In background briefings and interviews, the White House signals that the purpose of this year’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit is to show that the United States is ready to compete in Africa. Kudos to President Biden for recognizing that the United States cannot take Africa for granted.
The notion, however, that one strategy fits all for the continent is condescending.
Would the White House argue that a single Asia strategy would suffice? Are Japan and Saudi Arabia the same? Or would a Europe strategy make sense if it treats the leaders of democracies like France and Germany as equivalent to dictatorships like Belarus and Turkey?
The diversity of Africa and African governance requires different strategies. Certainly, the United States can outcompete China and Russia among Africa’s democracies. When governments are accountable to their public, rulers neither have the power nor are immune from consequences if Beijing seeks to bribe them. Unless the United States is able and willing to out-bribe the Chinese Communist Party to beat them at their own game, countries like Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, or Somalia, however, require a strategy centered more on U.S. coercion.
The same holds true for Russia. As French influence across the Sahel collapsed, Russia moved in to fill the gap. Here, the United States faces a conundrum. Mali’s junta sent Paris packing and the country turned to Moscow because Russian paramilitaries were willing to do what the French would not: target opponents based on their ethnicity. Conferences and lunches in Washington are nice, and while Biden wisely omitted Mali, he still has not formulated a strategy to deal with the problem Mali represents.
In other cases, such as the Central African Republic, Russia utilized paramilitaries like the Wagner Group both for plausible deniability and to extract the country’s resources in order to fund the intervention and turn a profit. Often, failing leaders invite the Russians in to help prop up their regime, essentially selling their country’s future for the sake of personal power. Here, the United States also has no clear strategy. Simply sanctioning countries that embrace Wagner mercenaries will not work if the United States has no strategy to outcompete the Russians.
Biden campaigned upon ending “forever wars.” Once in office, he doubled down. The idea that the Biden Administration will order U.S. forces into countries like the Central African Republic to deny space to the Russians is farcical. Frankly, the notion that any Republic administration would anymore send the military to fight an insurgency is as unlikely.
The U.S.-African Leaders Forum could be a good first step if there is adequate follow-through, but the idea that diplomacy alone will enable U.S. competition is naïve. With China and Russia both challenging the rules-based order, is it any surprise they refuse to operate by its rules?
This is why coercion matters to stop China from transforming countries like Equatorial Guinea into a Chinese base. To be proactive, the United States should reverse its Obama-era abandonment of the Lajes Airfield in the Azores. It must also recognize the strategic logic of Somaliland ties, especially given China’s growing presence next door in Djibouti.
To counter the Russian problem requires a different strategy. Here the White House should work through African partners like Rwanda willing to put boots on the ground. This requires resources more than red carpets or fancy lunches. It also means that the State Department will need to engage in consistent, two-way diplomacy rather than have Secretary of State Antony Blinken parachute into capitals to lecture, not listen, and then depart.
Simply put, if the United States is going to succeed, it is necessary both to recognize diplomacy will not be enough and American humility cannot be in such short supply.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
