Pierre Poilievre has made one thing clear: if elected prime minister, he intends to end Canada’s decades-long decline as a serious military power.
His recent pledges—to establish a permanent Arctic military base, invest in naval icebreakers, and substantially increase defense spending—represent the most serious commitment to revitalizing the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in a generation. If implemented, these measures would not only enhance Canadian sovereignty but also go a long way toward addressing the growing frustration in Washington over Ottawa’s chronic failure to meet its defense obligations.
These proposed actions are not just ambitious; they are essential. Canada’s security environment is changing, and the country is unprepared. The Arctic is emerging as a strategic frontier as Russia and China expand their military and economic footprints in the region. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic and North Pacific—two maritime theaters that are vital to Canada’s security and economic lifelines—are increasingly contested by hostile actors.
Yet, Canada’s aging military infrastructure, particularly its naval capabilities, remains inadequate to meet these challenges. Without urgent investment, Canada risks ceding its ability to protect its own territory and interests. Poilievre’s plan is about more than military spending; it is about reasserting Canada’s role in securing its own future in an era of mounting geopolitical instability.
For years, Canada has acknowledged the Arctic’s growing strategic importance but failed to act decisively. The Trudeau government has released Arctic strategies filled with ambitious rhetoric, yet these have not translated into real investment. The gap between policy and capability is widening, and Canada’s northern security is increasingly exposed.
Russia has steadily expanded its Arctic military presence, reopening Soviet-era bases and deploying hypersonic missile-equipped submarines. China, though lacking direct Arctic territory, has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and continues to push for influence through scientific stations, economic investments, and deepening ties with Moscow.
But threats to Canadian security extend beyond the Arctic. The North Atlantic, long considered a critical maritime highway for NATO, is once again a focal point for Russian submarine activity and hybrid warfare tactics. At the same time, the North Pacific—an often-overlooked theater in Canadian strategic thinking—is rapidly becoming a flashpoint, with growing Chinese naval assertiveness and tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Canada’s west coast is home to vital ports and maritime trade routes that are increasingly vulnerable to foreign interference, espionage, and military intimidation. Yet, Ottawa has failed to make meaningful investments in naval power projection, surveillance, and domain awareness in this crucial region. Poilievre’s defense commitments are therefore not just about Arctic sovereignty; they are about ensuring that Canada can protect its interests in all three maritime domains—the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the North Pacific.
Poilievre’s pledge to establish a permanent Arctic military base is a long-overdue step toward correcting this vulnerability. Currently, Canada’s northern military footprint is minimal. Its most notable installation, the small seasonal station at Alert, is little more than a research and signals intelligence post. Without a sustained military presence, Canada is failing to assert its sovereignty in a region where rival powers are rapidly expanding their reach. A year-round Arctic base would reinforce Canada’s commitment to defending its northern frontier, signaling to allies and adversaries alike that Canada is serious about securing its own territory.
Strengthening Arctic infrastructure alone, however, is not enough. Canada’s naval capabilities are also in urgent need of modernization. While the government has announced plans to procure up to 12 new submarines, build 15 Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC), and continue production of Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), progress remains slow, and existing capabilities are stretched thin. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) currently lacks the ability to operate in the Arctic year-round. The Canadian Coast Guard operates a handful of icebreakers, but these vessels are aging, and their missions are largely limited to civilian support. Meanwhile, Russia has built the world’s largest fleet of heavy icebreakers, including nuclear-powered variants capable of escorting warships through Arctic waters. Without comparable capabilities, Canada risks being sidelined in its own northern waters.
Submarines will be equally critical, not just in the Arctic but in the North Atlantic and North Pacific as well. Canada’s current fleet of four Victoria-class submarines is aging and increasingly unreliable, with limited ability to operate in Arctic conditions. The planned procurement of up to 12 new submarines is a necessary step, but without clear timelines and a procurement system capable of delivering results, these plans risk becoming another example of Canada’s chronic defense mismanagement. Without undersea capabilities, Canada’s ability to monitor and deter hostile activity in its maritime domains will remain compromised, particularly as Russian and Chinese submarines expand their presence in the Atlantic and Pacific.
Canada’s surface fleet also faces serious challenges. The CSC program is meant to replace the aging Halifax-class frigates with modern, multi-role combatants, but cost overruns and delays have plagued the project. At the same time, the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, designed for northern operations, are being built at a frustratingly slow pace. While these ships are an important step in maintaining a year-round Arctic presence, they are lightly armed and lack the capability to operate in high-intensity conflicts.
If Canada is to have a meaningful surface presence in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North Pacific, these vessels must be accompanied by properly equipped warships capable of operating alongside allied fleets.
While Canada faces mounting security challenges at home, its credibility as an ally is also at stake. Poilievre’s plan is not just about Canadian defense—it is also about preserving Canada’s standing with its closest partner, the United States. Washington’s patience with Ottawa’s chronic underinvestment in defense is wearing thin. While Canadian leaders often speak of their country as a “middle power,” the reality is that Canada has failed to meet even the most basic commitments to its allies.
Successive U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have urged Canada to increase its defense spending. Yet under Trudeau, Canada has remained far below the NATO target of 2% of GDP, even attempting to reclassify non-military expenditures as defense spending to create the illusion of progress.
This has only reinforced the perception in Washington that Canada is a free rider—one that benefits from the security umbrella provided by the United States while making little effort to contribute meaningfully to collective defense.
Poilievre’s defense commitments, if followed through, would represent a much-needed reset in U.S.-Canada defense relations. Strengthening Arctic defenses, modernizing the military, and ensuring a credible naval presence in both the Atlantic and Pacific would demonstrate that Canada is prepared to take its responsibilities seriously.
This would not only reduce tensions with Washington but also prevent a scenario in which the United States feels compelled to unilaterally secure Canada’s Arctic or patrol its Pacific waters—an outcome that would be politically untenable for both countries.
Members of 1st Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light infantry, playing as coalition forces take cover behind a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 6.0 during Ex MAPLE RESOLVE in Wainwright, Alberta on May 10th, 2021. From May 1 to 11, 2021, about 2500 Canadian Armed Forces members are participating in Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 21 in Wainwright, Alberta. As the premier annual Canadian Army field training event, Ex MAPLE RESOLVE tests soldier skills and abilities within a realistic, complex, and challenging combat environment.
At its core, Poilievre’s plan is about ensuring that Canada is no longer a passive actor in its own security. For too long, the country has relied on geography and alliances to shield it from external threats. That assumption is no longer valid. The Arctic is becoming a contested space, and the North Pacific and North Atlantic are growing in strategic importance. A well-equipped, well-funded Canadian military—capable of defending Arctic sovereignty, patrolling key maritime domains, and contributing meaningfully to North American and NATO security—is not a luxury. It is a necessity.
The alternative is continued decline, dwindling influence, and an increasing dependence on the goodwill of allies who are growing tired of carrying Canada’s weight. If Ottawa does not act now, it may soon find that its sovereignty is recognized in theory but unenforceable in practice. Poilievre’s vision for the Canadian Armed Forces is not just ambitious; it is essential. The only question that remains is whether Canada has the political will to make it a reality.
About the Author: Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, writing a daily column.
