President Jimmy Carter openly projected weakness. “It’s clear that the true problems of our nation are much deeper … than gasoline lines or energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or recession,” he said in his July 15, 1979 “malaise” speech. When Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 45 years ago, they did more than violate diplomatic norms. By holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, they humiliated America. In the eyes of its adversaries, America was a paper tiger. Iran, a pillar of American policy for decades, fell. Sixteen days later, an anti-monarchy and religious extremists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. For two weeks, Saudi Arabia appeared to teeter. Not long after, the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. Iran-backed insurgents challenged Bahrain, Kuwait, and Lebanon. The Islamist challenge peaked with the October 6, 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat.
American novelist Mark Twain once quipped, “History doesn’t repeat, but it often rhymes.”
Certainly, 2024 increasingly looks like 1979. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” is on the warpath, putting Suez Canal traffic at risk. Hamas seeks to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Even Ethiopia challenges law and order as it seeks to use water against Egypt, Kenya, and Somalia.
What allowed the United States and Egypt to rally and restore order in the 1980s, and what lessons does it hold for today? Personalities matter. While Carter distracted himself with minutiae, often at the expense of the broad picture, President Ronald Reagan was the opposite.
Far more important, though, were the policies Reagan embraced. Intuitively, Reagan understood that true alliances must go two ways. Relations between Washington and Cairo deepened. Egypt hosted the world’s largest U.S. Embassy, as Cairo became a hub for everything from trade to defense to aviation safety. The relationship was not one-way. Egyptian diplomats worked behind-the-scenes to protect peace and promote security across a region where extremist groups cynically used both religion and the rhetoric of democracy to destabilize societies and impose their own autocratic control. Nor was the realism of Washington’s relations with Cairo the exception. Reagan provided sophisticated AWACS early warning aircraft to Saudi Arabia while the Kingdom upgraded its military infrastructure in a manner that allowed it to host Coalition forces with little difficulty after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
While Washington and its Arab allies had differences, they respected the other’s core interests and security needs. That changed with President Barack Obama. When protests erupted first in Tunisia and then in Egypt, the United States stood on the fence. The White House ignored Egyptian warnings about the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood, preferring to listen instead to scholars from think tanks and universities, many of which Qatar funded.
Rather than stand up for allies, the White House stood down. When millions of Egyptians saw through the Muslim Brotherhood’s lies and rose up, Washington again stood on the fence. Obama acted like a gambler who wanted to see the card before placing its bet. Egyptians understood they could not rely on Washington. Saudis drew the same conclusion after Joe Biden himself targeted Saudi leaders with little understanding of the security issues at stake.
Unfortunately, Biden ignores history. Iran’s shah long had America’s back, but Carter cast him aside like garbage to pursue ties with Tehran’s theocrats. The result was the hostage crisis and terror.
Biden’s mistake today is equally consequential. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly embraces the Muslim Brotherhood if not theocracy, Biden seeks to engage with Turkey as if nothing is new. He fails to understand that Erdogan seeks to export revolution every bit as much as Ayatollah Khomeini did and Ayatollah Khamenei does. The White House fails to recognize that Ankara 2024 is Tehran 1979.
The Middle East is most secure, stable, and peaceful when the United States works in tandem with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. What was true in the 1980s remains true today. Restoring partnership requires Washington respect its allies and their interests, not seek middle ground with those in Ankara, Addis Ababa, or Tehran.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
