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Why America Was Destined to Fail in Afghanistan

Afghanistan Collapse

In April, President Joe Biden ordered the full withdrawal of remaining U.S. troops from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, in effect ending America’s longest overseas war; the mission itself is now slated to be over by August 31.  Since the announcement, the Taliban have been on the march, assuming control over provincial capitals and surrounding territory. The Afghan forces, nominally numbering over 300,000, trained and equipped by the United States and its allies to the tune of billions of dollars, seem unable to do much to stop the advance, notwithstanding Biden’s calls on the Afghan leadership to come together, develop a strategy and fight for the future of their country.

As of this writing, the vastly outnumbered Taliban fighters are making lightning battlefield advances and are already pressing on the outskirts of Kabul, with some reports now having them just entering the city.  There are already thousands of refugees on the move, running away from areas now once again under Taliban control. If, and as is looking increasingly likely, when Kabul falls, the United States will have no option but to evacuate our already downsized embassy. Some analysts have suggested that we may be tracking for a repeat of the “Saigon scenario” reminiscent of the last days of the Vietnam War (the U.S. is sending 3,000 troops to Afghanistan to assist with the evacuation of the embassy).

But speculating about how quickly the current Afghan government will fall, or whether the United States will re-engage with air power to slow down the Taliban advance, is not as important as is the imperative to understand how we got to this point. The unfolding drama in Afghanistan marks the end of two decades of U.S. strategy and policy there. We must take stock of this twenty-year-long war and ask why so much of our blood and treasure expended there has led us to the abject strategic failure we are witnessing today.

Setting aside the manner in which the Biden administration has reached the decision to pull our military out of Afghanistan—with seemingly neither Plan B in place, nor thinking through its impact on the region and our NATO allies and partners—the winding down of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan should compel our policy elites across the political spectrum to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. strategy going forward. Such forensics must begin with revisiting the core assumptions that have allowed for a de-facto open-ended commitment of American power and resources to continue for two decades, driven mostly by flawed ideological framing.

The original decision to overthrow the Taliban regime was secondary to the George W. Bush administration objective in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks on New York and Washington: to have Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida organization, living at the time in Afghanistan, handed over to the U.S.  We went to war against the Taliban in less than a month after 9/11, with across-the-board support from allies and partners, as well as with clear moral sanction. America’s military action against bin Laden’s jihadists and their Taliban enablers was seen as a justifiable retaliation for the murder of thousands of U.S. citizens. The objective of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was also clear at the time: to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and other senior figures in his terrorist group, plus those Taliban leaders who had hosted them.

By December of 2001 it was clear that bin Laden had not been eliminated, and that the Taliban—though kicked out of power—were not extinguished and for the next two decades would continue fighting. During the final days of the Tora Bora battle, the George W. Bush administration made critical misjudgments, especially the decision not to use U.S. military assets to seal the border with Pakistan, relying instead on airstrikes, Afghan militia, and Pakistan’s Frontier Corps forces to block the mountain passes.  This decision allowed Bin Laden and his bodyguards to walk unmolested out of Tora Bora into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area.

And that point, our elites’ ideological hubris prevailed over sound strategic judgment. The United States’ counterterrorism policy shifted, setting in motion forces that for the next twenty years would commit America to a series of open-ended counterinsurgency operations, with a steadily widening geographic aperture and a concomitant increase in the level of ambition. Instead of refocusing on the mission’s primary objective (capturing bin Laden and attacking and destroying terrorist groups), the George W. Bush administration chose to reformulate the mission in terms of a systemic transformation across the region as the sine qua non of victory.  Buzzwords such as “democracy-building,” “state-building” and even “nation-building” became guiding principles of policy, as U.S. power was applied to transforming cultures, a near-impossible goal whose ancillary consequences had never been fully considered. The second Iraq war that overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein threw that country into chaos, while also removing the only viable regional counterweight to Iran’s imperial ambitions.  (Lest we forget, Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war in the 1980s, with both the West and the Soviets working to ensure that neither of the two would emerge victorious, for nobody wanted a decision that would favor either Iraqi Baathists or Iranian radical mullahs.)

