The Russian Navy Is Getting Kicked Out Of Its Tartus Naval Base in Syria

Key Points and Summary: Russia’s forced exit from its Tartus naval base in Syria presents a strategic opportunity for the United States.

-While the new Syrian government may be no better than Assad, losing the base hampers Russia’s ability to project power in the Mediterranean.

-This situation highlights a broader point: the global landscape of military bases is constantly shifting.

-Instead of simply expanding its own presence, the US should consider strategies to encourage the closure of adversaries’ bases or even take them over when opportunities arise.

-This approach can enhance American influence while potentially reducing the need for direct military intervention and promoting a more stable global order.

What Russia’s Exit from its Tartus Syrian Naval Base Should Teach the United States

The Syrian government under Ahmed al-Sharaa and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham may very well prove itself as bad as the Assad regime it replaces, but its decision to revoke the Russian lease over its naval base in Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartus is a net positive for the United States. An American effort to take over the Russian lease could be an even greater positive.

True, President Donald Trump won election promising to be discerning about U.S. dispatch of forces abroad. Trump argues and most Americans agree that the United States has too willingly deployed U.S. forces abroad without regard to legality or broader wisdom. Growing near-peer competition encouraged America’s expanding footprint and created a self-propelling dynamic: Russia and China expanded their presence abroad, justifying expansion of American presence.

Rather than simply engage in a base race to expand presence, perhaps a better focus for the age of Trump would be either compelling the closure of competitors’ bases obviating the need for more robust U.S. presence or simply taking over their strategic landscape. After all, what better way to acquire a base than for free?

And while the public does not want U.S. forces engaged in war, filling vacuums make the likelihood of conflict less likely. Deterrence requires deployment, while withdrawal encourages adversaries.

Russia Lost a Key Naval Base in Syria: Why Tartus Matters

The Russian history at Tartus reflects the ups and downs of Russian power. In 1967, the Soviet Union formed the 5th Mediterranean Squadron both to counterbalance the U.S. Sixth Fleet operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and to support Soviet ambitions in Egypt. The Russian Navy briefly exited the Mediterranean after the Soviet Union’s collapse, but Russian President Vladimir Putin created a 16-ship Mediterranean task force in May 2013, basing it in Tartus. Russia’s current exit from the Eastern Mediterranean, at least temporarily, makes the region far safer. Russian warships can still ply its waters, but sustained operations will be difficult absent any nearby logistical hub.

Tartus and the Khmeimim Air Base were Russia’s only remaining bases outside the borders of the former Soviet Union, with Russia’s base in Cuba closed in 2002 and its Vietnam base shuttered two years after that. Russia still seeks bases in Sudan and Eritrea, but these remain largely on the drawing board. Indeed, whenever the Russians appear close to landing a base deal on the Red Sea, astute diplomacy and funds channeled through Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates sways Sudanese and Eritrean officials away from any lease. 

Nor is Tartus the first base Russians have lost. The Soviets built the Berbera airfield and deepwater port in the mid-1970s, only to lose them when later that decade, Somalia flipped sides in the Cold War.

What History Teaches 

Transfers of bases are more common than many Americans realize. Italy built the Mellaha Field just east of Tripoli, Libya, in 1923. The Italians and German Luftwaffe used it during their North Africa campaign until the British occupied Libya. Recast Wheelus Air Force Base, it was a Cold War mainstay for U.S forces in the Mediterranean until Libyan leader threw the Americans out in 1970.

The United States lost the base it built at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam to the Soviets after North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam. The following year, the U.S. Navy was the beneficiary of shifting geopolitical winds when the British left Bahrain, turning its base over to the United States; today, Bahrain hosts the 5th fleet in a facility the British built. The Taliban now controls U.S. bases in Afghanistan up to and including Bagram Airfield, and may lease the facility to China. 

China also expands its presence elsewhere. The People’s Liberation Army- Navy built its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2017, which China has leveraged to interfere with U.S. forces and to hamper regional security. It has fired lasers as American pilots, for example, and allegedly supplied weaponry to the Houthis in exchange for immunity from attacks on Chinese shipping.

Americans can celebrate Russia’s loss in Syria, but a Russian victory tomorrow or American loss elsewhere could blunt any advantage the West gains or disadvantage the Kremlin suffers. Dominant powers rise and fall acquiring and losing bases as their fortunes change. 

The questions for American strategists are three-fold: First, how can the United States compel states to shutter adversaries’ bases. A new Syrian government gave Russia the boot. Is there anything short of regime change in Djibouti that can do the same trick with the Chinese? Second, how can the United States prevent adversaries from seizing existing or moribund bases? Russia left its Lourdes SIGINT station in Cuba in 2002.

Will China Take the Base in Syria? 

What policy exists to prevent China from, now moving in? Trump may focus rightly on the challenges China poses in the Panama Canal, but a Chinese base off Florida’s coast could be even more threatening. Finally, what calculations exist to gauge the merits of U.S. bases. Seeking a lease in Berbera, Somaliland makes ticks in all the strategic boxes. So too does Guam. Maintaining bases in Qatar and Turkey, however, bring significant costs in terms of immunizing host regimes that undermine stability throughout the region. While the U.S. long ago abandoned its bases in the Philippines, Chinese regional aggression merits reconsidering that decision. 

210624-N-BR419-1091 INDIAN OCEAN (June 24, 2021) The U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), steams in the Indian Ocean. Ronald Reagan, the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 5, provides a combat-ready force that protects and defends the United States, as well as the collective maritime interests of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Oswald Felix Jr.)

Too often, the Pentagon approaches U.S. global presence haphazardly and approaches its adversaries’ basing map as if immutable. Both attitudes are wrong. If Trump’s defense team really wish to challenge bureaucratic group think and tunnel vision, it might start by plotting adversaries withdrawal and a much more deliberate strategy for U.S. basing abroad.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The author’s views are his own.