Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has not gone the way anyone expected—for Russia itself, the results have been far worse than it hoped.
More than three years after the initial invasion, Russian troops are bogged down in a war that, barring a loss of outside support by either Ukraine or Russia, will likely drag on for years longer without a significant breakthrough.
With the dim prospect of a ceasefire on the horizon, it is worth asking: How much of a threat will Russia pose to Ukraine and its neighbors once this war is over?
Russia’s Losses in Ukraine War
Ukraine’s spirited resistance, buoyed by arms transfers from sympathetic states, has inflicted a staggering toll on the invading Russians. Russia’s total armed forces were estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency at 850,000 in early 2022, with the initial invasion force estimated at 190,000.
Nearly three years later, in late 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin estimated Russian casualties at 700,000 killed or wounded. Russia is also estimated to have lost approximately 14,000 armored vehicles, including 1,400 tanks and more than 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles. Aircraft losses as of July 2024 included at least 82 fixed-wing aircraft—primarily fighters and attack aircraft—and 131 helicopters. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has incurred heavy losses in the war, losing a guided-missile cruiser, a submarine, at least three large landing craft, and several small patrol craft.
Despite exceedingly heavy losses and a lack of real progress, Russia has fought on. It has dug deep into its reserves, breaking tanks and armored vehicles out of Cold War-era stockpiles, broadening its draft, and recruiting from prisons, non-combat military units, and other unconventional manpower sources.
Russia has also cut deals with China, North Korea, and Iran for military hardware—and at least 11,000 North Korean troops entered the war on the Russian side.
All of these efforts have produced minimal results. The Russian army today numbers approximately 1.5 million personnel, but this is not a force capable of breaking the stalemate and taking Kyiv. The frontline is still basically where it was two years ago, but with the carveout of a large chunk of Russian territory seized by Ukrainian forces to use as a bargaining chip. Weapons and supplies from China, North Korea, and Iran have failed to make a difference, and indeed often are plagued by serious design flaws and general low quality.
North Korean troops sustained heavy casualties in fierce fighting, underpinning their lack of relevant training for modern warfare, and reflecting Russian commanders’ disregard for their lives.
A Ceasefire Is Just a Break
If Russia were to accept a ceasefire in Ukraine, this would almost certainly mean only a temporary break in the fighting. Russian President Vladimir Putin has invested too much of his own reputation, and that of Russia as a whole, to give up. He would use a ceasefire as an operational pause to reconstitute his forces and await the opportunity to attack again. Putin’s age and health would also likely factor into this calculus, as the war is deeply personal to him, and he would want to see victory before he dies.
Putin would simply wait for a window of vulnerability in Ukrainian defenses before attacking again. This would be particularly dangerous for Ukraine because, even if its intelligence services detected a buildup and a clear intent to attack, it could not strike first without handing Russia a major propaganda win.
Another possibility is a ceasefire followed by an attack on NATO. In that scenario, Putin peels off a portion of the Russian army and reorients it toward Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Putin, an avowed Soviet revanchist, could launch an attack on any one of the Baltic States, or even on all three.
The small size of each state, both geographically and in terms of defense forces, would make Russian victory inevitable. The only significant threat to conquest would be forces from other NATO states based in those countries that could contribute to the defense—and serve as a tripwire to quickly involve the rest of the alliance. In a NATO-Russia war with American support questionable, Russia’s numerically superior ground forces and its sheer geographic depth would make it difficult for NATO to force a quick end to the war.
Attacking larger NATO states is less likely, but as the original invasion of 2022 illustrated, it is not impossible. Poland, a historical adversary and a former member of Putin’s fondly remembered Warsaw Pact, has large, well-trained armed forces. Finland, Norway, or Sweden are other possible targets.
While Russian victory against any of these countries, with NATO behind them, seems extremely unlikely, it is important to keep in mind that victory against Ukraine has been extremely unlikely for three years—yet Moscow has continued its war.
Russia’s Incapable Navy
Farther-flung attacks using Russia’s naval forces are unlikely. The navy is in bad shape. Russia inherited the bulk of the Soviet navy after the breakup of the USSR, but had neither the shipyards nor the economic resources to continue building large ships. While the Russian economy began growing again in the 2010s, it has been unable to build surface warships larger than frigates. Submarine construction has continued largely unabated, especially of subs that contribute to Russia’s nuclear deterrence.
The remainder of Russia’s fleet, particularly its Kilo- and Yasen-class submarines, as well as its frigates and corvettes, is largely only useful to serve as cruise-missile and anti-ship platforms. The bulk of the Russian navy is incapable of any large, consequential naval operation, including amphibious operations.
From an outsider’s perspective, Russia’s war against Ukraine is the definition of madness. Putin appears unbound by reality, which makes it hard to predict his future choices. Putin’s irrationality and his fixation on reestablishing the old Soviet borders make it clear he will not stop with Ukraine.
The Russian president may not have the forces to win another war, but he has his reasons for starting one, and that will make Russia an extremely dangerous threat to the rest of Europe for the foreseeable future.
About the Author: Kyle Mizokami
A 19FortyFive Contributing editor, Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco. His work has appeared in Popular Mechanics, Esquire, The National Interest, Car and Driver, Men’s Health, and many others. He is the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch, Asia Security Watch and War Is Boring.
