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Drone War in Ukraine: Bombers, Kamikaze Strikes and Dogfights in the Sky

Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
Switchblade Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.

Key Points and Summary: A new era of warfare is unfolding in Ukraine, where small drones dominate the skies in battles reminiscent of WWI’s early air combat.

-These inexpensive and versatile machines have transformed tactics, from kamikaze-style attacks to sophisticated AI-driven interceptors.

-Ukraine’s FPV drones counter Russia’s reconnaissance fleet, significantly disrupting artillery operations. The war also highlights the rapid evolution of drone technology, including armed drones and drone escorts. With over 1.2 million drones fielded by Ukraine last year, traditional airpower faces unprecedented challenges.

-This drone revolution, still in its infancy, signals a dramatic shift in modern combat and the importance of drone superiority.

Air War 2.0: How Small Drones Fight

A new type of air war is unfolding in Ukraine, one with curious echoes of WW1 and the early days of air combat. It is a battle of drone versus drone, with tactics and technology for attack and defense evolving fast. It is happening in a parallel universe to traditional air warfare, a space where existing weapons have been unable to reach.

Victory in this sphere will have insurmountable significance – greater perhaps than winning air superiority in previous wars. 

Air War Beneath the Jets 

In 2017, the Allies completely dominated the sky over Mosul during the operation to retake the city from ISIS militants. The United States Air Force A-10 Warthogs, Navy F/A-18s, and Marine Corps Harriers provided close air support while B-52 Stratofortresses delivered bombs from high altitude, collectively hitting up to 500 targets a week in the most intense phase of an air campaign against ISIS. 

Simultaneously, allied forces on the ground were coming under an air attack.

ISIS was among the first groups to weaponize small consumer quadcopters, turning them into bombers dropping grenades and other small munitions. These were not used effectively and lacked anti-armor capability, but they caused casualties and delays among the attacking forces. At times, there were as many as a dozen ISIS drones in operation, and according to one BBC correspondent, bombs “fell like rain.” 

“This last year’s most daunting problem was an adaptive enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available drones,” Gen. Raymond Thomas told a Special Operations Forces Industry Conference.

US air defense systems were designed to tackle jets, helicopters, cruise missiles, and other large and fast-moving threats. Small, slow-moving aerial objects were of no interest, and radar systems usually filter out such objects as they are assumed to be birds. 

Surface-to-air missiles, like the 1500-pound Mach 2 Pac-3 Patriot, can take out the most agile, high-performance aircraft even at extreme altitudes. But a Patriot is an impractical weapon for shooting down a $2,000 drone. And while an F-35 can shoot down small quadcopters, it will quickly run out of AIM-9X SideWinder missiles costing $2 million each. Even shoulder-fired Stinger missiles are in short supply and can cost $500k a shot. 

Air War Ukraine

With hindsight, the proliferation of drones that are too numerous, too small, or too low for conventional air defenses would present a massive challenge. The challenges of battling drones has proven to be a new dynamic in Ukraine. While there are some instances of drones being shot down by missiles, SAMs are generally conserved for more valuable targets.

Drones have given rise to a new form of air war. It was inevitable that drones from the two sides would cross paths, and the first ever ‘drone dogfight’ was recorded in October 2022. An unarmed Ukrainian Mavic reconnaissance drone tackled and brought down its Russian counterpart.

Lancet Drone. Image Credit: Russian State Media.

Lancet Drone. Image Credit: Russian State Media.

When an enemy drone is an imminent threat, for example, directing artillery fire, an operator might decide to sacrifice their own machine by crashing into the opposing drone and destroying both. But skilled pilots soon developed more sophisticated tactics. 

Drones have rotors on top, and their cameras point downwards. The ideal approach is to come from above, taking advantage of the enemy’s blind spot, and descend rapidly. The attacking drone’s body strikes the target’s whirling rotor blades. At least one blade will break and send the enemy drone spinning out of control to the ground, leaving the attacking drone undamaged.

Numerous such encounters followed, and both sides soon started work on dedicated interceptors. The Russians used their drones against Ukraine’s ‘Baba Yaga’ night bomber platform, while Ukraine set their sights much higher. 

