As tensions in the Red Sea continue to escalate, the U.S. Navy’s controversial Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is back in the spotlight.
Recent reports of Houthi drone and missile attacks on commercial and military vessels have intensified the urgency for enhanced maritime defenses. In response, the Navy has fast-tracked its long-planned upgrade of select LCS hulls, equipping them with Hellfire missiles to counter unmanned aerial threats.
This decision reflects years of frustration over the ship’s underwhelming combat capabilities and seeks to repurpose the troubled platform for modern threats. But while this upgrade may offer a short-term tactical fix, it does not address the LCS’s fundamental shortcomings or justify further investment in the program.
The Littoral Combat Ship Gamble
The LCS, originally conceived as a nimble, adaptable platform for near-shore operations, has instead become a symbol of the Pentagon’s struggles with procurement bloat, strategic drift, and shifting operational realities. The new modifications are meant to give these fast but vulnerable ships a renewed purpose: intercepting aerial threats, particularly drones, with the radar-guided AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missile. It’s a desperate bid to justify the program’s existence. But does it actually make strategic sense?
The modifications involve installing the Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM), which repurposes the Hellfire—a weapon originally designed for tank-killing and ground targets—to engage airborne threats, including drones and small manned aircraft. The Navy has framed this as a necessary response to emerging challenges, particularly from unmanned aerial systems (UAS) employed by groups like Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have demonstrated an increasing ability to disrupt maritime operations in the Red Sea.
The USS Indianapolis was one of the first LCS to receive these upgrades, and during its deployment in the Middle East, it reportedly performed well in trials against drone swarms.
That’s a tactical success, but it doesn’t resolve the broader strategic dilemma: is the LCS worth saving?
Littoral Combat Ship Equals B-52J Bomber?
This initiative bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the U.S. Air Force’s troubled B-52J upgrade program.
The B-52, a relic of the Cold War, is undergoing extensive modernization, but delays and rising costs have cast doubt on whether the effort will deliver meaningful capability enhancements. Like the LCS, the B-52J upgrade is an expensive attempt to extend the viability of a platform whose underlying design is increasingly out of step with modern threats. Meanwhile, the Air Force’s F-15EX program represents a much sounder approach—leveraging a proven, high-performance airframe while integrating cutting-edge avionics and weapons.
Unlike the LCS and B-52J, which attempt to salvage outdated platforms with expensive upgrades, the F-15EX Eagle II builds upon a design that remains competitive in modern warfare without requiring a fundamental overhaul. Where the F-15EX offers a cost-effective and operationally relevant solution, the LCS and B-52J risk becoming case studies in how not to modernize aging or otherwise obsolescent platforms.
Geopolitics vs. the Littoral Combat Ship
The broader geopolitical context matters. The U.S. is increasingly engaged in an era of great power competition, particularly against China, whose navy is growing at an alarming rate. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is not just expanding in numbers but in capability, fielding more advanced destroyers, cruisers, and even aircraft carriers designed to contest U.S. naval dominance in the Pacific.
If war breaks out in the Indo-Pacific, the LCS—even with its new anti-drone capabilities—would be little more than a liability in high-intensity combat. It lacks the firepower, survivability, and range to contribute meaningfully to a fight against the PLAN’s blue-water fleet.
Yet in lower-intensity conflicts, like those involving the Houthis or similar adversaries, an upgraded LCS might have a role. The ship’s speed, modularity, and new drone-defense capabilities make it well-suited for patrolling contested brown or light-blue waters, protecting merchant shipping, and engaging asymmetric threats.
Against non-state actors who rely on drones and small attack craft, the Hellfire-equipped LCS could provide a cost-effective way to counter such tactics. The Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and even the Baltic and South China Sea’s gray zone conflicts may present operational environments where a more capable LCS could serve a useful, if limited, role.
The key question is whether these modifications are worth the investment. The Navy has already begun decommissioning some LCS hulls years ahead of schedule, implicitly admitting that the program was a mistake. The Hellfire upgrade does not fix the ship’s other critical vulnerabilities: its weak hull, its lack of long-range weapons, and its limited endurance.
These vessels will never be able to stand in a fight against a serious adversary, and even in asymmetric conflicts, they remain vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and swarm attacks. A Hellfire-equipped LCS may be able to swat down drones, but it won’t survive a serious engagement with a peer or near-peer opponent. The Navy must decide whether investing further in this troubled program is a wise allocation of resources when new, more capable platforms are needed to meet the demands of modern naval warfare.
The United States should not fall into the trap of pouring money into an aging and flawed platform simply because it’s already spent billions on it. The LCS upgrade, much like the B-52J modernization effort, is an attempt to breathe life into an obsolete design, in stark contrast to the far more promising F-15EX program, which builds upon a still-relevant and adaptable airframe. The B-52J upgrade is struggling with cost overruns and delays, and the LCS upgrade risks following the same path—both attempting to salvage platforms that are increasingly mismatched to modern warfare.
The Giant Bandaid Might Not Save LCS
While repurposing the LCS with Hellfire missiles may provide a temporary tactical benefit, it does not change the fact that this platform was flawed from the outset and, like the B-52J, represents a misguided attempt to modernize a design that is fundamentally outdated. Instead of investing further in a troubled program, the Navy must focus its resources on building a fleet that is survivable, versatile, and capable of meeting modern threats head-on.
Littoral Combat Ship. Image Credit: U.S. Navy.
If it fails to do so, it risks being saddled with ships that are obsolete before they ever see combat. The LCS Hellfire upgrade is a band-aid on a ship that was flawed from the outset. In a world where the Navy must prepare for high-end conflicts against great power rivals, half-measures like this may ultimately do more harm than good.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
