In the run-up to the Iraq War two decades ago, aspiring Iraqi politicians struggled to get the attention of American and British diplomats and officials. Iraqi activists and diaspora leaders flocked to workshops and conferences.
As war became inevitable, many Iraqis understood that the path to power was to win the backing of powerful bureaucracies. Some focused on the State Department, others on the Pentagon or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and still others on Congress. The only Iraqis not able to participate in the scramble were Iraqis from portions of Iraq still controlled by Saddam Hussein. These became the great unknown in the early months of government formation.
Early Power Struggles
Ultimately, Ayad Allawi, an English-speaking former Baathist favored by the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency won the scrum. L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, appointed Allawi to be interim prime minister as the United States formally returned sovereignty to Iraq. The problem with Allawi was that he was much more popular with Bremer and in Washington than he was in Baghdad. That he lost the subsequent election badly surprised no one in Iraq.
It would be more than a decade before Allawi gave up. During Nouri al-Maliki’s premiership, Iraqis told a joke about how Maliki had confiscated Allawi’s international zone pass but Allawi did not notice for seven months, the implication being he was too busy in London.
Over subsequent years, some Sunni Arab politicians made the round of Washington and London to lobby government officials and think tank analysts for a “Sunni Regional Government” analogous to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Most in Washington saw them for what they were: grifters who thought they could take a shortcut to power.
Maintaining Rule in Iraq
Today, former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, a former intelligence chief-turned-interim prime minister, appears to be trying the Allawi play. He remains popular in the CIA and in the think tank circuit and seeks their support to make a comeback.
He does himself and Iraq disfavor. If Kadhimi wants support, he should not replicate Allawi’s failed strategy. His constituency should be in Iraq, not Washington or London. He should seek to win over Iraqis rather than try to paper over the corruption for which his administration is known for throughout Iraq. Simply put, he has some explaining to do, not in Washington but in Baghdad.
Trying to convince American policymakers that Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani represents the triumph of Iranian-backed militia state capture is disingenuous. Put aside the fact that every leader has sought to capture the state over the past 20 years; fortunately, Iraqi political dynamics create checks and balances to prevent that.
It is revisionist to say that Kadhimi had taken the Iranian-backed militias to the brink of defeat, given that the groups had grown more powerful during Kadhimi’s tenure. The former prime minister had become a master of telling Washington one thing, but doing the opposite.
Nor is it correct to suggest the current government is the result of backhanded regime change. After all, it was Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to leave the government and his decision alone. It was a tactical mistake, but there are no do-overs in politics. This is akin to blaming George H.W. Bush for Michael Dukakis’ disastrous tank-ride decision or blaming Donald Trump for Hillary Clinton’s 2016 failure to campaign in Wisconsin.
Iraq and Judiciary
The Iraqi judiciary can be problematic, but it is ridiculous to suggest Kadhimi was the victim of a judicial coup. The court upheld the results of the election against the efforts of reactionary forces to cancel it. As for the decision to enforce an interpretation that effectively raised the quorum for government formation, that occurred only because the U.S.- and Mustafa-friendly President Barham Salih solicited an official clarification from the supreme court.
Regardless, that particular court decision was correct by the letter of the constitution. Nor was majoritarian rule the problem, given that two failed attempts were made to form a government because of minority bloc concerns and maneuvering. For Kadhimi to complain about losing an election is akin to Gerald Ford complaining about his 1976 loss after rising to the White House by chance rather than mandate.
None of this is to imply that militias are not a problem in Iraq. No political party should have militias at their disposal, be they Iranian-backed or Kurdish peshmerga, or Muqtada al-Sadr’s gangs effectively rented by Kadhimi in the twilight of his tenure.
Iraq’s partners should maintain diplomatic and financial pressure upon the Sudani administration to unwind that grasp, but there are no shortcuts to power. Kadhimi’s efforts to cast doubt on the most recent government formation are the Iraqi equivalent of Trump denying the 2020 election results. Kadhimi is the victim of his own failures, not some grand conspiracy. If he wants to make a political comeback, the place to do that would be from within Iraq, not from Beirut, Washington, or London.
Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
