The combat realities in Ukraine and the Red Sea continue to drive accelerated Pentagon action to engineer and deploy a new generation of paradigm-changing drone technologies.
The potential drone threat to US forces has, in recent years, grown exponentially for several key reasons, as small, inexpensive drones are easy to acquire and increasingly easy to arm with explosives and other kinds of weapons such as electronic warfare (EW).
Ukraine has shown that small drones, such as the US-built Switchblade Kamikaze, have been able to track and decimate tanks in substantial quantities by loitering and then essentially transitioning from surveillance to kinetic attack.
A simple question of numbers substantially compounds the drone threat, as drone swarms substantially change the threat equation. A single drone or airborne explosive, operating at medium or low altitudes, can be tracked and intercepted or jammed with reasonable success.
The swarm threat, however, is intended to blanket an area with Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and overwhelm or test enemy air defenses. The concept of operation is as straightforward as it is simple, as drone swarms can include far too many targets for most countermeasures to defeat.
Even if a proximity or area fuse is used to disperse fragmentation across an area to destroy more than one target, massive volumes of individual drones operating in a swarm formation will likely enable continued attack.
Sheer redundancy is the concept of drone swarm threats, enabling ISR and an attack to continue even if many drones are knocked out or disabled.
Experience on the Red Sea also informed critical counter-drone tactics for the US Navy, which has been highly successful in tracking and destroying incoming Houthi-fired drones and cruise missiles.
While senior US Navy leaders told me the training, doctrine, and weapons systems proved highly effective, new tactics and critical lessons were learned in drone defenses and countermeasures—for example, the Commanding Officer of Carrier Strike Group 2 Rear. Adm. Javon “Hak” Hakimsadeh told me that Navy maritime warriors networked ship-based targeting systems with fighter jets in position to perform surveillance or direct attacks on incoming airborne threats. Hak explained that lessons learned from the Red Sea are now informing ongoing Pentagon efforts to develop new countermeasures, weapons, and concepts of operation for the specific purpose of countering drone swarms.
US Prepared for Drone Swarm Attacks?
These threat scenarios raise critical and likely often-discussed contingencies regarding US drone defenses and Combined Arms Maneuver. Are US mechanized formations and land convoys or Carrier Strike Groups at sea extremely vulnerable to attack swarms of low-cost enemy drones?
While the Navy handled Houthi drones with great success, the service is quickly integrating new weapons, tactics, and concepts of operation to prepare for a new generation of threats, such as those more likely to be used in a great power scenario.
Both US Navy and Army war formations have several fast-emerging promising drone defenses. Yet, the services are also rapidly exploring possible new technologies and cutting-edge approaches to countering drone swarms.
EW & High Powered Microwave
Arguably, the most promising or significant innovation in drone defense pertains to the rapid and continued emergence of new kinds of EW and high-powered microwave technologies capable of jamming multiple signals simultaneously. An ability to do this would prove highly critical in a swarm because an electronic signature could be shut down across a wide area.
The Pentagon will likely focus on a spectrum of potential weapons and tactics. One must simply be ISR-focused, meaning identifying and accurately identifying a launched drone swarm must be done quickly to prevent a kill or disruption.
“Hak” described this as killing the archer instead of the arrows, suggesting that if ISR technology and sensors can identify the “launch” point or point of origin of drone swarms, they can be attacked earlier in the defensive process.
While both the US Army and Navy operate close-in area weapons such as the ship-integrated Close-In Weapons System (CWIS), a technology that integrates radar and fire control with a Phalanx weapon able to fire 4,500 or more small interceptors per minute to destroy multiple targets across a wide aperture.
The Army also uses Phalanx weapons as part of its forward operating base defense system called Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar (CRAM).
These weapons are intended to blanket an area with defensive projectiles to deny an enemy the ability to hit its intended target successfully. However, these weapons are designed to counter close-in attacks nearer to a target, and the Pentagon is likely quite focused on detecting and seeing drone swarms at greater stand-off distances.
Years ago, the US Army experimented with arming its heavy tactical trucks with Phalanx systems, which could help protect Army formations while on the move in combat.
Yet another kinetic response, which may have some limitations, is using proximity fuses, meaning rounds designed to detonate or explode across a given area without necessarily intercepting one target. These munitions can disperse hundreds of small fragments to destroy multiple targets simultaneously.
About the Author: Kris Osborn
Kris Osborn is the Military Technology Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