Our grand ideological project rolled on, morphing into a modern-day “island-hopping” campaign across the Middle East and beyond to bring about “regime change.” After Iraq, the decapitation of the Gaddafi regime following NATO’s intervention in Libya and the war in Syria further destabilized the region. One entirely predictable consequence was a wave of refugees from the Middle East that to this day continues to flow into Europe. Meanwhile, as the moniker “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) morphed into “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO), successive administrations felt compelled to throw in more manpower and resources, some believing perhaps that victory was just around the corner, others because they felt compelled not to be the ones on whose watch we “lost Afghanistan.”

Afghanistan Collapse

The 35th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James F. Amos, the 17th sergeant major of the Marine Corps, Sgt. Maj. Micheal P. Barrett, and their staff, board a Ch-53 Sea Stallion helicopter at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Nov. 24, 2011. These leaders traveled to Afghanistan to visit deployed service members throughout Regional Command (West) and Regional Command (Southwest) for the Thanksgiving holiday. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Mallory S. VanderSchans)

Through all this, our men and women in uniform and those of our allies served bravely, selflessly and with utmost dedication in multiple theaters, some paying the ultimate price, others returning with injuries that would permanently alter their lives.  They were asked to implement a strategy whose goals they understood less and less with each passing year.  I recall a conversation with a young officer during my 2013 visit to a forward operating base in Helmand province; he concluded after his time in-country that his mission was to bring his men back home alive.

The winding down of America’s war in Afghanistan should serve as a wake up call for our policy elites to abandon fashionable post-Cold War shibboleths about “institutions trumping culture and history” that have shaped our strategic decisions since. As Afghanistan implodes, such flawed assumptions need to be fully owned by those who constructed and sustained this ideologically laden strategic framework.  We will be paying for their hubris for years to come, for going forward both our allies and partners will factor into their decision-making and their policy choices the lessons of the past twenty years when the greatest superpower responded to a criminal act of terror against it with a policy – breathtaking in scope – that sought to reforge the world its own image and failed.

As we watch authoritarianism surge worldwide, alongside a growing skepticism about American leadership, what happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria should bring us back to the fundamentals of realist foreign and security policy. We need to re-learn the art of power-balancing, of building coalitions not around high-minded ideals but around shared interests and threat perceptions, all the while remembering that America’s military is a precious resource and that it must be the means of last resort, not the first tool in our foreign policy toolbox.

Andrew A. Michta, now a 1945 Contributing Editor, is the dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Written By

Andrew A. Michta is the dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and a new Contributing Editor for 1945. He is the former Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College and former Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. You can follow him on Twitter: @AndrewMichta. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.



  1. Cornfed

    August 15, 2021 at 9:14 am

    I notice you don’t refer to Obama by name. Bush didn’t a plan, but let’s not forget neither did Obama who screwed up another country, dropped bombs like they were confetti, gave us Benghazi, the Iran payoff, and all 8 years of his presidency at war.

  2. Mark Matis

    August 15, 2021 at 12:00 pm

    We failed because of the Rules of Engagement, which were more restrictive for military personnel in the sandboxes than they are for “Law Enforcement” officers in the US!!!

  3. THApe-1137

    August 15, 2021 at 12:46 pm

    There were only two options: just go in to retaliate, or conquer the country and make it a US Territory. No one wants to hear the truth though. Or do the really hard work. All the fed does about anything is kick the can.

  4. JGO Heinz

    August 15, 2021 at 2:24 pm

    Dear Mr. Michta,

    I think there were also other factors at play in the decision to invade one month after 9/11.

    It is clear that Bin Laden was logistically and materially aided by members of the Saudi royal family, and that the effectiveness of execution of his plan was contingent on receiving state level help. Without this very substantial and necessary aid his plan would not have succeeded to the degree it did. But, the Bush government was loathe to openly single out and punish the Saudis due to the strategic ramifications this would have in the Middle East. Given the widespread shock and horror caused by the attack, the USA could not not retaliate. A proxy, Afghanistan, was substituted in place of the Saudis, and the attack on Afghanistan was predicated on the fact that the attacks had been planned from a cave in a remote valley.

