Key Points – Acquiring South Korea’s KSS-III diesel-electric submarines would be a strategic misstep for Canada as it seeks to replace its aging Victoria-class.
-While modern, the KSS-III is optimized for Indo-Pacific littorals and lacks deep integration with NATO and Five Eyes systems crucial for Canada’s core operational areas: the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific.
-Significant logistical and industrial support challenges would also arise from a transpacific supply chain.
–Canada must prioritize a submarine that meets its specific geographical needs and alliance interoperability requirements—likely from European suppliers like Germany or France—rather than opting for a seemingly convenient but strategically mismatched foreign purchase.
Canada Has a Submarine Problem to Solve: Enter South Korea?
For a country surrounded by three oceans, Canada has done a spectacularly poor job of thinking like a maritime power. Now, with the former Trudeau government having belatedly admitted the need to replace the decrepit Victoria-class submarines, a major procurement effort is (finally) underway. The stakes are high. Submarines are not simply tools of naval warfare – they are instruments of statecraft. They can signal commitment, generate deterrence, conduct surveillance, and, if needed, deny an adversary access to key waters. And with growing security challenges in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, Canada needs a serious undersea capability. So, could – or should – Canada buy South Korea’s submarines?
On the surface, the idea has a certain appeal. South Korea’s DSME KSS-III (also known as the Dosan Ahn Changho class) is a modern diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion (AIP), a 3,400-ton displacement, and the range and endurance to operate in blue water. South Korea has invested heavily in its submarine force, and the KSS-III represents a genuine leap forward in regional capabilities. For a country like Canada, which lacks the industrial base to build its own submarines quickly or cheaply, the prospect of buying “off-the-shelf” from a reliable democratic partner may seem prudent.
But beneath the appealing surface lies a tangle of strategic, operational, and industrial concerns. A submarine is not just a piece of hardware – it is a national strategic asset. It must be integrated into a doctrine, a theater, a logistical base, and a supply chain. And this is where the KSS-III, however impressive in isolation, begins to falter as a Canadian option.
Let’s begin with geography. Canada is not South Korea. Our maritime theater is not the Yellow Sea or the East China Sea. Our concerns are not limited to shallow-water ambushes against North Korean shipping or blockade scenarios. Our challenge is vast, unforgiving, cold-water oceanic space – from the GIUK Gap and the Norwegian Sea, to the Bering Strait and Beaufort Sea. And in that space, Canada’s submarines must not only survive but also contribute meaningfully to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions of NATO. That requires interoperability with the United States and allies – not just communications systems, but weapons, sensors, and maintenance protocols. Every bolt and line of code needs to be integrated into a North American defense ecosystem. And here lies the rub: South Korea’s systems, while technically advanced, are not wired for Five Eyes or NATO integration.
In short: Canada does not need an Indo-Pacific submarine. It needs a North Atlantic, Arctic, and North Pacific submarine.
There is also the deeper issue of strategic identity. For decades, Canada has muddled along with the self-image of a middle power dabbling in global do-goodery, rather than embracing its hard geography as a trilateral maritime power. This has led to procurement decisions driven more by politics than strategy – decisions that see capability as a cost center to be minimized, not a geopolitical asset to be maximized. Buying a South Korean submarine might look like a bargain, but it would be a strategic mismatch, driven by budget logic rather than grand strategy.
That grand strategy must be rooted in our core theatres of interest: the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific. These are the zones where Canadian sovereignty, alliance credibility, and deterrence all intersect. And they are also the zones where Russian and Chinese submarine activity is growing, where NATO ASW operations are intensifying, and where Canada will be called upon to contribute meaningfully if it wants to retain a seat at the adult table of allied defense planning.
Buying South Korean submarines would send exactly the wrong message: that Canada is still not serious about defending its own maritime domain and integrating fully into the strategic architecture of North American and transatlantic security.
It’s not just geopolitics. There are also industrial considerations. Canada has a long and checkered history with defense procurement. Delays, cost overruns, political interference, and shifting requirements have plagued nearly every major acquisition program of the past three decades. The submarine file is no different. If Canada were to buy foreign, it must buy from a partner that can provide not just boats, but training, maintenance, and long-term lifecycle support. It must also support Canadian industry – through licensed production, technology transfers, or robust in-country servicing capabilities.
It’s unclear whether South Korea, despite its excellent engineering, can meet all these demands. Its navy has never exported a submarine of the KSS-III class. There is no preexisting Canadian supply chain. And given the distance, the logistics of spare parts and maintenance could become a nightmare over a 40-year platform lifespan. Moreover, any delays or disputes in the transfer of sensitive technology could compromise the ability of Canada to operate these boats independently, or to integrate them into joint operations with allies.
So what’s the alternative?
Let’s not get too romantic about a Canadian-designed and built boat. Ottawa simply doesn’t have the capacity or track record to pull it off at scale or speed. But there are other options that make more strategic and operational sense. German Type 212CD submarines – already being acquired by Norway – offer Arctic-proven, NATO-integrated capability. Japanese Soryu or Taigei class boats, though AIP-capable and technically excellent, suffer from many of the same integration problems as the Korean boats. Australia’s AUKUS SSN plan is too far down the road – and too nuclear – for Canada. And Sweden’s Blekinge-class might be suitable in certain coastal roles, but lacks the range and power for full-spectrum blue-water patrol in the Atlantic and Pacific.
That leaves Germany and potentially France as the most viable suppliers – assuming we do not go nuclear. And let’s be clear: Canada is not going nuclear. Not now, not for a generation.
At the end of the day, the right submarine for Canada is not the cheapest, flashiest, or most immediately available. It is the one that can operate undetected under Arctic ice, coordinate seamlessly with American and NATO forces, fire Western torpedoes and missiles, and be serviced without relying on a transoceanic supply chain. The KSS-III may be an excellent submarine – but it is not Canada’s submarine.
Victoria-Class Submarine from Canada.
Victoria-Class Submarine Canadian Navy. Image Credit: Government Photo.
The real danger here is that, faced with decades of procurement dithering and a sudden moment of urgency, Canada might rush into the wrong decision. There is a seductive logic to going offshore for a ready-made solution. But the strategic cost of getting it wrong – of buying a submarine that doesn’t fit our geography, alliance obligations, or defense-industrial reality – is far higher than the sticker price.
Canada must resist the temptation to “buy cheap and foreign” for the illusion of speed. Instead, it must buy strategically – for deterrence, for sovereignty, and for its role in the defense of the North Atlantic, the Arctic, and the North Pacific. That may not be the South Korean submarine. It may not even be quick. But for once, let Canada act like a serious country and get this decision right.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
