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How to Tell if Saudi-Iran Rapprochement is Virtue Signaling or Real

Saudi Arabia
Vladimir Putin met with Crown Prince and Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud.

China’s announcement last month that it had brokered a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia caught Washington by surprise. The goal was not the problem. After all, this was reportedly why, two years ago, Director of Central Intelligence Bill Burns had met with the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council at a Baghdad iftar arranged for that purpose by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. Rather, it was not only China’s involvement but also its success with a country that enjoyed a close U.S. security partnership dating back to the Roosevelt administration that surprised Washington.

Biden administration officials take the development in stride. Barbara Leaf, the assistant secretary of State for Near East Affairs, put a positive spin on China’s involvement. “Frankly, it’s about time that it used whatever leverage it has with Iran, to constrain Iranian destructive behavior,” she told the Emirati newspaper The National. “We’re not trying to counter, we are very confident in the length, duration, scope, richness of our relations across the region.” Critics, however, warned that Washington should be worried about China, if not about Saudi-Iran relations.

On April 8, 2023, China hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Beijing, the highest-level meeting between Iranian and Saudi officials in years. A couple days later, a Saudi team visited both Tehran and a potential consulate site in Mashhad and Iranian technical teams traveled to Riyadh and Jeddah to discuss the establishment of embassies. It may seem that rapprochement is going forward at a fast pace, but not everything in the Middle East is as it seems.

Iranian authorities say they want their teams in place before the Hajj. Whether or not the Saudis allow this will signal whether the rapprochement is real or simply virtue signaling. Certainly, both countries might be sincere as they bury the axe. They had relations from the early 1990s until an Iranian mob sacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January 2016. Therefore, resuming ties might simply mean going back to the status quo ante rather than truly moving forward.

So, is Saudi Arabia’s participation in the China-led rapprochement with Iran sincere? Or is it a way for Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman to show his displeasure with President Joe Biden. Bin Salman deeply resents both Biden’s gratuitous and personal attacks on him, Biden’s role in the progressive lynch mob targeting Saudi Arabia, and the general lack of support Riyadh feels as Iran advances its nuclear program.

When embassies are exchanged matters. While trading embassies may seem straight-forward, the Hajj is a third rail. In 1986, Mehdi Hashemi, an Iranian intelligence officer who headed the predecessor to the Qods Force, sought to infiltrate into Mecca saboteurs disguised as pilgrims. The following year, Iranian agitators precipitated demonstrations and clashes with Saudi security forces that culminated in the deaths of over 400 pilgrims. Iranian diplomats may signal they can put aside the Islamic Republic’s ideology, but Iranian intelligence and military operators may tolerate no such compunction. For Saudi authorities, the size and scale of the Iranian mission will be a paramount concern, as will limitations or freedoms Iranian diplomats enjoy inside the Kingdom. After all, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps do not fall under the authority of Abdollahian.

Presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Biden have each treated traditional allies poorly, easily dispensing with them as convenience might dictate. Unfortunately, disrespect for allies is now more the rule of American policy than the exception. Saudi Arabia has reason to show anger. Should they allow potential Iranian operators to enter the country with diplomatic immunity prior to the Hajj, that would signal Saudi’s pivot to be real. It would mean they actually trust Iranian intentions more than American ones.

A more agile administration might recognize they still have time to right relations before Saudi signals the passing of the point of no return. It is unclear, however, if the White House and State Department are up to the task.

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

Written By

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

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