China’s diplomatic inroads in the Middle East are an increasing U.S. national security concern but behind the headlines, China continues to face challenges. Any state can claim to be a global power. Still, one of the best metrics for proving its logistical and operational ability are Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), often involving the speedy air and sea evacuations of thousands of civilians from danger zones. In 2011, China claimed to have conducted a NEO in Libya, but it failed, leaving many Chinese workers to fend for themselves as the country descended into chaos.
In 2020, word broke of a supposed 25-year deal between Iran and China. Again, the headlines were alarmist, but the breathless reporting ignored an important Iranian reality: While Iranian diplomats will seek to leverage China against the West, a mix of Iranian dysfunction and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) self-interest and corruption make execution of any such deal unlikely. The IRGC will never forfeit its monopolies to allow Chinese companies a toehold in Iran.
A similar failure now looms for China’s ambitions to make the Iranian port of Chabahar the latest in its “string of pearls” network of military-capable ports. Until recently, Chabahar was a dusty outpost, more than 400 miles away from Zahedan, capital of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province, which is itself a backwater. At 1,125 miles, the distance from Iran’s capital Tehran to Chabahar is greater than the distance between Washington, DC and Minneapolis.
Iranian officials sought to cash in on Chabahar’s strategic location. In March 2016, Chinese ambassador Pang Seng visited the port. The following month, Chinese engineering company Nick Unique sent a delegation to visit both Chabahar on a three-day visit. Not long after, the IRGC’s economic wing refurbished the road network surrounding the port and began work to connect the port with Zahedan by railroad.
While no Iranian government could weather the national storm that an outright grant of a military base on Iranian soil would generate, upgrading the Chabahar port to military standards and making it turnkey ready for China’s Navy in time of conflict would significantly alter the operational environment in the region.
Now there are signs Chinese investment in Chabahar is lagging. In February 2023, Hossein Shahdadi, deputy director of Ports for the Province of Sistan va Baluchestan, took to the pages of the reformist-leaning Shargh daily, to argue for further Chabahar port development. He sings Chabahar’s merits: Chabahar lies outside the congested Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, and the open land surrounding the town makes it better situated for further expansion. That he needs to make such arguments is significant, and may signal that Chinese investment in the port is falling short of Iranian expectations. If money still flowed to Chabahar, either from Beijing or from the IRGC, then the local port development officer would not need to scramble in such a public way.
Certainly, the United States should not be complacent with regard to China’s inroads into the Middle East. The Biden administration’s deliberately insulting relationship toward Saudi Arabia will have a generational cost. China’s pivot to Iran, though, is more posturing than real. A combination of Iran’s prickly nationalism, IRGC interference in the economy, and a lack of commercial law all mean that, sanctions or not, Iran will be a losing prospect for any investor, whether from East or West.
Author Expertise and Biography
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
