The Commander, United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, recently told Congress he may return bombers to alert status if the United States removes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from its nuclear deterrent force; this would certainly be prudent. However, the United States should return bombers to nuclear alert even if ICBMs persist.
The History
President George H. W. Bush formally ended alert status on September 27, 1991. It was extraordinary and I witnessed it first-hand. As a young Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander with the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, I processed the Emergency Action Messages from Strategic Air Command which stood down the strategic bomber and tanker force and retired the older Minuteman II ICBMs. Malmstrom AFB’s “Alert Area”, where for decades Air Force KC-135 air refueling tankers and their aircrews lived inside compounds ready to launch on minutes’ notice, were swiftly emptied and soon repurposed.
President Bush took these steps on the cusp of the Soviet Union’s collapse and with the contemporary changes in the global security environment in mind (the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the first Gulf War). President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin sustained the reduced posture, and de-targeted ICBMs in January 1994. Nearly a decade of easing away from the Cold War’s brink ended in 2000 with Vladimir Putin’s ascendancy as leader of Russia.
The Growing Threats
Putin began an uninterrupted era of Russian nuclear modernization. As a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty inspector from 2004 to 2006, I well remember the modification of the SS-27 road-mobile ICBM and the initial development of a new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Added to Russia’s conventional military modernization efforts, regional aggression, and unrelenting gray zone “warfare” against the United States and its allies, Russia is squarely back to being a legitimate U.S. adversary.
Yet Russia is no longer the United States’ sole nuclear threat. China, particularly under Presidents Hu and Xi, aggressively pursued both conventional and (more disturbingly) nuclear force development and modernization. The bipolar Cold War could become a nostalgic era for having had only one clear focus for national security policy. China’s push for its own strategic TRIAD is a clear and present danger to our Indo-Pacific allies: deterring the United States from upholding its commitments to Indo-Pacific allies is arguably the sole reason for China to pursue such destabilizing capabilities.
A New Cold War Emerges
Despite denials by some in our policy community, we are unambiguously in a new, and tri-polar, Cold War. The difference this time is that the “arms race” is centered on nuclear modernization, which our nation is immeasurably behind. The United States’ nuclear capabilities have atrophied, a fact we publicly acknowledge, to the point that Russia and China can reasonably question our long-term deterrent credibility.
Yes, our ICBMs and nuclear submarine patrols do provide a continuous strategic deterrent, but the bomber leg of our TRIAD does not—it is not “on alert”, postured for immediate nuclear deployment. Consequently, Admiral Richard rightly told Congress we actually have a DYAD. We should change that–now.
Although nuclear-capable, the bomber community (specifically B-52s and B-2s) focused on conventional operations, especially since 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This drove a deep wedge into their nuclear focus and expertise, with the 2007 Minot-Barksdale incident as a clear example. Returning bombers to alert status (along with their required tanker support) would solve three problems.
First, it would return the United States to combat-ready nuclear TRIAD deterrent. Fully loaded bombers with aircrews ready to launch would clearly and unambiguously message to Russia and China (and perhaps North Korea) that our nuclear response capabilities are legitimately available. This would significantly underscore that all “options” are on the table and strengthen our nation’s credibility.
Second, it would reintroduce a key survivability factor for bombers that does not now exist. Although there are procedures known as “cart-starts” that can jumpstart B-52 engines in 10 minutes, the normal timeline to do this is more than an hour. Considering that an adversary’s submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) can strike a target in as little as 15 minutes, the availability of this leg of the deterrent cannot be assumed. Alert status would fix that.
Third, it would begin to restore critical nuclear expertise to the bomber community that severely atrophied into a “fragile skill.” The level of expertise in nuclear deterrence has previously been identified as a key shortfall following the end of the Cold War. With alert status, aircrews would be withdrawn from conventional missions, able to focus (and train) clearly on the nuclear deterrent mission during their operational assignments and bring greater knowledge to future nuclear staff assignments. Else, the conventional role will continue to be the primary focus and dilute this critical skill set.
Unless our nation again believes we will face a massive preemptive first strike, we can have a small group of B-52s returned to alert status. My thoughts? Choose one of the two bomber squadrons at Minot AFB, North Dakota, to be dedicated to the nuclear deterrent mission.
Minot AFB is the home to both the 5th Bomb Wing (B-52s) and 91st Missile Wing (ICBMs) and already qualifies as a legitimate adversary target for both military value and limited civilian casualties (the closest American city of any size is Minneapolis, Minnesota (~430,000) roughly 430 miles away). Each B-52 can carry 20 nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, so even three to five aircraft on alert would provide a tremendous survivable capability.
For tanker support, consider one of the closer Air National Guard (ANG) units. The ANG is already involved in bomber nuclear operations (B-2) at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, and ICBM force protection at Minot AFB, so identifying one ANG squadron for dedicated alert to the nuclear deterrent mission would not be a novel operational request. Plus, it would ensure that the active-duty air refueling capabilities remain to support conventional worldwide requirements.
The Path Ahead
As a military officer, I had to live in reality about our adversary threats. I believe it is time for the United States and policymakers to do the same. Russia and China are great powers that want regional hegemony and are fully committing to their military instruments of national power to achieve it. That includes nuclear capabilities. We need to show them that we, too, are fully committed to our allies and global peace and stability.
Lt. Col. Robert J. Hill, U.S. Air Force (retired) is a senior principal program analyst with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). He has over 25 years’ experience with nuclear operations, arms control, strategic communications, and nuclear-related support within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two Unified Combatant Commands, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, HQ Air Force Space Command, and operational units. As a proud member of the final class of Cold War missileers, he holds an MS in International Relations from Troy University and is a graduate of Air War College and Joint Forces Staff College. His views are solely his own and do not reflect the official position of any government, organization, or group.
