Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force faces significant development and programmatic challenges. A test launch failure of Russia’s newest and most capable ICBM, the RS-28, also known as the Sarmat, in September of last year highlights numerous issues with Russian ICBM modernization. However, Moscow’s nuclear deterrent capability remains formidable and ICBMs are of particular importance to their nuclear force. The recent test launch failure is a clear indication of the declining state of Russia’s ability to develop and field an advanced ICBM capability.
RS-28 Sarmat ICBM Challenge
The RS-28 Sarmat ICBM was developed to replace the aging RS-18 Satan ICBM which currently deploys about one-third of all Russian land-based warheads. Russia has historically deployed more nuclear warheads on ICBMs rather than sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
The Sarmat ICBM is designed to provide Russia with an intercontinental capability to deliver up to 10 large, independently targetable nuclear warheads or 16 smaller ones and hypersonic glide vehicles. This massive liquid-fueled ICBM tips the scales with a launch weight of over 200 tons and towers nearly 115 feet. The Sarmat is the Kremlin’s crown jewel in its nuclear arsenal as Putin hyped this missile as a game-changer that could deploy nuclear warheads at hypersonic speeds that no current missile defense capability could stop.
However, the rollout of this missile has been beset by problems and has only one successful flight test to its credit in April of 2022. At least one other test launch resulted in failure while other scheduled test launches were cancelled. The imagery of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, home of the Sarmat test launch site, indicates the most recent planned test launch attempt in September of 2024 failed in spectacular fashion. The test site revealed massive destruction likely caused by either an explosion inside the missile silo or just after launch.
As expected, the Kremlin has been tight-lipped about the incident.
Russia’s ICBM Forces At a Crossroads
This is a significant setback for Russia’s ICBM force. The RS-18 ICBM, originally fielded in the late 1970s, has already exceeded its original service life and several life extensions to keep it on alert. At one point, the Kremlin stated it would begin deploying the Sarmat in 2018, but encountered repeated delays.
Finally, in September of 2023, Russia declared the Sarmat operational despite only one successful test launch. This overly ambitious deployment schedule was driven by the RS-18 rapidly nearing the end of its service life with some reports indicating all missiles will need to be replaced by 2027. This is a notable departure from Russia’s missile development playbook as previous versions of the RS-18 were tested dozens of times before being declared operational.
The Ukraine War Impact
The lack of flight tests raises significant questions about the full capability of the missile as well as its reliability. Putin himself attempted to downplay Sarmat’s development issues when he essentially stated the missile had passed “relevant checks” and merely some “administrative procedures” that could be accomplished in short order stood in the way of mass production. However, the catastrophic failure at Plesetsk is further evidence of Russia’s ICBM production and development problems since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine stopped all cooperation on missile engine development and maintenance with Russia. Russia’s state space agency responsible for overseeing missile development and production, Roscosmos, and its subcontractors have been under crippling U.S. sanctions since 2014. These sanctions, coupled with the cancellation of international contracts following the invasion of Ukraine, has put Roscosmos in financial distress.
This put Moscow in quite a bind as there are but two remaining missile developers in Russia, and neither have extensive experience with liquid-fuel ICBMs. Lacking access to equipment and technology from the West, Roscosmos is facing severe production delays, a shortage of qualified experts, and technical problems with Sarmat’s first stage. Additionally, the overall design of the Sarmat has contributed to its development problems. According to some experts, the Sarmat’s booster casing weighs less than a traditional liquid-fueled rocket and the first stage engine employs a complicated propulsion design for optimal acceleration. This increased acceleration appears to in response to U.S. missile defense capabilities as a shorter boost phase could conceivably complicate detection and interception.
What Will Russia Do Next?
Russia has bet big on the Sarmat as a viable replacement for the RS-18, and further delays could have significant ramifications for Russia’s land-based nuclear force. Should the Sarmat not be able to fully replace the RS-18 before its eventual retirement, Russia will likely have to get creative in keeping warhead parity with the United States. It is not an easy task as it would require pulling nuclear warheads out of storage and potentially uploading them to other existing missile systems. This seriously complicates Russia’s goal of maintaining the ability to respond after absorbing a first-strike should the RS-18 be retired without a proven land-based replacement.
Given the myriad issues currently plaguing the Sarmat, it would appear the Kremlin is leaning heavily on the speculative rather than proven capabilities of the Sarmat to glean some deterrent value from it.
MAY 9, 2018: An RS-24 Yars mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system rolls down Moscow’s Red Square during a Victory Day military parade marking the 73rd anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War, the Eastern Front of World War II. Sergei Bobylev/TASS.
To be fair, the U.S. is also dealing with its own issues with nuclear modernization but those mostly deal with cost overruns, supply chain issues and schedule slips. However, these problems pale in comparison to Russia’s woes. While Russia appears to be on its heels with fielding the Sarmat, it still maintains a capable nuclear force and there should be no debate about continuing to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad to maintain a credible deterrent against an increasingly desperate Russia.
Additionally, at this tense moment in history, in concert with U.S. nuclear modernization efforts, keeping lines of communication open with Russia, such as the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, is crucial. This 1988 agreement requires notification between the U.S. and Russia before any ICBM or SLBM test launch and was designed to maintain transparency and reduce the risk of misinterpretation.
Thankfully, it seems the Kremlin still thinks avoiding miscalculation is important, as evidenced when they notified the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Center, prior to launching an intermediate range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile against the city of Dnipro in Ukraine. The prior notification is the only silver lining to glean out of that scenario, but the U.S. should exploit any attempt to avoid nuclear escalation.
RS-28 Sarmat ICBM test.
Additionally, even though diplomacy between Moscow and Washington has been severely limited since the invasion of Ukraine, former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated the U.S. “has the capacity to speak directly at senior levels” to Russian officials. The Trump administration would be wise to maintain that capability.
About the Author: Dana Struckman
Dana Struckman is a retired Air Force Colonel and a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. He was a missile launch officer on active duty and commanded an intercontinental ballistic missile squadron at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota. The views expressed here are solely those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.
