One of many vivid Chinese aphorisms is “chóng dǎo fù zhé,” which describes a cart following in the same tracks as an overturned cart further up the road. It’s a metaphor for repeating the same mistake despite fair warning. The PRC’s recent South China Sea policy fits this scenario.
The use of increasingly harsh “gray zone” tactics—so harsh they border on what are traditionally recognized as acts of war—is producing diminishing returns for China. The Chinese government should draw the conclusion that its interests are best served by seeking an amicable settlement with the other claimants. Unfortunately, however, that almost certainly won’t happen.
China’s ability to deploy navy, coast guard and maritime militia vessels into the South China Sea is unmatched by any other Southeast Asian country, and the gap is growing. China is the world leader in gray zone tactics, both in innovation and operational experience. Despite those advantages, however, China’s intimidation tactics during the last year were largely ineffective.
Although reticent to confront China publicly, Malaysia is continuing its hydrocarbon exploration in its own EEZ despite protests and harassment by China. Indonesia claimed to drive out Chinese Coast Guard vessels attempting to interfere with drilling operations in Indonesian waters. Beijing especially dislikes neighbors welcoming the US military into the region, but Malaysia and Indonesia continue to participate in joint exercises with the US armed forces.
Some Vietnamese fishermen continued to suffer ramming, beatings and confiscation of their fish catch by Chinese maritime law enforcement personnel. Nevertheless, although cautious about alarming China, Vietnam held a humanitarian training activity with American military personnel. Another aspect of Vietnam’s pushback is its extensive and dramatic land reclamation. In 2021, Vietnam had only one-tenth the amount of China’s reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. By 2024, however, Vietnam had reclaimed two-thirds as much land as China had, and in 2025 Vietnam will probably equal China’s acreage. While China occupies the three largest features in the Spratlys (Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs), Vietnam occupies the next four largest.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the counterproductivity of China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea is the case of the Philippines. Chinese harassment of Philippine vessels, especially those attempting to rotate and resupply the soldiers garrisoning the shipwrecked Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, gained international attention in 2024. These incidents framed China as a bully, employing more numerous and larger ships to ram and water-cannon the overmatched Philippine boats.
The Chinese attacks got so bad the US government offered to escort Philippine vessels. This would have forced China to either back down or incur a much higher level of risk. Fortunately for Beijing, the Philippines was determined to rely on its own efforts and declined US help.
The Chinese government seemed to conclude that due to either reputational damage, an unacceptably high risk of escalation, or a combination of both, a truce around Second Thomas Shoal was desirable. In July 2024, China and the Philippines quietly reached an agreement intended to prevent further incidents. That agreement held into early 2025 even though the two sides disagreed about details such as whether the Philippines was required to give China advance notice of rotation/resupply missions. The Philippines managed to make sufficient repairs to the crumbling Sierra Madre in 2024 to further extend its usefulness as makeshift outpost.
The climbdown from intensifying clashes over Second Thomas Shoal was encouraging. This truce, however, does not indicate China is abandoning the harassment policy. Rather, it is shifting to other locations. A Philippine Coast Guard ship anchored at Sabina Shoal for about five months last year. The Chinese disrupted resupply missions for that ship, eventually forcing it to depart. This year, tensions heated up again around Scarborough Shoal. Incidents included a Chinese helicopter intentionally flying dangerously close to a Philippine airplane and more near-rammings by Chinese navy and coast guard ships. As if to broaden the message beyond claimants in the territorial dispute, in February a Chinese fighter aircraft released flares in front of an Australian P-8 aircraft flying in international airspace near the Paracel Islands.
Chinese harassment, intended to cow the Philippines into accommodating Beijing, has instead induced the opposite reaction. Manila has embarked on an arms buildup. It plans to buy US F-16s—the Philippines’ largest-ever foreign weapons purchase—and to accept some additional damage to its relations with Beijing by hosting advanced US Typhon and NMESIS missile systems, which would be useful in a US military conflict against China. It is also acquiring two corvettes from South Korea and 20 drones from Australia. Combined, these acquisitions represent a major upgrade in capability for the Philippine armed forces.
For its escalation of harassment against the Philippines, Beijing failed to dislodge the Sierra Madre while unintentionally persuading the Philippines to strengthen its security cooperation with the US and to beef up its own armed forces.
One reason PRC policy is unlikely to change is that the Xi government fears suffering a perceived defeat. Beijing’s understanding of the issue is firmly, and probably hopelessly, anchored to a narrative that all but precludes the Chinese government from moderating its policy. For PRC citizens, China by definition cannot be an expansionist bully because they believe this is a historical, cultural and political impossibility.
The Party line is that Philippine opposition to Chinese attempts to claim ownership of the Philippines’ EEZ is not based on legitimate national interests, but rather reflects the influence of Philippine politicians trying to get votes and a US government that uses the Philippines as a “pawn” to contain China.
Rather than China trying to force the Philippines to de-occupy Second Thomas Shoal, the PRC government presents the Sierra Madre issue as a Chinese attempt to restore the status quo. Beijing says the crumbling, World War II era Philippine Navy ship originally grounded on the shoal accidentally and Manila promised to tow it away, but later reneged on that promise. (Sources in the Philippines say the ship grounded intentionally and the Philippine government never committed to towing it away.)
The PRC narrative similarly says the Philippines first and repeatedly tried to occupy Scarborough Shoal and Sandy Cay Reef. International observers might be surprised to learn that PRC commentators even sometimes cite the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which forbids claimants from occupying new unoccupied features, in Chinese criticisms of the Philippines.
Given this outlook, Chinese would tend to see any compromise by Chinese leaders as a surrender to attempts by rival claimants to unilaterally advance their holdings at China’s expense. Worse, all of the rival claimants are much smaller and weaker than China, so there is no excuse for Beijing declining to vigorously protect China’s purported rights.
The second reason Beijing won’t give up its policy of pressure and intimidation in the South China Sea is that the strength of the US commitment to defend its regional friends is in question. The PRC leadership sees an opportunity to test the Trump Administration’s appetite for following through with the Biden Administration’s policy of strengthening security cooperation with the Philippines. Compared to the previous US government, Trump appears more averse to a war with China over Taiwan or uninhabited rocks in the South China Sea, and more amenable to retrenching out of East Asia.
J-15 Fighter from China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Southeast Asia’s strategic importance did not spare it from high “reciprocal tariffs” announced by Washington in April, which threaten these countries with serious economic hardship. Historical friendship and shared democratic values, which would seem to bind the US and the Philippines, seemed to count for little as the Trump Administration distanced itself from its Western European allies.
Moreover, Trump has a history of allowing his senior advisors to pursue a tough policy toward China, only to abruptly intervene with a more conciliatory approach if a bilateral economic deal appears within reach.
China’s inability to change poor-performing policies should not be underestimated. This is a government that, after spectacularly dismantling civil liberties in Hong Kong, still touts the “one country, two systems” idea for Taiwan. The Chinese appear committed to gray zone warfare, with a growing number of platforms and new bases, even as regional states stand their ground. The cart careens onward despite the anticipated danger.
About the Author: Denny Roy
Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, who specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues.
