Synopsis: The Pentagon debate isn’t whether aircraft carriers matter—it’s whether they can survive inside China’s A2/AD strike complex long enough to generate combat power.
-Pete Hegseth sparked controversy by suggesting Chinese hypersonics could neutralize carriers quickly, but hitting a moving carrier requires a full kill chain: persistent ISR, midcourse updates, and terminal penetration against layered defenses and deception.
-Carrier strike groups bring Aegis escorts, electronic attack, decoys, fighters, and point-defense—and can push air wings farther out with tanking and standoff concepts. China’s own carrier buildup suggests Beijing doesn’t consider the platform obsolete—just contested.
The Aircraft Carrier Isn’t an Obsolete Battleship—But Taiwan War Targeting Would Be the Real Fight
Much has been written about the need for a new platform capable of establishing air superiority and surviving in high-threat environments, all while protecting the Navy’s primary power-projection platforms—its aircraft carriers.
Some analysts argue the age of the carrier may be nearing its end, as obsolete as an old battleship. Does the U.S. Department of Defense view the aircraft carrier as an obsolescent power-projection platform, too vulnerable to the threat of China’s newest long-range missiles? Those missiles have much better range and accuracy than in the past.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth set tongues wagging last year when he said Chinese hypersonic missiles could sink all U.S. aircraft carriers within minutes of the onset of a conflict.
“So, if our whole power projection platform is aircraft carriers, and the ability to project power that way strategically around the globe. And, yeah, we have a nuclear triad and all that, but [carriers are] a big part of it. And if 15 hypersonic missiles can take out our 10 aircraft carriers in the first 20 minutes of a conflict, what does that look like?” Hegseth said during an interview.
While his statement may have been hyperbole meant to gain greater traction for a larger defense budget, Hegseth is correct in assessing that China has upgraded its armed forces for one purpose: to confront and defeat the United States.
But is the aircraft carrier really as vulnerable as some suggest? Are they really just as obsolete as a WWII battleship?
China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/D2) Strategy:
China’s “carrier-killer” missiles are a core component of its broader anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, which intends to push U.S. naval forces beyond a range from which they could strike at Chinese assets.
The strategy took shape after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, when China felt humiliated by its inability to counter the presence of U.S. carrier groups.
China has since developed a sophisticated network of reconnaissance satellites, over-the-horizon radars, and drones to locate and track enemy assets and provide targeting data for its anti-ship missiles.
Aircraft Carrier USS Gerald R. Ford Diagram. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Nov. 28, 2023) Line handling crew assigned to the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) prepares to come alongside USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) for a replenishment at sea. John S. McCain is currently conducting routine training and certifications in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Garrett Fox).
During a conflict, China would likely launch a coordinated, high-volume salvo of anti-ship missiles to overwhelm a carrier strike group’s defenses.
China’s Growing Hypersonic Missile Arsenal:
The Chinese military has built up its ballistic missile force and its arsenal of anti-ship missiles to deny the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs) access to the Western Pacific in a war sparked by an invasion of Taiwan.
China’s “carrier-killer” strategy is based on three land-based missile systems. The DF-21D is the original—a medium-range ballistic missile with a maneuverable warhead designed to strike U.S. CSGs inside the first island chain. The DF-21D is capable of rapid in-field reloading. It is a road-mobile, medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile.
It is equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle and flies at hypersonic speeds during its final phase, making it difficult for existing missile defense systems to intercept. It has a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers. In 2013, the missile was tested against a target roughly the same size as a U.S. aircraft carrier.
The DF-26B has a longer range of 4,000 km that extends this threat to U.S. bases in the second island chain. It is dubbed the “Guam Killer.”
The DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile variant can rapidly be swapped with conventional and nuclear land-attack warheads. It is capable of nuclear precision strikes, potentially with low-yield optionality.
In addition to conventional anti-ship and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads, it is mobile and can be moved rapidly after firing.
China’s numerous DF-17s have a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) to evade U.S. and allied radar and air defenses. U.S. defense officials have said the DF-ZF HGV performed “extreme maneuvers” and “evasive actions” in previous test flights, according to CSIS.
China also successfully tested its DF-27 intermediate-range ballistic missile with an HGV in 2023.
China test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean last September, adding to already heightened tensions in a region where multiple countries have overlapping territorial claims, and where Beijing and Washington both seek to project influence.
A high angle port bow view of the aircraft carrier USS SARATOGA (CV 60) underway.
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Bay of Bengal as part of Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX), Oct. 16, 2021. MPX 2021 is a multilateral maritime exercise between the Royal Australian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, U.K. Royal Navy, and U.S. maritime forces, focused on naval cooperation, interoperability and regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific and is an example of the enduring partnership between Australian, Japanese, U.K. and U.S. maritime forces, who routinely operate together in the Indo-Pacific, fostering a cooperative approach toward regional security and stability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Russell Lindsey)
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Philippine Sea with six additional F-35C Lightning II aircraft assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, part of Carrier Air Wing FIVE, Dec. 13, 2024. VFA-147 operates from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command forces perform operations in and around critical sea passages and trade thoroughfares to deter threats that create regional instability and impinge on the free flow of goods, people, and ideas. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Pablo Chavez)
Accurate Targeting Of Moving Carriers Is No Easy Feat:
These systems would not easily strike a U.S. carrier. Accurate targeting depends on the ability to track a moving vessel, and a missile must then penetrate defenses comprising advanced missile systems.
