China: Under Force Design 2030, the U.S. Marine Corps is shifting from a “second land army” to a maritime-focused force, divesting its tank battalions to prioritize amphibious and island-hopping operations against near-peer threats like China.
-This strategy leverages light infantry and advanced missile systems while relying on the Army for follow-on heavy armor support. Critics argue the lack of organic tanks could hinder the Marines’ ability to seize or defend urban terrain, especially in contested environments.
-Effective joint training with the Army remains crucial to address gaps in amphibious capabilities and ensure readiness for future operations against advanced adversaries.
Marines vs. Tanks: Exploring the Force Design 2030 Dilemma
In 2020, the US Marine Corps announced it would implement a 10-year plan to forego its “second land army” focus and return to its maritime legacy.
In his Force Design 2030 plan, the then Marine Corps Commandant, General David Berger, said, “We must first divest of legacy programs in order to generate the resources needed to invest in future capabilities.”
“Army is huge,” Berger said. “We need a big Army. They win our wars. The Marine Corps doesn’t win the wars. We win the battles.”
As part of preparing for a potential conflict with near-peer China, the USMC will focus on amphibious, island-hopping scenarios and has divested itself of its tank battalions.
Marines Have A Long Legacy With Tanks
Despite its image of a light infantry-based force conducting amphibious operations, the Marines have long had organic armor units. They first conducted tests with armor in the 1920s.
During WWII’s first offensive operation at Guadalcanal in 1942, the Marines had light Stuart tanks supporting the operation. The USMC used tank support on future invasions at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc. Korea, Vietnam, and the latest combat operations during the GWOT saw Marine armor being used against our enemies.
At the time of the divesture of its organic armor, the Marines had 452 tanks, of which 323 were quickly transferred to the Army. However, the decision to divest of tanks was made before Russia invaded Ukraine.
3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division sends the first round downrange with the U.S. Army’s new M1A2 SEPV3 Abrams Main Battle Tank, Fort Hood, Texas, August 18, 2020. After the GREYWOLF brigade conducts a test fire on every tank they will dial in their sites by “zeroing” the tanks main gun, ensuring they are fully prepared to conduct future gunnery live fire exercises.
Despite the massive armor losses on both sides, the tank is still essential to the force structure.
How the New Strategy Is Supposed to Work
In the current strategy, the Marines will land with a light infantry force, and if armor is needed, the Army will land tanks in follow-on landings to support the Marine infantry. Built-up cities on every island that could be a potential conflict zone will require clearing or defending.
Can a light infantry force defend or seize terrain from an entrenched enemy force in an urban area without tank support? Yes, but at a significantly higher casualty rate.
The Marines have been eliminating their towed artillery units and replacing them with expanded rocket and missile batteries. This makes sense since a towed artillery battery is very vulnerable on today’s battlefields.
The Marines are acutely aware of the drone threat that would decimate infantry units and any attached armor that would be included in post-modern amphibious operations of the future. And right now, the airspace above the infantry is in doubt.
M1 Abrams Tank firing. Image: Creative Commons.
The Marine Air Defense Integrated System is a great platform but isn’t deployed in enough numbers to support all of the infantry on the ground.
A bigger question would be whether the Army could support a Marine major amphibious operation. Such an operation would require the two forces to train together to work out all the bugs earlier rather than later. The Army doesn’t train its armor for amphibious operations, and neither the Marines nor the Army has the training or doctrine to conduct joint amphibious operations in the way the DoD envisions them. This must be corrected.
Solutions To Issues Aren’t Simple
Landing heavy armor of the Army isn’t easy. The M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tank is not an amphibious tank. They have “deep water wading kits” in the inventory that allow it to go ashore in six feet of water. Its weight limits the number of tanks the LSTs can carry. The new M10 Booker is about half the weight of the SEPv3 Abrams (about 40 tons) but is not amphibious and doesn’t have a deep water wading kit, so it would be required to land on dry ground on the beach.
The Marines should have kept at least some of their armored battalions if only in a reserve unit, to keep an organic armor unit readily at their disposal in case such a need arises that will need to force potential adversaries (PLA) from a beach.
A live fire demonstration of the Army’s newest and most modernized combat vehicle, the M10 Booker, marks the conclusion of the M10 Booker Dedication Ceremony at Aberdeen Proving Ground, in Aberdeen, Md., April 18, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Christopher Kaufmann)
In the meantime, the Army and USMC should be doing much more joint training in amphibious operations. Otherwise, they will be unprepared for future conflicts with near-peer adversaries.
About the Author:
Steve Balestrieri is a 19FortyFive National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing for 19FortyFive, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in other military publications.