    The oft decried  «  intelligence failure » which led the CIA and other intel agencies to fail to see the signs and connect the dots appears instead to have been caused by the compartmentalization of all intelligence report concerning the KSA, and an utter lack of acceptance that the US’s closest ally in the Middle East would engage in a terrorist plot to cripple the US.

    I am not convinced that there was every a realistic expectation that the USA would achieve the creation of a stable democracy in Afghanistan, and had they really wished to do so the first required step would have been to remove from positions of authority the warlords like General Dostum, and disband their militias. Stable democracies are not possible when warlords and thugs can count on state immunity for their crimes, and person retinues of armed militias to terrorize, extort and exploit civilians within their reach.

  5. Brian Richard Allen

    August 15, 2021 at 3:36 pm

    Some have suggested we’re tracking for a repeat of the “Saigon Scenario,” reminiscent of the last days of the Vietnam War ….

    No it wasn’t. “The Saigon Scenario” occurred two years after America and our allies had ceased hostilities and only after DC “democrats” had back-stabbed all of our allies — and had lost yet another Well-Won War.

  6. Rick

    August 15, 2021 at 3:47 pm

    The author gets the signs and symptoms of failure correct. But he does a great job of covering up who was the most causal factor in those mistakes resulting from the military being ordered to dropping the mission of closing with and destroying the enemy, and instead engage in virtue signaling support for multinational NGO initiatives and “democracy project” new wars.

    It was the political academic/analyst class that was whispering that in presidential ears as to how the war should be conducted. Not generals saying “we really should be spending most of our effort, money, and blood supporting NGOs digging wells, building schools for little girls, etc.

    Curious how Michta can easily list the signs and symptoms of the failure, all while not naming who was at the root of that change from warfighting to school building.

    But apparently, from his academic positon, Michta also can’t see how the war could have indeed been won, even with mistakes, if the military had been told to continue concentrating on closing with and destroying the enemy. Not NGO initiatives and “nation building/democracy projects” that had nothing to do with defeating the enemy, but improve the prospects of the politicians back home who sent them off to do that instead of finding and killing the enemy.

  7. Carlton Meyer

    August 15, 2021 at 3:54 pm

    Despite what Biden says, this is very similar to Vietnam in that soldiers refused to fight for the American puppet regime. South Vietnamese troops had better equipment and air superiority, yet most threw down their weapons and fled as a North Vietnamese force attacked that was one-fifth its size.

  8. Miguel Tejeda

    August 15, 2021 at 3:56 pm

    A political solution should have been sought only after eliminating the Taliban, once your foe is vanished you can afford to be magnanimous. When your goal is a political settlement and not victory you’ll achieve neither.

  9. Rick

    August 15, 2021 at 4:13 pm

    The premise it was destined to fail is false: a troubling misjudgement from somebody paid by the Biden Department of Defense to be the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies. More on that in a moment. My analysis is that probably less than 20% of our time, money, and blood was spent on efforts that even remotely appeared to be closing with and destroying the enemy. Or if you prefer, closing with and destroying the global terrorists.

    But to be fair to the author, he’s never spent a day in uniform. He’s been in suits while we’ve been in boots on the ground. I’m an example of one of many: finished my degree and had switched to jumping out of airplanes for a 30 year long career before he even finished his degree. And he’s my age.

    He has a Ph.D in International Relations; you know, those academics that when they screw things up, those of us in the military are sent to go clean their mess up. At which point they switch their campaigns to advising presidents on military science: how the military should actually be fighting the war.

    If this is to be taken as a scholarly policy analysis, it’s hard not to notice that, with all the castigating going on, the names of two presidents after Biden get no mention, while Biden himself gets barely a mention. A long list of errors, but no analysis of who was responsible after Bush. Similarly, no notice of any president who actually managed to reverse or mitigate some errors, even if they still allowed politically motivated war to continue at the same time.

    If one president really, REALLY jacked it up and made things much, much worse, it would be Obama. Unmentioned, and assigned no blame whatsoever for the long list of his errors Mitchta gives us (while he had no problem whatsoever tagging Bush for his mission creep).

    That would be the same Obama that was the very author of the democracy project spread of war to other countries, usually guised as “democracy projects”. The Obama/Clinton war in peaceful, stable, if not democratic Libya – who in the balance was more of an ally by not providing refuge for hajji Salafist/Wahaabist terrorists and fighters.

