On 6 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed the General Director of Roscosmos, the Russian Space Agency, Yuri Borisov. He will be replaced by 39-year-old Dmitry Bakanov, who had been the Russian deputy transport minister and was the head of the state-backed Gonets satellite communications system.
Borisov’s dismissal represents the second experienced director of the Russian defense and aerospace industry sector to have been replaced in the last four months.
In November 2024, Yuri Slyusar, who was the head of the United Aircraft-Building Corporation (OAK), departed this powerful position to become the regional governor in Rostov-na-Donu. He will now be replaced by Vadim Badekha who is currently the CEO of the United Engine-Building Corporation (ODK).
Although Borisov was officially fired by Putin and Slyusar engineered his own replacement by seeking the regional governor’s position, both individuals are no longer in these positions for the same reason: the Russian defense and aerospace sector is falling apart.
As one long-time colleague who worked many years in the Russian aircraft design and manufacturing sector told me – “many parts of this once-proud and prestigious symbol of the Soviet Union’s industrial empire are dying and major portions are dead already.”
Decades of Experience
The departure of both senior industrial group CEOs means decades of experience walking out the door at a time when Russia’s defense sector is in more dire need of – as the Brits would say – “a safe pair of hands” than ever.
Slyusar was with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, controls the defense sector, and then was given the reins of OAK in 2015. Borisov was a Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry from 2012-2018, Deputy Minister of Defense for procurement from 2012-2018, the
Deputy PM for Defense and Space Industry from 2018-2022 and the General Director for RosCosomos from July 2022 until last week. His knowledge of the defense sector is encyclopedic.
Although the head of OAK is the most visible and prestigious of all the Russian defense sector positions, Slysar left before he could be removed as Borisov was. The numbers in recent years explain why he would have been fired as well had he stayed on.
Speaking with Russian aerospace industry watchers late last year, one of them explained, “the record for the industry fulfilling state orders is abysmal. The problems in the military aircraft sector are bad enough, but the commercial production lines have almost completely collapsed.”
Not Fulfilling the Plan
The Russian state plan for aviation called for 40 civil airliners to be produced in 2023 and by 2026. This was to increase to 120 planes annually, then 200 per year in 2028, and 230 annually by 2030. This would have been the highest level of production of airliner aircraft since the late 1970s – the heyday of the Soviet era and when this industrial sector was at its peak.
In actuality, only three airliner aircraft were built in 2024 instead of the 40 that were called for. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has constructed only seven commercial airliners.
In the Summer 2024, the state decided to classify the number of aircraft registered to different airlines, which is consistent with the Soviet and Russian practice of always trying to cover up bad news.
Projections are for a significant decline in passenger traffic in 2025-2026 due to the number of aircraft available dropping rapidly. Accident rates are rising with open sources reporting the frequency of incidents having more than doubled since 2019.
MiG-35 Fighter from Russia.
One author surveying the situation said, “The idea that Russia has weathered the impact of Western sanctions is nothing more than a fantasy and a fabrication of Russian propaganda. While the sanctions did not trigger a macroeconomic crisis or cause irreparable disruptions in supply chains, they are increasingly exerting a cumulative effect.”
Others point out that shortfalls in the commercial sector do not mean that there is no collateral impact on the defense side. Most of the significant new military programs like the PAK-DA long-range flying wing bomber or the MiG-41 PAK-DP replacement for the MiG-31 are little more than “paper airplanes” at this point.
Negative Campaigning
Perhaps the most revealing part of the entire story are the circumstances around Borisov’s firing. According to a Moscow source, the rumors are that a “papka” or a large file of papers was placed in front of Putin. The documents revealed the number of space launches in Russia had fallen sharply to the level of the 1960s when the program was in its infancy.
The information that the space sector was in dire straits reportedly enraged Putin, so he had Borisov removed effective the next day. According to one news report in Moscow, most of the staff at Roscomos were unaware that he had been fired as the entire process took place literally overnight.
This tells you, said the source in Moscow, “how little Putin understand about the true state of affairs inside his defense sector. He thought everything was fine inside the space and aircraft sectors. It was a huge shock for him to learn how bad the situation really is – and this is probably not the last time either.”
MiG-41. Image Credit: YouTube Screenshot.
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is now an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw. He has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments and the Australian government in the fields of defense technology and weapon systems design. Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.
