“Big Change” is upon us, and the rate is accelerating. We must adapt quickly and comprehensively throughout our national security enterprise, including the defense industrial sector. We must learn to be comfortable with continuous change by leading it.
The Challenges in Asia
Asia is home to the biggest challenge to US national defense policy, strategy, and operational concepts.
Our allies primarily form the First Island Chain fronting on the East and South China Seas.
War with China or Russia is not unlikely; it can happen at any time and includes the potential for a near-term major war.
We are in a period of rapid, accelerating, profound changes in geopolitics, economics, and technology, mainly with weapons technology.
We have work to do in our defense industrial base. We are no longer the arsenal of democracy. We had to appeal to our allies to supply Ukraine with artillery ammunition because we could not produce it in the quantities needed.
The era of unchallenged air and sea superiority is most assuredly over, as shown by China’s massive dredging and building project in the international waters of the South China Sea.
Our armed forces must adapt quickly to the new realities of ubiquitous, pervasive surveillance and high-speed weapons accurate at a distance.
We survived “Big Change” before, particularly in Asia. It might be helpful to look back at what we did then and find lessons for today.
Lessons from History
As is well known, throughout WW II in the Pacific, we emphatically validated our pre-war operational concept of seizing control of the seas and the air above.
Ironically, the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the signing of the surrender documents on the deck of the USS Missouri meant that our WW II strategic concept was no longer meaningful or convincing to the public.
The United States Navy possessed the largest fleet in its history and had less reason to maintain as significant a fleet as ever. The fifteen battleships, one hundred aircraft carriers, seventy cruisers, three hundred and fifty destroyers, over one hundred amphibious ships, and two hundred submarines of the United States Navy floated in virtual solitary splendor upon the earth’s waters.
Critics were not slow to declare the Navy finished.
One general remarked: “To maintain a five-ocean navy to fight a no-ocean opponent … is a foolish waste of time, men, and resources.”
Another: “Why should we have a Navy at all? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force.”
Things did not entirely turn out as the angry generals recommended. And we did get many things right in this turbulent post-war era. NSC-68, a remarkably short document by today’s standards at 58 pages, set forth a comprehensive strategy and theory of victory for the Cold War emerging from the turbulence of the late 1940s. Presented to President Truman in
Post-War Events
April of 1950, it described possible policy choices: a return to isolation, war, continued diplomatic and negotiating efforts, or “the rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” The last choice aligned with the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement.
While leadership was pondering the choices, North Korea’s Kim IL Sung, with Soviet backing, invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had not been part of our security planning, but President Truman, fearing the potential precedent for Europe of a loss of Korea to naked Communist aggression, promptly responded.
In a “no plan” environment, while demobilizing, reorganizing, and struggling with roles and missions for the services, US forces responded as best they could. US forces deployed to Korea from Japan and the United States. We charged a famous commander, Douglas MacArthur, who was “too big to fail” in today’s jargon, with the mission. The new United Nations resolved to join the fight with forces drawn from 16 countries, thanks to the absence of the Soviet representative and his veto when the issue was decided.
As is well known, the first months of the war included more than a few near-run engagements as we struggled to avoid being ejected from the Asian mainland by an army that did not exist on VJ Day in 1945. We committed to something new and unexpected, a “limited war” with limited aims underneath a nuclear threat less than five years from demanding “unconditional surrender” from our enemies.
We reversed our occupation policy with Japan. We realized that a successful Japan was needed to resist Communist pressure. Out was the goal of total Japanese disarmament. It was the gradual emergence of an armed Japanese Self-Defense Force from the national police. We signed the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan in San Francisco in 1951. Among other things, this formally ended our post-war occupation of Japan, save for Okinawa Prefecture, where the US remained the occupying power until 1972. The long-lasting military alliance between the United States and Japan began.
We also became comfortable operating from our offshore sanctuaries, particularly Japan. Our unchallenged air and sea superiority was exploited from both a mobile naval presence offshore coupled with power projection and sustainment from a safe Japan. North Korea and China had no ability to project power seaward, and the sea and air were secure maneuver space for the US. Japan’s sanctuary role led to its designation as the formal home of the UN Command Rear. Seven bases in Japan still fly the UN flag along with Japanese and American flags, signaling the UN’s continued commitment.
In short order, exploiting sea and air control from a mobile seabase and offshore sanctuaries became a key strategic and operational concept and the foundation of our influence, policy, strategy, and operations in the Western Pacific. This advantage served us well in the last century.
But now this is under threat. Ubiquitous, pervasive surveillance coupled with high-speed weapons accurate at great distances threatens the territory, infrastructure, and lives of our allies, as well as our forces at sea and ashore.
The current environment is not a checkmate but cannot be left unattended. It demands a comprehensive response across our government and industry like that created in response to “Big Change” in the previous era. Can we do that again?
About the Author: Wallace C. Gregson
Wallace C. Gregson served as a former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2009-11) and is currently a senior advisor at Avascent International. Gregson last served as the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Bases, Pacific, headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. He is a senior advisor to General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems.
