The name sounds like an April Fool’s joke, but it isn’t.
The Club of Angry Patriots was established on April 1 by none other than convicted Russian war criminal Igor Girkin, the man a Dutch court held responsible for the intentional downing of Flight MH17 in August 2014. Several other distinguished reactionaries are among the Club’s founding members: Pavel Gubarev, Vladimir Grubnik, Viktor Alksnis, Maxim Kalashnikov, Maxim Klimov, Mikhail Aksel, and Yevgeny Mikhailov.
The Patriots are angry because of Russian strongman Vladimir Putin’s painfully obvious mishandling of the invasion of Ukraine. Importantly, they don’t hide their anger or refrain from pointing fingers at the powers that be. Although their views may not be typical for most Russians, they do reflect the beliefs of influential hardliners and Putin critics in and out of government. At the same time, the fact that the Patriots call themselves a club, and not a party or movement, clearly suggests that they are aware of the limited nature of their appeal.
Their founding manifesto, published on Telegram on April 17, is worth reading, as their analysis is spot on.
“Our country is waging a serious war,” say the Patriots, “but this war is being waged incompetently.” Exactly.
“Defeat in the war will lead Russia to catastrophic consequences.” True again.
“The country in its present state cannot inflict on the enemy that crushing defeat that will force the enemy to accept peace terms acceptable to us.” Ditto.
Alas, say the Patriots, “the military-political leadership of Russia does not realize the gravity of the situation.… Everything is very similar to the Russo-Japanese or the First World War. What’s next?” An excellent comparison. And you know what happened after both wars: revolution.
But, not to worry, caution the Patriots, they won’t rock the boat: “We understand that now is not the time to continue the confrontation between the reds and whites of a hundred years ago. In a most dangerous war, such disputes can be seriously conducted either by fools or by agents of the enemy.” Did they have former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who regularly shoots off at the mouth, in mind for the first category? As to the second category, as always in Russia, it’s the traitors who are responsible for Russia’s troubles. Who might they be? The oligarchs! The Club is taking on the oligarchs! Good luck with that, fellas.
“Those who have transferred their capital and their loyalty to the West continue to remain in power and big business. They are ready for sabotage, as well as for direct collusion with the enemy and, therefore, betrayal. We do not rule out that they are preparing a pro-Western coup, capitulation and, consequently, the dismemberment of Russia.”
Rest assured, though, that “we will counter this scenario with all available means. We are ready to cooperate with all the healthy forces of society, with all those who do not want Russia to lose.” Nota bene that the Club doesn’t specify who these healthy forces are.
Ironically, just as the Patriots see doom and gloom for Russia, Western policymakers and analysts are increasingly wont to see doom and gloom for Ukraine. I put my money on Girkin’s merry band of angry patriots. As insiders, they understand the current condition of Russia’s politics and war effort better than analysts and policymakers in the West.
The Patriots are right to be angry. Putin and his Russia are in serious trouble, and there may be no way out of the dead end into which the country and its people have been led. What Girkin and Co. fail to see is that they too offer no solution to the multiple crises afflicting Mother Russia.
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
