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Should America Reflag Ships Heading to Ukraine?

Kirov-class Battlecruiser. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Kirov-class Battlecruiser. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

According to the Open Source Intelligence Monitor, the Russian Defense Ministry has said that, beginning July 20, it will consider any ship in the Black Sea that it believes is heading to a Ukrainian port to be a “hostile military transport.” In effect, the Kremlin wants to restrict shipping in international waters.

Fear of provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin dominates thinking in the White House, and the Biden administration’s knee-jerk reaction to Russian escalation is conciliation. But to stand down in the face of threats to international shipping will not bring stability. Rather, it could set peace back decades. 

U.S. presidents have long faced challenges to free passage in international waters. For seven decades, successive administrations have challenged attempts to restrict shipping, even resorting to military force to do so.

Reagan vs. Gaddafi

A half-century ago, Moammar Gadhafi’s regime in Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra was actually a bay and claimed its entirety as Libyan waters. During both the Nixon and Carter administrations, Libyan fighter jets harassed American surveillance aircraft in this region. Soon after taking office, President Ronald Reagan ordered a freedom of navigation operation, sending two carrier strike groups into the Gulf of Sidra. On Aug. 19, 1981, two Soviet-built Libyan Sukhoi Su-22 fighters fired on U.S. aircraft, and U.S. F-14s promptly shot them down. The 1986 film “Iron Eagle” is based on the incident. 

Following a series of Libyan-sponsored Palestinian terror attacks in Europe, Reagan sent three carrier strike groups into the Gulf of Sidra on another freedom of navigation operation. In January and February 1986, U.S. naval vessels crossed into waters Libya claimed as its own without incident. But when U.S. ships again crossed Gadhafi’s self-declared Line of Death in March 1986, Gadhafi sent corvettes and patrol boats to challenge U.S. forces while Libyan jets made mock runs at U.S. ships. In the skirmish that followed, Libya lost at least four boats. American forces destroyed several surface-to-air missile sites and wounded six Soviet technicians. Even at the height of the Cold War, Reagan did not allow the Soviet presence to deter him. All told, several dozen Libyans died. 

Just weeks before Reagan left office, Gadhafi again tried to challenge freedom of navigation. As the USS John F. Kennedy and its escorts sailed eastward toward Haifa, maintaining a distance of 120 miles from the Libyan coast, Gadhafi ordered two MiG-23 Floggers to approach the American ships. They repeatedly challenged two American F-14s escorting the carrier. As the Libyans continued to pursue the F-14s, the American pilots received authorization to fire. They downed the Libyan aircraft, presumably killing both pilots.

Reagan vs. Saddam

The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War was brutal, but it need never have extended beyond the two combatants. As the war dragged on, however, the Iranian government grew increasingly frustrated at the stalemate. Beginning in 1984, Iran launched the so-called Tanker War, using its navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to target ships believed to be heading to Iraq or its economic partners. Iranian speedboats harassed tankers and laid mines in international waterways or staging points in neighboring countries’ waters. Iranian missiles struck Kuwait, and Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles posed a constant hazard.

To protect freedom of navigation, the United States reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, believing Iran would not dare attack American ships in the same way it did those of smaller countries. In this, Reagan was wrong. On April 14, 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine forcing retaliation with Operation Praying Mantis. Reagan ordered the Navy to attack Iranian oil platforms after giving the Iranians onboard time to evacuate. Iranian leaders decided to double down on confrontation. By the end of the day, Iran had lost not only its two oil platforms, but also a frigate, a gunboat, and three speedboats. Iran avoided any direct confrontation for more than a decade. 

The United States vs. China

It is one thing to stand up to Libya or Iran, but what about near-peer competitors? 

Here, there is also precedent. President Dwight Eisenhower stared down China during two successive Taiwan Strait crises. Rather than abandon Taiwan, Eisenhower and his successors doubled down, at least until President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, decided to back down from support of Taiwan and woo the People’s Republic of China. To make the deal possible, Nixon withdrew forces from South Korea, and more from Taiwan, and ordered U.S. destroyers to stop patrolling the Taiwan Strait. Kissinger hinted at even more, suggesting to his Chinese interlocutors that the United States might abandon Taiwan entirely.

Congress would have none of it. In 1979, liberal Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) sponsored the Taiwan Relations Act, which both promised Taiwan military assistance sufficient to enable its self-defense, and also made clear to Beijing that the United States might respond militarily should China invade. The Act also defined Taiwan as not only its main island, but also the Pescadores/Penghu Islands, thereby recognizing Taiwan’s territorial waters through much of the Taiwan Strait. 

Even as China grew more powerful and aggressive, Washington held firm. In 1996, as Taiwan prepared for its first democratic presidential elections, China sought to intimidate the island, shooting missiles with dummy warheads into the Taiwan Strait to warn voters attracted to a pro-independence candidate. President Bill Clinton responded by dispatching two carrier strike groups.

Every U.S. president since has sent carrier strike groups through the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate commitment to freedom of navigation. The same holds true for the South China Sea, where the United States refuses to imbue Beijing’s fictional Nine-Dash Line with any legitimacy.

Should the United States Re-Flag Ships Heading to Ukraine?

Ukraine’s grain exports are important to feed the world. Ukraine also has every right to export its wheat. While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan purposely misread the 1936 Montreux Convention to deny NATO ships access to the Black Sea, there is no legal reason to deny naval vessels access to the body’s international waters, where they could escort third-nation shipping. Even if Erdogan does not play ball in pursuit of freedom of navigation, or seeks to extort further concessions, the United States could use its aerial presence in Romania to fly escort missions. 

Putin does not yet systematically attack international shipping in the manner that Ayatollah Khomeini once did, but should he begin to, it is time to take a cue from Reagan and offer to re-flag third-nation cargo ships heading to Ukrainian ports. Critics of aiding Ukraine might say such a move would be reckless, but it is no more reckless than defending freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. At stake is not whether a Liberia- or Micronesia-flagged tanker transits the Black Sea safely, but instead the principles that serve as the bedrock for the liberal order.

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

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Written By

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

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