    Michta doesn’t feel it worth mention that it was Obama and Clinton who took out Ghaddafi – leaving us instead with Al-Queda, and hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing that murderous regime. A move that no credible analyst would attempt to justify had the slightest basis in the Global War On Terror dealing with a site of global terror.

    The author makes mention of those Obama democracy project wars, and the refugees – but not The Smartest Guy In The Room, Obama, who created both.

    Same Obama whose altered rules of engagement for American troops that looked to those in the military like they came from the enemy, not the Commander In Chief.

    Same Obama, in a prequel to Afghanistan today (with Biden watching at his side) dropped everything and raced out of a stabilized Iraq to gather the political cheers back home – leaving it wide open for inevitable chaos and yet another home for Salafist/Wahaabist hajji fighters and terrorists.

    (sidebar: would it be fair, Mr. Michta, as an analyst, to at least take notice that Biden learned nothing after less than ten years earlier being a partner to the Obama/Iraq withdrawal debacle?)

    Also apparently not worth mentioning, the one president who was far from perfect in his Middle East policy and warfighting, and yet, took the dog’s breakfast Obama/Biden left for him, and at least made things better, not worse.

    Trump throwing out the Obama rules of engagement that crippled our military effectiveness, giving us new ROEs that disadvantaged the enemy, while at the same time bringing us closer to being back to closing with and destroying the enemy. War against an enemy, rather than purity of purpose sideshows than we had been forced into since Obama stepped into office.

    A new mission statement to find Al-Queda where they were and destroy them, even if the purity sideshows still went on. A new mission to find and take out the enemy’s most valuable leaders and commanders, yes, even though the purity sideshows were allowed to continue. And that was accomplished.

    But again, that’s a positive response by Trump that’s just as unmentioned as the fact that it was Obama’s mission change that left the military and humanitarian disaster that Trump at least partially dealt with using new mission focus.

    Why would a supposedly apolitical analyst of this war easily be able to link Bush to his errors and mistakes – but just a few paragraphs later be unable to link following presidents to the long list he provides of their horrible mistakes and the consequences of those mistakes.

    And also be unable to mention the one president who left things better, rather than worse, after becoming president, even if he allowed the virtue signalling war to continue to the benefit of the anointed experts and analysts? No mention of that president and his positive achievements? Where was Al-Queda at the end of Trump’s four years, versus where they were after Obama’s eight years?

    Why the deliberate attempt to miss making any mention of that? Perhaps because that act of academic honesty would then open the door to people asking if it was true that America was destined to fail as the author claims?

    That’s just a question, of course.

    Here’s my analysis of why the errors of omission: Michta owes his position (and his paycheque) to the Biden Department of Defense who employs him as the Dean of that college. And when it’s the Biden administration allowing you to keep your job and that US government paycheque and perks that go with it – the last thing you’re going to do is name Obama. And certainly not link him to the horrible consequences of his political, not strategic, decisions regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, etc. For the same reasons, Michta’s not going to mention Trump’s name and list what he did to improve the dog’s breakfast that Obama and Biden left him.

    By the way, when a Dean of international and security studies claims Afghanistan was destined to fail, it’s an error that shows the complete lack of self-awareness of WHY we failed in Afghanistan. It wasn’t the troops in boots and their professional military leaders who failed to properly fight a war. And it wasn’t the professional military leaders who told Bush for starters and then eight years of Obama, to use troops as the support mechanism for multinational NGO initiatives and “democracy project” wars.

    No, the people who were instrumental in pushing professional military leaders aside and replacing them with scholarly bureacrat experts who knew how it should be done were people exactly like Andrew Michta. Michta does not mention or place any blame on the security analyst class he is the poster child for.

    No general said “I have an idea Mr. President; we should have the troops providing support, security, and their blood assisting projects digging wells and building schools for little girls”

    Listing the signs and symptoms of what led to failure is nice, but identifying the people and institutions would actually be valuable. Before we have yet another policy expert/bureaucrat ran “endless war”, where the primary intent is political victories back home.

