Recently, voices in both South Korea and Poland have seriously suggested arming their countries with tactical nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing national deterrence. The compulsion is understandable. During the Cold War, enemies and allies handed out tactical nuclear arsenals like candy on Halloween.
Still, too much candy is bad for you. So are too many nuclear arsenals. Expanding the nuclear club never worked well during the Cold War.
Proliferating mini-nuclear arsenals would work no better now. The greatest mistake humanity could make over four decades after the end of nuclear brinkmanship—which spanned decades—would be to abandon the vision of President Ronald Reagan to make the prospects of an atomic holocaust unimaginable.
Untested Ideas
During the Cold War, the theory behind deployment of tactical nuclear weapons was that it would create a bond between conventional and strategic forces. If conventional deterrence failed, armies could supplement defenses with smaller yield nuclear-arms. If the use of these weapons did not end conflict, war would escalate to strategic attack which would end in total destruction. Employing small yield nuclear arms would be signal of escalation to force de-escalation, linking the threat of conventional war to mutually assured destruction.
For almost half a century, the sketchy theory remained untested. In contrast to the West, Soviet doctrine considered tactical nuclear arms warfighting weapons, envisioning robust employment if conflict escalated to the nuclear level. In turn, NATO and American forces and allied troops supported by nuclear weapons deployed in other theaters, like South Korea, struggled to develop realistic doctrine and practical plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons as an actual warfighting tool to supplement conventional forces.
Meanwhile, the costs and risks of deployed tactical nuclear forces proved not insignificant, competing for resources with the conventional forces that they were supposed to supplement and strengthen. Instead of a cheap alternative to conventional combat power, tactical nuclear arms were just another expensive budget burden to bear.
After the Cold War, NATO and US forces in Asia rapidly drew down tactical nuclear weapons. These arms were rightly considered the least valuable deterrent force.
Back to the Past
Countries are suddenly interested in boutique nuclear arsenals once again. None of their arguments are all that good.
The US faces increased strategic nuclear competition with Russia and China. The expansion of Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is dramatic and concerning, likely to equal and perhaps exceed either the arms of Washington or Moscow. Further, the prospects of serious arms talks to limit the stockpiles of the three powers that would actually result in significant reductions are extremely unlikely. The old question raised during the Cold War, “Would Washington risk a confrontation that might lead to a nuclear attack on New York to save an allied city?” has returned, leading some to think they need their own nuclear deterrent or, in the case of Europe, relying on the very limited nuclear arsenals of France and the UK.
There is no question that Europe and South Korea require strong deterrence against enemies on their borders, but trying to replicate the strategic umbrella the US provides is unnecessary, wasteful, impractical, and dangerous.
Future of Strategic Deterrence
Arguing that allies can’t rely on the American strategic deterrent is just wrong. Allies ought to have more, not less, confidence in the US strategic umbrella. While American political leadership is deeply divided on many issues, there is rare, strong bipartisan support for continuing to develop America’s strategic arsenal—largely as a response to the threat posed by China.
Further, the US, particularly the present administration, is firmly committed to improving and expanding missile defenses. This initiative is important because the most stable strategic environment is an offense-defense mix, demonstrating the capability to both devastate an enemy, but also to protect your own population and infrastructure. Trump has even called for building an “Iron Dome over America.” In addition, the current administration looks to accelerate US military strength in space to prevent enemies from undermining the capability of strategic nuclear weapons and missile defenses.
The current administration is decidedly determined to achieve peace through strength. The more committed the US acts to build out its strategic umbrella, the more credible an instrument America’s nuclear forces will be for the one mission these weapons can credibly and effectively do—deter future nuclear wars.
Role of Conventional Forces
Guns, planes, tanks, bombs, and ships, conventional arms, also have an important role to play in deterring both nuclear and conventional conflict. This was actually demonstrated during the Cold War. What pushed the Soviet Union to the brink were not scattering tactical nuclear weapons all over Europe like poppies. Reagan paired the strategic defense initiative, which would have given the US a powerful strategic offense-defense mix with a significant increase in NATO’s conventional striking power. The Soviets feared the West could potentially match or overmatch the Warsaw Pact with both conventional and strategic forces.
Recent conflicts only reaffirm the deterrent value of conventional arms. Nuclear arms do not deter conventional war. Israel has nuclear arms. The country was attacked by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Russia has nuclear arms. Yet, Ukraine counter campaigned on Russian territory. Nobody detonated a nuclear bomb. Even after Russia failed to achieve its tactical objectives in Ukraine, despite the fact Ukraine has no nuclear weapons, Russia did not use tactical nuclear weapons.
World condemnation against a disproportionate use of arms may have played into Russia’s reluctance to drop nuclear bombs on Kyiv. On the other hand, there are practical reasons reminding that tactical nuclear weapons have little warfighting utility in the modern world.
For starters, like every arm from hand grenades to a nuclear-tipped cruise missile, tactical weapons are used for “fire and maneuver.” Targets are attacked with firepower to enable a maneuver force to advance on an objective. Fire and maneuver with nuclear arms is very difficult, necessitating deliberate well-crafted plans and well-trained, well-equipped troops capable of operating effectively on a devastated nuclear battlefield. Arguably, no military in the world today is really trained to do this well.
While tactical nuclear weapons can also be used to destroy population centers and infrastructure, this is more easily done with conventional weapons. In fact, in contrast to the Cold War, modern armies have way more capability to conduct devastating attacks with more precision at greater depth. Why use a sledgehammer when there are a lot cheaper and more practical hammers that can deliver the same destruction.
Recent conflicts reaffirm that tactical nuclear weapons are not practical warfighting tools. They also demonstrate how modern deterrence really works. If militaries can’t win a conventional war, they don’t start a nuclear one. The linkage between strategic and conventional deterrence is not tactical nuclear weapons, national nuclear arsenals, or France or the United Kingdom’s mini-me European nuclear forces—the linkage is strong conventional forces. The stronger national conventional forces, the more effective a strategic nuclear deterrent deters nuclear war.
Triumph of Trump
Countries who want their own nuclear weapons because they think they just can’t trust Trump just don’t get it. When President Trump says he wants to stop World War III he is serious—and he is showing the way. Trump is actually pressing allies to embrace the responsible, credible, suitable actions they should take to enhance deterrence in the modern world—invest in national conventional forces and expand the means to protect population centers and infrastructure from enemy attack. Indeed, investing in more tactical nuclear weapons would have negative consequences, diverting scarce resources, time, effort, political capital, and money from building-up the conventional arms we really need.
The actions Trump wants are the best to deter future conventional wars. Paired with the U.S. strategic umbrella, the free world also has the best option to deter nuclear war. Ronald Reagan would have heartily embraced this course of action.
About the Author: Dr. James Jay Carafano
Dr. James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy affairs. Carafano previously served as the Vice President of Heritage Foundation’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and served in the US Army for 25 years. He is an accomplished historian and teacher as well as a prolific writer and researcher. Follow him on X: @JJCarafano.