The Fixed Wing Threat

During this conflict, Russia has relied on its massive advantage in heavy artillery to pound Ukrainian positions. In recent months, the bombardment has been supplemented with hundreds of precision-guided glide bombs tossed from outside the range of air defenses, plus strikes with Lancet loitering munitions.  

Such attacks all rely on precise intelligence about the positions of Ukrainian forces provided by ubiquitous drones. Russia has a mixed fleet of Orlan-10 and -30, ZALA, SuperCam drones, and others. Each type is typically assigned a specific role guiding airstrikes, artillery, or loitering munitions. The most common is the Orlan-10, which has a wingspan of 10 feet and a flight endurance of more than 12 hours. 

Up until last summer, these platforms were able to operate freely in Russian-controlled airspace from where they could overlook Ukrainian positions. 

Then, Ukraine started deploying interceptors. Ukraine uses FPV drones for this action. These drones are derived from high-speed racing quadcopters and are extensively used to attack tanks and other ground targets. With enhanced batteries and, crucially, a system that allowed air-defense radar to hand off the location of air targets to drone operators, a whole new type of warfare began.

At first, a few, then dozens, and then hundreds of videos were released on social media showing the intercept process. The FPV homes in on the reconnaissance drone’s position and approaches from above and behind, matching speed and vector and slowly moving into kill range. When close enough, the FPV operator detonates a shrapnel warhead, destroying both drones.

The interceptors cost $750 each compared to over $100k for a fixed-wing recon drone, so the exchange is more than worthwhile. More importantly, taking out these drones blinds Russian commanders. Artillery and other long-range systems become useless when they cannot see a target. Between August and September, when the intercept campaign took effect, strikes by Russian Lancet loitering munitions dropped from 180 to 81 and remained low. 

Harop Suicide Drone

Harop Suicide Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.

Evolution In Fast Forward on Drones

Seeing their drones repeatedly taken out, the Russians took action. Unlike larger and more complex systems, these weapons evolve fast, which cannot be modified quickly and easily.

One simple development was fitting the reconnaissance drones with a rear-facing camera. This addition can be something as simple as a cellphone camera. Still, it gives the drone pilot situational awareness and allows the pilot to take evasive action when they see an FPV coming. The added rear camera makes it more challenging for the interceptor pilot. If the target dodges long enough, the FPV will run out of battery power, as they only have 20 minutes or so of flight time. However, skilled interceptor pilots can still make the kill

Another approach is fitting the recon drones with radio-frequency jammers. These detect the signal from an incoming FPV, lock, and broadcast noise to break the link with the operator. This strategy may succeed, but the need for the recon drone itself to maintain a video link and control signal limits its effectiveness. 

Both sides have also developed net launchers, which, unlike an explosive charge, can be fired without damaging the drone that launches the net. There are no confirmed cases of Russian drones armed with rear-firing net guns, but designs have been discussed on Russian Telegram channels. Another proposal, not yet seen, is to trail long wires or streamers behind a drone to tangle the rotor blades of an approaching attacker.

The interceptor platforms are also evolving fast. While the initial version was essentially a repurposed ground-attack FPV, new designs are emerging. Ukrainian nonprofit drone makers Wild Hornets are already fielding a new type called Sting, a highly aerodynamic, bullet-shaped interceptor. A similar design, used to film Formula 1 racing, can reach over 200 mph. 

With Sting, Wild Hornets want to extend the capability to bring down not just reconnaissance drones but also the larger Iranian-designed Shahid drones, which are hitting Ukraine on a high basis. In addition, Ukrainian FPV operators have already downed several Russian helicopters, but this takes a lot of luck as helicopters are so much faster. High-speed interceptors make such kills far more likely.

A Russian tank under attack by a drone from Ukraine. Image Credit: YouTube/Ukrainian military.

A Russian tank under attack by a drone from Ukraine. Image Credit: YouTube/Ukrainian military.

A recent Wild Hornets video shows the air launch of one of its interceptors. The group makes the Queen Hornet, a giant FPV drone with a 15-pound payload able to carry other drones and act as a flying radio relay. This technique allows operators to position a carrier in a region where enemy air activity is expected and only launch the interceptor drones when needed.  

