Once seen as an absolute certainty, an initiative to deliver U.S. submarines to Australia as part of the AUKUS partnership is in doubt.
With the United States eyeing a potential showdown with China in the Indo-Pacific, American policy planners and shipbuilders are feeling the pinch of increased demand that the available resources cannot match.
That imbalance has led to doubts about whether the United States will deliver the submarines it has promised to Australia.
As a result, some Australians have expressed renewed interest in the modified Suffren-class submarines that French shipbuilder Naval Group proposed to build as a replacement for the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class subs.
The Suffren-class, with its diesel engines, would have fulfilled Australia’s requirements for a long-endurance, conventionally powered class of submarines that could effectively patrol in the shallow littoral waters to Australia’s north, as well as provide an offensive presence in deeper, remote waters throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
The Land Down Under
In a decision that garnered significant attention at the time, Australia reneged on the proposal to buy into the Suffren-class program as an alternative to the Collins-class.
Australia’s current fleet of submarines entered service between 1996 and 2003. While the vessels were initially intended to remain in service for 30 years, upgrades to the submarines’ sonar and batteries, as well as to its combat systems, aim to extend their service significantly, possibly until the early 2040s.
The conventionally powered diesel submarines are designed for long-range patrols in the Indo-Pacific. Though their large size and endurance help achieve that operational requirement, the Collins submarines must surface periodically, or sail at snorkel depth, in order to recharge their batteries—a distinct limitation compared to nuclear-powered submarines that do not need to surface.
The submarines face significant challenges: Propulsion failures, excess noise, and other issues have plagued them. These issues are the main reasons the Royal Australian Navy sought a replacement.
The Australians were in advanced discussions with the French for a modified Suffren-class design. The design, which was essentially a smaller version of the original, was provisionally called the Attack-class.
Australian requirements specified that the Collins replacement would need to have long endurance for navigating Australia’s enormous coastline, as well as the long, empty wastes of the Indo-Pacific. The replacement submarines were also proposed to have anti-ship and land-attack capabilities, in addition to conventional torpedo armaments.
The AUKUS About-face
It came as a surprise to the French when, in late 2021, Australia canceled plans with Naval Group, the French firm behind the Attack-class design. Then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison explained that Australian requirements had shifted.
The nation’s navy required nuclear propulsion for its greater endurance and its ability to keep vessels submerged for the entirety of their patrols.
The United Kingdom and the United States, along with Australia, announced the tripartite AUKUS partnership on the same day.
However, questions about the United States’ ability to deliver on its part of the AUKUS agreement, which would initially see American-built submarines enter Royal Australian Navy service, have prompted discussions about renewed cooperation with Naval Group for their modified Suffren-class subs.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s nominee for policy head at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, recently urged Australia to bump its defense spending to 3 percent of GDP. But Colby also warned that the United States is in the midst of “a very difficult problem” getting three Virginia-class nuclear submarines to Australia on time, thanks to longer-than-anticipated submarine-production timetables.
Early last month, Australia paid $500 million to the United States; the first payment of $3 billion in total the country is committed to invest in U.S. shipbuilders.
Speaking at a nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Colby emphasized how, in his mind, providing American submarines to Australia should not be allowed to compromise the U.S. Navy’s capabilities.
“So if we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed, then great,” Colby said. “But if we can’t, [supplying Australia] becomes a very difficult problem because we don’t want our servicemen and women to be in a weaker position and more vulnerable and, God forbid, worse because they are not in the right place in the right time.”
In August, Colby tweeted that “AUKUS is a great example. In principle it’s a great idea. But I’ve been very skeptical in practice. I remain skeptical—agnostic as I put it… but more inclined based on new information I’ve gleaned. It would be crazy to have fewer SSNs in the right place and time.”
Here Comes the Suffren-Class?
While the AUKUS program is still sailing ahead for now, it faces potential squalls in the future. Much hinges on the ability of American shipbuilders to manufacture submarines for the U.S. Navy as well as the Royal Australian Navy, and to do it in time and on budget.
Injections of Australian cash will certainly help shipbuilders reach this goal, but the pacing question is whether these will be enough.
If not, Australia may well opt for something more readily available, and in that case, Naval Group’s Suffren-class submarines will resurface as strong contenders to replace the aged Collins-class.
About the Author: Caleb Larson
Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.

John
March 14, 2025 at 10:00 pm
Why not get the French nuclear powered sub?
Matt
March 15, 2025 at 3:27 am
It’s my understanding in the high ranking ADF and RAN circles that it’s the full SSN Suffren class, not the conventionally powered attack submarines that Australia has one eye open for.
The reasoning for this is firstly, the latest defence white paper recommends SSN’s. Secondly France can produce the SSN quicker and cheaper with far less risk than the Attack class submarine, obviously because they have not built one yet.
Lastly it seems that the Australian public and politicians are warming to the idea of SSN’s on Australian shores. Yes there’s still some resistance and backlash but that mostly comes down to the costs, risks and complexity of the AUKUS deal.
Teller-Ulam
March 15, 2025 at 10:12 pm
The comments made by Colby regarding Virginia delivery priorities should be taken very seriously by Australia.
He makes clear there is no guarantee of any reward for Australia’s multi-billion dollar investment in U.S. shipyard infrastructure.
At face value, the Suffren would appear to be a path for Australia to reduce risk without derailing the submarine component of AUKUS – I don’t see that acquiring the Suffren would jeopardize the future AUKUS class submarine.
Like any weapon, one that is on order or partially built is of no value when fighting breaks out. It does appear that the Australian public and politicians have had a change of heart regarding nuclear propulsion. I think Australia should seriously consider the Suffren – quickly.
Teller-Ulam
March 16, 2025 at 2:25 am
I agree. It would make no point to reconsider a conventionally powered variant.
Apart from no longer being fit for purpose, as you noted, attitudes in the Australian public and their politicians seem to have shifted with respect to nuclear propulsion.
I think there is an opportunity for Australia to order Suffren SSNs in the unmodified, French form. This would take advantage of Naval Group’s experience with the design and I would expect they would be delivered much sooner than Virginias.