A nuclear frenzy has taken over East Asia. China is growing its nuclear arsenal at a breakneck pace to catch up with Russia’s and the United States’ larger weapon stockpiles. Despite international outcry, North Korea now musters a working nuclear deterrent. It is restlessly working to increase its size and survivability. Russia is helping Pyongyang by weakening the sanction regime and providing technological support. And yet, the norm of non-proliferation may have found a new challenger: South Korea.
South Korea: A Slow Brew Towards Nuclear Weapons?
Last year, President Yoon Suk-yeol warned that a military nuclear program was an option on the table. He is not the only South Korean political heavyweight toying with the nuclear option, and almost three-fourths of the citizenry favor an independent deterrent. Caught off-guard, Washington reemphasized its commitment to defending Seoul and the two capitals formed a ‘Nuclear Consultative Group’ to discuss issues of nuclear deterrence further. American nuclear submarines now make frequent stops in South Korean ports to give substance to extended deterrence. Still, unsurprisingly, these small gestures did little to reassure South Koreans. Sixty percent do not believe that the United States would risk nuclear war on their country’s behalf.
This seemingly sudden eruption of South Korea’s nuclear debate has deep causes. The North Korean threat is the most obvious driver for a potential program. The northern rival detonated its first nuclear device almost twenty years ago. Its ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization,’ once an actual foreign policy goal, is now deemed for the foreseeable future a pipe dream by most experts and policymakers. To many, South Korean nukes are the only realistic equalizers.
Newer growing concerns have reinforced Seoul’s nuclear temptation. China’s emergence as an aspiring hegemon in the region also pushes toward the nuclear option. Beijing’s growing clout threatens Seoul’s foreign policy autonomy, and the two capitals have border disagreements. Chinese power could grow to the extent that the U.S.-ROK alliance is hopelessly outgunned or U.S. forces can no longer access the Korean Peninsula in wartime. A nuclear arsenal is thus one of South Korea’s only means to maintain the balance of power in East Asia in the face of China’s rise.
South Korea is undergoing one of the most dramatic demographic collapses in modern history. That would be worrisome enough for a ‘normal’ country. But Seoul has to deter and potentially defeat North Korea’s gigantic military of over a million troops. And nearby lurk Russia and especially China, the two most formidable military powers on the Eurasian landmass. The ROK Armed Forces still rely on conscription to maintain a sizable force posture, and the number of conscripts is in free fall due to low natality. A nuclear deterrent is an attractive clutch to compensate for this growing inability to sustain conventional deterrence.
Moreover, the United States’ security guarantees have less sway than before. During the unipolar era, few doubted that Washington was ready to wage war with North Korea. Now that the United States is confronting great power rivals in several theaters, it has less bandwidth to fight a costly war against a secondary threat like Pyongyang. Also, the decline of neoconservative ideas in the body politic made Americans less eager to wage wars when essential interests are not at stake. In that context, there is little appetite for a potential nuclear exchange with North Korea, and South Koreans understand that full well.
Indeed, many Americans are unhappy with the United States risking a nuclear war against a tertiary threat like North Korea. Hence, some politicians and strategists have shown sympathy toward Seoul going nuclear. Donald Trump suggested in the past that South Korean nukes could be a useful deterrent against North Korea. Prominent ex-Pentagon official Elbridge Colby consider that a South Korean arsenal would better afford U.S. forces to focus on China and a Taiwan contingency. Unthinkably a few years ago, a growing number of experts acknowledge that a nuclear deterrent would support America’s goals in East Asia.
Historically, the United States supported partners’ nuclear proliferation when it served its national interest. It let Britain, France, and Israel develop their own arsenals to help deter common threats in their neighborhoods. Still, some believe that Washington might sanction and ostracize South Korea if it went nuclear. But it stretches the imagination that rational American decision-makers would jeopardize the U.S.-ROK alliance and sabotage America’s position in East Asia just for the sake of the dying dream of non-proliferation. Indeed, the AUKUS agreement showed that U.S. leaders understand that encouraging allies to master nuclear technologies is sometimes more important than upholding abstract norms inherited from the bygone era of American hegemony, when Washington could pursue both its strategic interests and non-proliferation.
A nuclear South Korea is one of the rare issues that could find unanimity among America’s three dominant foreign policy tribes. Restrainers will appreciate an ally doing more to defend itself and lessening the burden on the United States. An independent nuclear deterrent also means that Washington is less likely to become embroiled in a nuclear exchange with North Korea. For prioritizers, a more potent South Korea would help stymie China’s regional hegemonic ambitions and allow greater American focus on Taiwan and other hotspots. Primacists would be on board for a liberal democratic South Korea developing its military capabilities to push back against autocracy, containing North Korea, and supporting U.S. goals worldwide.
A South Korean bomb is no panacea and should not dissuade from trying the diplomatic track toward North Korea. Indeed, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington all share a fear of Chinese regional hegemony, and this common interest could serve to kickstart rapprochement. Still, letting South Korea get its own deterrent could increase Korean and U.S. security at no cost to the American taxpayer. Moreover, it is a low-hanging fruit that would probably meet transpartisan support in Washington. If the next administration oversaw a safe and smooth transition toward a nuclear South Korea, it could easily claim it as a major foreign policy success. It is not an ideal solution by any means. But the alternative may be for American leaders to choose between a nuclear war with a secondary small country or abandoning one of their most formidable allies to its fate.
About the Author: Dylan Motin
Dylan Motin is a non-resident research fellow at the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy. You can find his Linkedin profile here.