  10. Edmund

    August 15, 2021 at 9:07 pm

    Biden fled in the night conveying the belief that America had no faith in the Afghanistan soldiers. “If America doesn’t even trust the military in Kabul to flee, what chance do we have.” Biden handed a country to terrorists, gave China the rare earth mineral rights, and far far worse. India, who has been active in resisting Chinese expansion in the region, now has a Terrorist country to the north, knows they can now roam into Pakistan to India on their western border, and China on their east.

    What faith is India going to have in America as an ally after we just gave up to a bunch of losers in Toyota pickup trucks.

    This is Far, Far worse than the Fall of Saigon.

  11. Lucius Severus Pertinax

    August 15, 2021 at 10:12 pm

    Twenty-Four Centuries of campaigning, from Alexander the Great onward, has amply demonstrated that one cannot Win a war in Afghanistan without the demonstrated Willingness and Ability to Depopulate it.
    THAT is why we Failed; THAT is why Afghanistan is called the “Graveyard of Empires”.

  12. Rick

    August 16, 2021 at 3:40 am

    The “Graveyard of Empires” line is the mark of the historically illiterate. Or those who remember and parrot what they remember hearing most about Afghanistan.

    It presumes first that three millennia of Afghan’s conquerors and occupiers wanted to possess Afghanistan for it’s resources and what it possessed – rather than Afghanistan as a piece of property merely being geographically important to their empires and those lands that had actual monetary value.

    And second, that the Afghans eventually threw their occupiers out on their ears and/or their empires collapsed because of fighting Afghans.

    The Afghans were most recently given their independence by the British about 1920 – after quickly losing the last and third war they had with the British. They assumed their British masters bled white by five years of WWI trench warfare would be easy pickings. They were routed in defeat and hiding in the hills within weeks, England bled white or not.

    England then left Afghanistan simply because it no longer had strategic value. Lenin had destroyed the Russian empire a few years earlier, and Afghanistan was no longer needed as a wall between India, The Jewel Of The Crown, and the threat of the Russian Empire. England was not driven out – instead, Afghanistan had become worthless to the English Empire.

    The previous two Anglo-Afghan wars ended just the same way: Afghans in defeat, fleeing into the hills while the British roamed around for a while hanging insurrectionists and burning down cities of resistance, to remind Afghans the price of kicking over the traces. Put a new puppet ruler in place, and then leave to look after colonial business elsewhere.

    Before that, there was the Persian Empire… they were there for centuries… longer than America has existed. And Alexander The Great and his successors – they stuck around for about 300 years. And then there were the Mongols – if I remember correctly, they found Afghanistan useful as a transit point for troops and goods for 400 to 500 years.

    That would be a time span about the same as leaving modern day England and moving back to the end of the Middle Ages, before the Glorious Revolution and England having an elected parliament instead of a hereditary monarch.

    Etc and so forth. History isn’t that hard. But you do have to do a little more work than parroting the phrase “Graveyard Of Empires”.

  13. MA Wendt

    August 16, 2021 at 7:35 am

    15 month Afghan vet here.

    Good article, but more complex for the average reader. Key take away – “elites’ ideological hubris”.

    My strong opinion is that instead of taking responsibility for Afghanistan, as we successfully did with both Germany and Japan after WWII, the people in charge decided to rely on untried, liberalized ideology to massage Afghanistan into their dream, rather than do the hard actions that were necessary.

    And what was necessary?

    Total domination of Afghanistan’s education, economy, security, religion, media, transportation, and management at all levels. And a US soldier sitting side-saddle with an Afghan until they learned the American way. This would do two things: it would make Afghanistan function in a way we understood, and it allowed the locals to get a taste of what American’s were all about on a personal level.

    Education, media, and religion are key control points. In 20 years, the US could have controlled these areas and effectively brainwashed nearly two generations of Afghans into what we wanted. What would have made them stronger, and more loyal. In 20 years we could have built a hell of a dedicated, professional army – instead, the US ‘leadership’ allowed other nations in to train, and made huge excuses based on cultural disruption. We spent, accumulated, with our allies something close to $300 million USD a month at some points. At 3bn a year, we could have hired, armed, fed and trained 200,000 killers at $1000 USD a month (three times average monthly pay in Afghanistan)and crushed the Taliban or anyone else. At $1000 a month, many Afghans would murder anyone with justification. And be loyal. Instead – the money was wasted.