The Chinese would have to use satellites, over-the-horizon radars, airborne and maritime scouts, and drones to track and fix U.S. aircraft carriers—it has no combat-proven ability to do so. Course corrections also would be needed while the missiles are in flight.
The Undersea Threat: China’s Growing Submarine Fleet:
Currently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates about 50 submarines. The vast majority are diesel-electric boats, which limits their range and keeps them closer to the Chinese shores.
However, the PLAN is expected to have 65 submarines in the fleet by 2030. The United States, meanwhile, is rapidly expanding its anti-ship missile arsenal, including Tomahawk anti-ship Missiles and long-range anti-ship missiles.
US Carriers and Allied Airfields Are Prime Targets:
Chinese ballistic missiles would also target U.S. military runways and taxiways in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific islands in the event of a Pacific conflict, in order to dent U.S. airpower.
A Stimson Center report explored how the Chinese might attack U.S. airbases and damage the runways and taxiways.
The essay’s main point is that to restore its ability to project air power early in a war, the United States will need to outthink—not outspend—the PLA. The sobering message is that American air bases “can no longer be considered a sanctuary.”
US Air Defenses And Countermeasures:
The Chinese do have thousands of missiles that they can salvo against U.S. CSGs during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which many analysts believe will happen by 2027.
The U.S. military continues to develop and field countermeasures to address the threat posed by these missiles.
The United States would utilize a layered defense strategy. A CSG brings with it multiple Aegis destroyers and cruisers, airborne early warning aircraft, electronic attack capabilities, decoys, and fighters.
Electronic warfare is carried out by EA-18G Growler aircraft that can blind or jam sensors and data links.
Nulka active decoys and other shipborne deception tools can pull seekers off real targets in the terminal phase..
Close-in weapon systems (CIWSs) are a last line of defense. The Phalanx CIWS is a rapid-fire, computer-controlled, radar-guided gun that can defeat anti-ship missiles and other close-in threats on land and at sea.
Newer technologies, such as the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned refueling drone, can extend the range of carrier-based aircraft, allowing the CSG to operate farther from China’s missile range.
The U.S. is exploring ways to counter China’s A2/AD strategy by using submarines, unmanned systems, and distributing forces across a broader area to complicate Chinese targeting.
“Rather than talking about the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier … we should think about it as perhaps the most survivable airfield in the region,” former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson said at a recent Brookings Institution event.
Tom Callender, a senior research fellow for naval warfare and advanced technologies at the Heritage Foundation—and a former Navy officer—said that despite the number of hypersonics that China has, the carrier sails on.
“I don’t want people to throw in the towel … with China or Russia saying, ‘Oh, that’s it. Game over. We’re done,’” he said. “It makes the problem a little harder, but it’s not insurmountable, and we’re already working ahead to adapt and overcome and regain advantages in there. It’s not going to be easy … but it’s not the doomsday that I think some people will have you believe.”
China Believes In Aircraft Carriers:
China itself does not view the carrier as obsolete. Just look at the country’s development and construction of new carriers. As of January 2026, China operates three aircraft carriers—Liaoning (Type 001), Shandong (Type 002), and the advanced Fujian (Type 003)—with plans to expand its fleet to six by the 2030s, and up to nine by 2035.
The Fujian, commissioned in late 2025, features an advanced electromagnetic aircraft launch system. The carrier’s introduction marks a significant shift toward a blue-water Chinese navy, and the PLAN is also advancing its naval-aviation capabilities. The introduction of the J-35 stealth carrier fighter and the KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft strengthens China’s ability to contest sea and air control.
J-35. Image Credit: Chinese State Media.
J-35 Fighter. Image Credit: Chinese State Media.
While Chinese military doctrine emphasizes that U.S. carriers are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD capabilities, Beijing views aircraft carriers as essential for projecting power far from its shores, protecting global maritime supply lines, and achieving its goal of becoming a world-class military.
Are We Reacting Too Much To China’s Propaganda?
One thing to keep in mind is that any claims about China’s capabilities come from China itself. As War on the Rocks wrote, “China has the world’s largest bureaucracy to propagandize its greatest strengths while hiding (or at least dismissing) its greatest weaknesses. America, by contrast, ultimately bares all for all to see. It is an elementary analytical error to confuse the respective great powers’ ‘dirty laundry’ with their designer clothes.’”
The United States would face a daunting foe in an Indo-Pacific war with China. While China’s mobile missiles would themselves be challenging to track and destroy, the Chinese Navy, which is crucial for any invasion of Taiwan, would not. The U.S. Navy and Air Force would target Chinese carriers,and the landing ships needed for an invasion.
China’s own ships are more vulnerable to missile attacks than U.S. CSGs are, and they are the ones that have to support an invasion of Taiwan.
The threat to U.S. carriers is real, but defeat is far from certain. Many naval officers believe that carriers today are even more survivable than during the Cold War, and the Navy has been constantly upgrading its ability to fight a shooting war against China.
As the face of war evolves, the ability to adapt to evolving threats must also evolve.
About the Author: Steve Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
