On Jan. 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. Sixty-eight states ratified the treaty, committing to never develop, stockpile, use, or threaten the use of nuclear weapons, nor to allow nuclear weapons on their territory or assist other states in any prohibited activity. The end goal is total elimination of nuclear weapons. No current nuclear power has signed the treaty, and NATO collectively opposes it.
Although the United States and its allies are right to oppose the treaty, the United States should consider a nuanced regional strategy to exploit some of the opportunities TPNW offers. In practice, this means countering the treaty’s support among European allies through information warfare and counter-messaging, while encouraging TPNW support among allies in Asia at risk of possible nuclear proliferation. The goal is to ensure American nuclear weapons can remain in Europe, while using the TPNW to strengthen extended deterrence commitments in Asia that are weakened by China’s growing nuclear program.
Because this approach could be perceived as hypocritical, American public messaging on the TPNW should be unambiguously oppositional. Support for TPNW efforts in Asia should come through quieter channels, for example in the form of funding for sympathetic non-profits and interest groups.
Risks to American Security
China’s nuclear force is growing. Open-source researchers recently identified the construction of hundreds of new intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles in a desert in northwest China. At the same time, China has launched a multi-decade nuclear force modernization effort that includes fielding new road-mobile ICBMs, new ballistic missile submarines, and an altogether new type of submarine. Nuclear warhead stockpiles are growing. The Pentagon estimates that by 2035, China could have 1,500 nuclear weapons, quadrupling its current stockpile.
Nuclear weapons could also be a wedge issue in NATO, dividing the alliance between those concerned about nuclear weapons and those who see them as an integral part of collective security. NATO’s decision-making structure requires consensus for the alliance to act, which means only one NATO state needs to push opposition to nuclear weapons to create alliance-wide effects. Polls conducted by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons suggest this is a real concern. One YouGov-conducted poll in January 2021 found six NATO countries where strong majorities of the public supported a ban, including 89% of Spaniards; 87% of Italians; 86% of Icelanders; 78% of Dutch and Danish; and 77% of Belgium. Although there is always a gap between public opinion and security policy, it is certainly plausible that policymakers will take TPNW advocates and public support seriously, and oppose broader NATO nuclear policies. It would not be the first time.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union manipulated nuclear weapons and the NATO decision-making structure to create wedges in NATO. Starting in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union waged an active measures campaign to divide NATO support on the neutron bomb, targeting elites and the general public with information operations. The Soviets exploited disagreements within the alliance over theater nuclear weapons, public disclosures around neutron bombs, public opinion and government policy divides on funding neutron bombs, and general disagreements on nuclear doctrine and force structure. The Soviet Union put its finger on the scale, stoking public concerns through various front groups like the World Peace Council and the Dutch Communist Party. The Soviet Union also pressured NATO leaders and raised concerns about the neutron bomb at the United Nations. Although it is unclear how much impact these measures had, the result aligned with Soviet interests. On March 27, President Carter decided to stop production of the neutron bomb.
Of course, growing disarmament sentiment poses risks to American security too. As the Chinese nuclear arsenal expands, the United States will no doubt need to make appropriate adjustments to nuclear force composition and doctrine. That may include new nuclear delivery systems like the sub-launched cruise missile, pausing or even reversing historical disarmament measures, and generally having a serious conversation about the role of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons prove essential in preventing or limiting the scale of a future U.S.-China conflict (a topic that merits serious debate), then strong disarmament sentiment poses a serious risk to national and global security. After all, any major conflict between the two would have global repercussions, even in the unlikely event that it remained contained to just the United States and China. As two great powers fight, prospects would fade for global cooperation on myriad critical issues, from climate change to the stability implications of AI and emerging technologies.
Opportunities
China’s growing arsenal weakens American deterrence. During the Cold War and since, the United States extended its nuclear umbrella over allied states. This had the double effect of binding American and allied national security, while also removing incentives for allies to build their own nuclear weapons. But as China’s nuclear arsenal grows, the credibility of the American deterrence commitments will be reduced.
The United States increasingly must manage a tri-polar nuclear dynamic to deter China and Russia at once. Plus, the United States and allies need to worry about proliferation risks in North Korea and Iran. That significantly increases the demands on American nuclear resources across the enterprise, including early warning systems, intelligence apparatuses, and nuclear planning and targeting. The United States also has to worry about crisis entanglement: How might actions to escalate or defuse a crisis with one power affect relationships with the other? If resources are overextended and the United States cannot simultaneously manage both its nuclear rivals, Washington may need to prioritize one over the other, leaving concerned allies to fend for themselves.
Weakened extended deterrence creates new risks of nuclear proliferation. If allied states perceive a meaningful reduction in the United States’ commitment to protect them, they may seek to protect themselves. This is particularly acute for American allies in Asia who are most threatened by China’s nuclear rise as well as North Korean expansion. Although Russia still has a powerful nuclear arsenal, its dismal performance so far in the Ukraine war suggests European allies may not feel as threatened.
This backdrop creates the opportunity for the United States to strategically leverage the TPNW. Encouraging anti-nuclear views in South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other Asian nations that might seek to acquire nuclear capabilities, could support American nonproliferation goals. Although trust among policymakers in American extended deterrence commitments may still go down, political pressure may reduce the risk of new nuclear programs in the region. For example, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed openness to a Japanese nuclear weapon, but Japan remains generally opposed to nuclear weapons. Psychological operations, financial support for disarmament organizations, strategic communications, and other information operations could encourage anti-nuclear voices in Japan, helping reduce proliferation risks.
Making the Issue Worse
Of course, there is some risk of the United States creating a greater problem. If pro-TPNW sentiment gets too strong, allied publics may be resistant to American nuclear defense. Strengthened disarmament communities may also be able to exert more pressure in the United States and other allied nations. That may exacerbate some of the problems the strategy attempts to solve. Support should be quiet and subtle, exploiting disarmament sentiment at strategically critical moments.
The United States can also counter future risks through more robust and vocal defense of the American nuclear arsenal and the value it provides for national and global security. The United States should strongly emphasize its role as a nuclear guardian for allied states and advance public defenses of the arsenal. Nuclear weapons may not ensure global peace, but they can help prevent world-scale conflicts like World War I and World War II that cost hundreds of millions of lives.
The TPNW might be almost laughably far from achieving its aim of a world free of nuclear weapons, but the disarmament views it represents still pose real risks for the United States. Disarmament sentiment may constrain American options in responding to Chinese nuclear expansion, while also serving as a wedge issue to divide NATO. But at the same time, the TPNW might offer some opportunities to strengthen American extended deterrence and accomplish larger nonproliferation goals. A regionally nuanced strategy would allow the United States to exploit the opportunities while reducing the risks.
Zachary Kallenborn is an Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident) with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed U.S. Army “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant. He has published over 60 articles in a wide range of peer-reviewed, wonky, and popular outlets, including the Brookings Institution, CSIS, Foreign Policy, Slate, DefenseOne, War on the Rocks, the Modern Institute at West Point, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Parameters. Journalists have written about and shared that research in the New York Times, the AP, NPR, the Economist, Forbes, Popular Mechanics, Politico, al Jazeera, the New Scientist, WIRED, and the BBC, among dozens of others in dozens of languages. Zachary is also on the board of advisors of the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Akron.
