Why Doesn’t Trump Have Ambassadors in India or Pakistan?

The crisis that no one saw coming defines the foreign policy and national security legacy of every U.S. president. For George H.W. Bush, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. During their respective campaigns, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush each promised a domestic focus. It was not to be. The wars that resulted from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington changed the trajectory of both presidencies.

Barack Obama campaigned on ending “stupid wars,” but not only remained in Afghanistan and return after a brief withdrawal from Iraq, but he also involved the United States in both Libya and Syria. Joe Biden, of course, faced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While the pandemic and the debates about China’s role in it overshadowed President Donald Trump’s first term, the president’s reaction to the India-Pakistan war could easily shape not only the remainder of Trump’s presidency but the world for decades to come. After all, while the wars that blindsided his predecessors were bad, none were fights between two nuclear powers, conflicts that could conceivably escalate into nuclear war.

Trump is dubious of the career civil service and America’s diplomatic corps. This is understandable given the abuses of some, although not all, unelected bureaucrats who sought to undermine legal agendas with which they disagreed. The Foreign Service Exam, meanwhile, does not effectively produce great diplomats; rather, it is often arbitrary and discounts many aspects of life experience. It treats applicants as lumps of clay rather than as sculptures to judge on their merits. 

The top of the ladder for career foreign service officers is typically ambassador. Not all ambassadors are career diplomats, however. Whereas career diplomats often resent politicians, there is merit to both. Sometimes, it is good to infuse new ideas into a bureaucracy while they can usually access those outside the normal chain-of-command. When a new president enters office, the political ambassadors his predecessor appointed resign. Trump went further, however, and demanded the resignation of every U.S. ambassador, including career officials, though he did not choose to accept each one. 

U.S. ambassadors are not always essential, despite what the State Department might say. In Western Europe, political ambassadors are society figures who host cocktail parties and dinners but contribute little to foreign policy. U.S. relations with the United Kingdom, France, or Germany will never depend on any ambassador. In many other countries, ambassadors remain aloof and focus on ministerial and head of state meetings. For example, the U.S. ambassador to Somalia will never roam the streets of Mogadishu, whereas his colleagues in Beirut are notorious for their insulation from society. 

Across the Middle East and more industrialized African countries, U.S. ambassadors are glorified postmen who pass messages that increasingly bypass them as globalization and communications technology allow heads of state to develop personal relationships and telephone each other directly. Few would notice if a chargé d’affaires manages an embassy instead of an ambassador. 

Some countries are exceptions, however. Japan interprets the prestige of the U.S. ambassador as a sign of respect. This is why various administrations have sent such prominent retired politicians as Rahm Emanuel, Howard Baker, and Walter Mondale. Strategists also consider ambassadorial nominations to China and Russia in a way they would not to Sweden or Denmark. 

While the State Department usually sends career professionals to Pakistan, recent U.S. administrations have sent political ambassadors to India.  This is not a bad thing. While some countries like Belize and the Bahamas receive political ambassadors of questionable competence who wish the title or an extended vacation in exchange for their political donations, the U.S. ambassadors India receives are generally competent managers, experienced politicians, and astute analysts who seek to improve the partnership and bilateral ties. Frankly, the world’s most populous country and largest democracy deserves no less.

What they do not deserve, however, is to be ignored. Trump’s disdain for diplomats is one thing. Allowing it to play out in India and, for that matter, Pakistan, is another. As war erupted between India and Pakistan due to Pakistan’s support for cross-border terrorism against India, diplomats across the world scrambled. Conflicts between neighbors are one thing; war between two nuclear states is another. 

More than 100 days into Trump’s administration, not only is there no U.S. ambassador in either New Delhi and Islamabad, but the White House and State Department have also failed even to nominate one. As Indians and Pakistanis scramble, only a full and competent U.S ambassador in New Delhi could back channel, gather real-time intelligence if he had previously cultivated his sources carefully, pass messages when appropriate, and reach back to the State Department, if not the White House, directly to help the media. Career diplomats foisted to head the missions in New Delhi and Islamabad do not have the cachet to do either.

Certainly, Trump deserves some blame—the buck stops with him and his failure to nominate suggests shortsightedness in his shop—but the Senate does too. The time between nomination, confirmation hearing, and vote has never been longer. Senators might like to posture and engage in political stunts to cultivate their political base, but they have a broader job to advise and consent. Frankly, this need not mean full hearings on everyone if the government business is otherwise too pressing, but rather only full hearings on the contentious cases. If staffers do their jobs, votes can be almost instantaneous on those for whom there will be no real or reasonable objection. 

The White House and Congress can ignore most U.S. ambassadors on any given day: They exist so to address the daily drudgery, pomp, and business so U.S. officials can focus elsewhere. But, when the 3 am phone call came—and it could soon ring again as Pakistan and India only agreed to a ceasefire, not to talk—it was inexcusable that the State Department does not have ambassadors in its most important and consequential embassies in the conflict zone. 

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. The views expressed are his own.