Interceptors have scored kills as high as 12,000 feet, an achievement likely made possible with air launch. 

In another development, in late December, a video was released of a Ukrainian drone with a shotgun-type weapon blasting Russian quadcopters out of the sky. Such armament may become standard for interceptors and defensive mounts for larger drones, just as machine guns became standard on all combat aircraft during WW1.  

Russia also appears to be developing more advanced interceptors, like the Vogan-9SP, which have not yet appeared in action.

Tactics are also evolving. We are already seeing cases of drone escorts, both for large drones and for ground units – one video from January 7th shows a Russian FPV providing cover for a tank and intercepting a drone bomber before it attacks.

Future Conflicts 

It is tempting to assume that this will evolve into a WWII pattern, with packages of attack drones and fighter escorts being met by squadrons of interceptors or fighter sweeps across enemy territory to establish superiority. However, history does not repeat itself exactly. Things could be very different even in a year. 

The other central question is where this leaves traditional airpower. Again, it might be natural to believe that in the next war, crewed aviation will continue as before. But the proliferation of large numbers of small armed or explosive hazards at up to 12,000 feet – Ukraine fielded more than 1.2 million drones last year – may keep aircraft and helicopters well back from the combat zone. 

Bayraktar TB2 Drone. Image Credit: Ukraine Military.

Bayraktar TB2 of the Ukrainian Air Force.

Finally, it is important to stress that the situation is evolving fast. Dedicated interceptor drones have been around for less than a year. In aviation terms, we may be in 1916, with significant developments ahead that will make the next generation unrecognizable. The most important limitations of small drones are the need for a link to the pilot and the pilot’s dogfighting skills. AI systems already fielded on a small scale in Ukraine remove these limitations. Expect smart, agile, autonomous fighters working in coordinated teams.

The drone war has become a key aspect of ground combat. Whoever gains superiority wins a massive advantage: with drone superiority, they can see and strike the enemy, who cannot see or strike them. Hopefully, Pentagon analysts are paying close attention. Russia may be behind Ukraine, but they have a big head start on the rest of the world, and China, the world’s largest producer of small drones, is learning how to put its capability to military use. 

About the Author: David Hambling 

David Hambling is a London-based journalist, author and consultant specializing in defense technology with over 20 years’ experience. He writes for Aviation Week, Forbes, The Economist, New Scientist, Popular Mechanics, WIRED and others. His books include “Weapons Grade: How Modern Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-tech World” (2005) and “Swarm Troopers: How small drones will conquer the world” (2015). He has been closely watching the continued evolution of small military drones. Follow him on X: @David_Hambling.

Written By

David Hambling is a London-based journalist, author and consultant specializing in defense technology with over 20 years of experience. He writes for Aviation Week, Forbes, The Economist, New Scientist, Popular Mechanics, WIRED and others. His books include “Weapons Grade: How Modern Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-tech World” (2005) and “Swarm Troopers: How small drones will conquer the world” (2015). He has been closely watching the continued evolution of small military drones. Follow him @David_Hambling. 

2 Comments

2 Comments

  1. Zhduny

    January 15, 2025 at 8:23 am

    For sure, drones (and UAVs) have been heavily used in the ukraine conflict, but their usage first made significant impact during the 2020 nargono-karabakh war.

    During that 2020 war, azerbaijani forces made full use of drones supplied by turkey to defeat their adversaries.

    That victory paved the way for the eventual conquest of the whole of nargono-karabakh by azerbaijan in 2023.

    Today, in the ongoing ukraine conflict, the use of drones has been rather overshadowed by the glaring failure of either side to use city-busting weapons.

    If such weapons had been employed in feb 2022, the vicious fighting would have been over right there and then.

    But that never happened.

    That glaring failure which has resulted in endless & fruitless combat and very heavy casualty tolls is a good lesson for those whose heads have been painted with huge large massive bullseyes.

    Never ever do play play. Always go straight away FOR THE KILL !!!

  2. Jim

    January 15, 2025 at 7:36 pm

    It’s something.

    I’m watching.

    The whole World is watching.

    Everybody better catch up.

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