Summary: The American public’s war-weariness and the urgency of Ukrainian progress against Russia are pressing issues, reflecting a historical reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts, reminiscent of pre-World War II sentiments. The Ukrainians, bolstered by Western support totaling over $165 billion in aid, military hardware, and financial support, are battling against formidable Russian defenses and internal military coordination challenges. Despite achieving favorable kill ratios using Western tactics and equipment, Ukraine’s future hinges on continuous support as Russia aims to deplete Ukrainian resources.
Ukraine’s Military Challenges: The Path to Victory or Stalemate?
The American public clearly admires Ukrainian valor in the face of brutal Russian aggression, but after recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans are war-weary. This places the Ukrainians on a timer. They need to make forward progress against the Russians before American aid runs out.
When running for his third term in 1939, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not bring forward a litany of foreign policy “experts” to wag their fingers at isolationists.
Quite the opposite.
After taking over 300,000 casualties in World War I, many Americans were decidedly against fighting in yet another war over European borders and colonial possessions. Roosevelt recognized the validity of the isolationist position in his political rhetoric. His council of war was full of heavy-hitter advisors. These experts were directed to take the facts to Congress, who passed a series of bills increasing funding to the army and navy, instituting the draft, and providing the allies with desperately needed war materials and equipment.
Prewar preparation meant consulting with and persuading the American people. Roosevelt sought to reassure isolationists that he was against war, while simultaneously making preparations to defend American interests. Roosevelt knew that the people had to understand why the rise of fascism in Europe and Asia was their problem.
The current administration has made no such case to the American people regarding support for Ukraine.
Following the Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine won Western patronage through its impressive (if audacious) defense of Kyiv and the Donbas against the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Russians. Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson were wildly successful, capturing an entire army’s worth of weapons, military hardware, munitions, and vehicles. This loosened Western purse strings.
The United States has donated over $75 Billion to the Ukrainian cause. This includes:
-$4.5 Billion in military grants and loans;
-$18.3 Billion for Training, equipment, weapons, and logistics support;
-$26.4 Billion in financial aid to the Ukrainian national budget;
-$2.7 Billion in humanitarian assistance;
-$23.5 Billion of military hardware and weapons which was authorized by the Executive Branch to be drawn from existing stockpiles.
NATO’s European members have provided over $43 Billion in financial aid and $29 Billion in military hardware, weapons, and training for Ukrainian soldiers. The EU also provided another $18 Billion to support Ukrainian refugees who fled to EU member states, totaling European and NATO support to $90 Billion.
Despite the influx of Western support, Ukraine failed to make measurable gains during the fighting season of 2023. With the U.S. nearly matching European support to the conflict, it is clear that U.S. support is vital to Ukraine’s continuing combat operations.
Russia worked diligently to consolidate Russian Ground Forces to defensible positions after the fall of 2022. These consolidations were meant to frustrate a Ukrainian thrust east towards Rostov-on-Don – the source of Russian logistics and supply – or south towards the Sea of Azov.
Russia’s timely adjustments to the line firmly entrenched their troops behind fortifications and minefields. There were (and remain) no weak spots; no low-hanging fruit that the Ukrainians could exploit to achieve a breakthrough.
Russian entrenchments are now so thick that they can be seen from space.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also revealing their limitations. There is self-destructive competition between Ukrainian military leaders. They don’t coordinate advances well. Ukrainian artillery batteries cannot support infantry movements from other battalions or brigades. Close air support is non-existent.
On August 21st, 2023, Hungarian President Viktor Orban sat down with populist commentator Tucker Carlson in Budapest and said something shocking: Ukraine cannot win. He further claimed that the West did not understand Russia; that Moscow sees dominance of Ukraine as imperative to their national survival.
The Russian Ministry of Defense may have shown itself to be impotent, but Moscow cannot back down. Russia is fielding a conscripted army in Ukraine of over 600,000 soldiers. Realizing the Ground Forces are not capable of fighting a war of maneuver, the Ministry of Defense is procuring antiquated and inaccurate weapons systems for mass bombardments and strikes against both Ukrainian infrastructure and the Ukrainian people themselves.
Ukraine increased its military from 300,000 in 2019 to roughly 700,000 in 2022 – though estimates are difficult when factoring in paramilitaries and civilian volunteers. Building an army and sustaining an army are two very different problem sets, and they can only sustain th with international backing.
Over the next several years Russia will slowly grind the Ukrainian economy down until it can no longer support a national government or field an army. Once foreign aid dries up, the writing is on the wall for the regime in Kyiv and the Ukrainian people.
Using Western tactics and equipment, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are currently achieving a kill ratio of 3:1 and sometimes even 5:1 against Russian Ground Forces. This is unfortunately not nearly enough.
In my recent book on Hybrid Warfare, I write in detail about Russia’s unique approach to warfare, and what lessons may be taken from their application of war. Russia rarely backs out of a war due to casualties. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution forced Russia to remove itself from the First World War, only after the deaths of over 1.8 Million Russian soldiers. For reference, on December 4th, 2023 British Defense Intelligence posted estimates on Twitter that Russia had suffered 70,000 soldiers killed and another 220,000-280,000 soldiers wounded.
Rostov-on-Don is the staging point and logistics hub for Russia’s entire war effort. Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov and his deputies also run the conflict from the city’s Southern Military District’s Headquarters. If Kyiv wants to bring Moscow to the negotiating table realistically, then Rostov-on-Don is the intuitive target.
Ukraine would have to bet it all, and would likely take enormous losses. But the time to gamble is now.
American patience is waning. The clock is ticking.
About the Author
Curtis L. Fox is the author of the recently published book Hybrid Warfare. Despite being accepted to the graduate engineering program at Virginia Tech, Curtis chose to enlist in the Army, where he learned to speak Russian and earned his Green Beret. After completing his time in service, Curtis studied at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, earning a Master’s of Business Administration. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