    We paid Afghan soldiers less than $250 a month to risk dying, less than what they could get as civilians stacking rocks. And people wonder why they switched sides or ran away.

    The fighters toppling Afghanistan today are maybe 20% fighters and 80% opportunists who fight with the Taliban so they aren’t murdered themselves, or see a chance to make some easy money. Like the start of the conflict, a month of tactical, unrestricted air attacks would cow them back. Just the way it is.

    Last, if you want to change Afghanistan, you cripple the Pashtuns. Idiots in government, media and yes – even the US military – cry ‘Taliban! Taliban! Taliban!’ when there are at least seven big organizations and another 50 smaller groups that look to dominate regionally and locally, either what we would tag as Warlords (well armed gangster families, really) or Pashtun tribal constructs. As we fought the last 20 years, the US did not target enemy infrastructure – the places the Anti-Afghan forces recuperated, trained, received food/water/rest and medical. And the people who provided it – there families and friends. Want to end the Afghan resistance? Level their infrastructure. Something the US didn’t have the political will to do, which would have involved leveling villages, killing everything in them even ac cross the border into Pakistan.

    By year 10, there was huge corruption among contracting where MAJ/LTC/COL about to retire let huge contracts in order to get a job soon after they retired. Corruption was huge, and infected the military at mid-management level.

    Our regular army was keen and skilled in fighting, looking for blood, but the supporting backbone of National Guard and Reserve units had a differing philosophy – ‘Return Home with the Smallest Number of Casualties’. The leadership constantly avoided battle, emboldened our opposition (corrupt government, Taliban and criminal types) with the idea that they didn’t want to return home and face the bereaved families they knew very well.

    Finally, most Muslims in Afghanistan have difficulty arguing with the concepts put out by the Taliban. Salafism is a conservative interpretation, a black-and-white no-add-or-subtract view of the Koran. Many Muslims are raised to have no argument with many of the the ideas pushed by the Taliban. However, what they agree to on Friday in Mosque is not what they want throughout the week, with some Taliban guy with a stick and gun standing over them, forcing them to be righteous. In the eyes of most of the Afghans I dealt with, they agreed with the Taliban in ideology, but not implementation and enforcement. So it becomes easy to knuckle under when the guy with the gun shows up.

    War is hell. In Helmand, it was. Everywhere else it was a long weekend in Chicago, with the US militay playing cop with their hands tied by liberal lawyers. We needed to kill, and kill a generation. How it looked on the evening news curtailed that tactic.

    And those reasons, simply, is why we lost in Afghanistan.

  14. Danq

    August 16, 2021 at 10:25 am

    Mr. Michta’s analysis is mostly sound, and I’m glad he references Bush’s strategically insane decapitation of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which eliminated the region’s best bulwark against our actual main adversary in the Middle East, Iran. Given the sprawl of the topic, there’s no way an essay can touch on every aspect of it, and a few of the commenters helpfully did so. (While a few others just spewed whatever they heard that morning on talk radio.) There’s so much more to dig into here, from the Saudis’ support of al Qaeda to how the Pakistani ISI basically built the Taliban as a way to manage its neighbour after the Soviets left Afghanistan. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, that history will have to wait yet a few more years before we can see it clearly.

  15. GeoWash

    August 16, 2021 at 12:26 pm

    That’s great.

    Where were you with the warnings and such when this could have been prevented. Prevented the deaths and wasted capital and such?

  16. CM

    August 16, 2021 at 1:49 pm

    I think an equally germane factor in Afghanistan is a decided lack of national loyalty. In fact, national loyalty seems to be inversely proportional to the distance from Kabul; in other words, Afghanistan is much more legitimate in Kabul, but nearly meaningless to the residents of Herat.

    Tough to effectively use the tools of power (hard and soft) when the country’s population doesn’t care about the country itself. Even tougher when the U.S. doesn’t wield them competently.

  17. subject

    September 16, 2021 at 12:47 pm

    Why users ѕtill make use of to read news papеrs when in this technoloɡical world everything is accesѕible on net?

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