The Protests in Georgia and Serbia Should Not be Equated

After the Second World War, Europe was the scene of profound ideological conflicts. Nothing epitomizes the era more than the Prague Spring of 1968, when reformers in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek attempted to create what they called “socialism with a human face.“ Their reforms were a quest for liberalization and openness, a rebellion against Soviet dogma. At the same time, students on the streets of Belgrade were not protesting for democracy, but for a stronger commitment to Marxist ideals, demanding the deepening of communism. That contrast illustrates an important truth: Not all protests, no matter how similar they may seem, are based on the same goals or values.

Flawed Conclusions

Fast forward to 2024, and a similar dynamic is taking place in Georgia and Serbia. For weeks, protesters have been filling the streets of Tbilisi, waving Georgian and EU flags and condemning what they see as an anti-democratic, pro-Russian government. Their demands are clear: new parliamentary elections, continuation of Georgia’s European path, and resistance to the Kremlin’s influence.

At the same time, students in Belgrade also took to the streets, blocking universities and protesting after a tragedy in which 15 people were killed when the railway-station canopy in Serbia’s second-largest city collapsed.

Some observers have drawn parallels between these movements and portrayed both as a generational uprising against authoritarianism. In Serbia, they romanticize the protests, portraying the students as “fighters against the pro-Russian regime of Aleksandar Vucic“ and equating them with the protesters in Georgia who are resisting the Kremlin’s influence.

This simplified comparison is deeply flawed. It fails to acknowledge the diverse motives, symbols, and political contexts that drive each of these movements.

The protests in Tbilisi are unequivocally pro-European and anti-colonial. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Georgian government has come under intense pressure for its rapprochement with Moscow. Protesters accuse the ruling Georgian Dream party of undermining democracy and abandoning the country’s European aspirations. The symbolism is strong: The masses wave Georgian and EU flags, declaring their desire to integrate with the West and reject Russian subjugation.

These protests reflect a broader social consensus in Georgia, where memories of the 2008 Russian invasion and that country’s continued occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are still fresh. Deeply rooted resistance to the Kremlin’s influence unites different social groups around a shared vision of Georgia’s European future.

In Serbia, student protests are a reaction to a specific event: the disaster at the railway station in Novi Sad. Protesters are rightly demanding accountability and justice, requiring that the culprits be identified and punished. Their anger is justified, and their fight honorable.

However, the broader political and ideological context complicates this story. Accession to the EU does not motivate the protests in Serbia, unlike those in Georgia. On the contrary, EU flags are conspicuously absent and even banned at the protests. Other demonstrators greet those who carry the EU flag with hostility and even physically attack them, indicating a deep-rooted mistrust—even open hostility—toward Serbia’s European integration among many participants. In contrast, at several of the largest protests so far, Russian flags were often on display.

Differing Aspirations

This attitude is no accident. In Serbia, those opposed to the European Union often justify their position as a rejection of the West’s alleged support for Vucic, the president of Serbia. Moreover, pronounced criticism of the EU and its leaders is a primary characteristic of the Serbian opposition, which provides political support to the student protests.

Many of the protesters who condemn Vucic also have a pro-Russian and anti-European stance and are aligned with nationalist and right-wing movements that openly support Vladimir Putin and Russia.

This ideological nexus is further illustrated by the slogan “Belgrade is the world again“ that has been displayed at these protests. For many protesters, the “world“ they envision is not the EU, but a multipolar order led by Russia and China. The pro-European fervor in Tbilisi, which views EU membership and integration with the West as the path to freedom and prosperity, stands in stark contrast to this.

To understand the essential difference between these movements, it is useful to recall another historical comparison: the uprisings in Hungary and East Germany in 1956. In Hungary, the revolution was a cry for freedom, an attempt to break with Soviet rule and establish democratic rule. In East Germany, on the other hand, the workers’ protests in the same year demanded better living conditions within the existing communist framework, without calling Soviet rule into question.

Although both movements involved mass mobilization and resistance to the status quo, their goals were diametrically opposed: one wanted liberation from communism, the other its minor adjustment. Similarly, the protests in Georgia and Serbia reflect different aspirations—one seeking alignment with Europe and democratic values, the other driven by domestic discontent and influenced by nationalist, anti-European currents.

Context Matters

Romanticizing the Serbian protests as part of a broader European struggle against authoritarianism does a disservice to both. By equating these two movements, observers risk misrepresenting the authentic aspirations of the Georgian protesters while ignoring the ideological currents driving the Serbian protests.

This narrative also ignores the complexity of Serbian politics, in which, despite Vucic’s frequent rhetoric meant to appease the Serbian right, the most extreme opposition to Vucic often goes hand-in-hand with pro-Russian, anti-Western sentiment. While it is important to acknowledge the legitimacy of Serbian students’ demands for accountability, it is equally important to recognize that their protests do not represent a unified pro-European or pro-democracy movement. Members of the extreme right-wing organization People’s Patrol, an extremely pro-Russian and violent group with strong ties to the Kremlin, along with their leader, Damjan Knezevic, who visited Wagner Group headquarters in 2022, also appeared at their protests. The group also included military veterans from the 1990s wars who wore the Russian flag and the insignia of extremist Serbian organizations.

These facts do not negate the legitimacy of the protests in Serbia or the bravery of those advocating for justice. What happened in Novi Sad is a national tragedy, and the students’ determination to hold the authorities to account is commendable. Their energy and passion are a testament to the power of young people to challenge passivity and demand accountability.

However, empathy for their struggle must not blind us to the wider political context. In contrast to Georgia, where the protests embody a clear commitment to democratic values and European integration, the protests in Serbia are ideologically fragmented and contain key elements that go against the very ideals celebrated in Georgia.

The protests in Georgia and Serbia may seem similar—both are about young people challenging the government—but the underlying motivations and goals are completely different. The Georgian movement fundamentally stands for sovereignty, democracy, and rapprochement with Europe. Although the Serbian protests stem from justified anger over a tragedy, nationalist and anti-European currents influence them, making any comparison with Georgia entirely inaccurate.

We must go beyond simplistic portrayals and recognize the complexity of these movements. Those who romanticize the Serbian protests as a mirror image of the Georgian resistance ignore the ideological differences that define them. Instead, let us appreciate each movement on its own merits: Georgian protesters fighting for their country’s European future and Serbian students seeking justice for a national tragedy. Both struggles deserve recognition, but not equivalence.

Dr. Orhan Dragaš is Director of the International Security Institute in Belgrade, Serbia (www.isi-see.org). He is author of The End of the Russian World: Russia, Ukraine, Balkans; Russia: From a Failed State to a Rogue State; and The Modern Intelligence-Security Community, Utopia or Reality.