, damage the defense industrial base, and jeopardize the future ability of the United States to build submarines. We would be allowing a short-term budgetary decision to turn into a long-term security problem,” Lieberman said in an editorial in 1992.
The Navy and defense contractors are still fretting about the military-industrial base. There are not enough qualified workers and building submarines has been a challenge with the reduced number of trained employees. China is pumping out new warships every few months, and the United States is clearly behind.
Perhaps if the Navy had bought more Seawolfs the worker supply would have remained trained, highly-paid, and motivated if more new boats were built.
The Great Seawolf-Class Submarine Mistake?
The Seawolfs, after all, have great size, speed, and stealth – arguably better attributes than the Los Angeles-class. Twenty-nine Seawolf-class boats would have been a dream scenario that would have placed the Navy in a much better position to keep up with China and Russia. Unfortunately, the Seawolf-class program was ultimately canceled in 1995.
The Seawolf-class fast-attack submarine USS Connecticut transits the Pacific Ocean during Annual Exercise. ANNUALEX is a yearly bilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
With more Seawolfs, the Navy would have been sitting pretty in 2025. The hunter-killer and land attack features are top-notch. However, they were expensive. Policymakers and legislators tried to sound the alarm that the program was in jeopardy, but the bean counters won the final battle. Let’s hope that American submarine-building can keep up with the need and more money can be allocated to submarine warfare. This area of subsea combat will be critical in the coming years when Russia and China also grow their fleet.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
