In the blink of an eye, the roles have reversed. The U.S. – which had been Ukraine’s biggest arms supplier – has suspended military aid to that embattled nation even as the Trump administration vows to slash America’s defense budget.
Meanwhile, Europe – whose armed forces have been hollowed out by decades of neglect – is vowing a massive arms buildup to both revitalize European strength, and sustain Ukraine. Britain has pledged to boost defense spending to 2.5 percent from its current 2.3 percent. This exceeds NATO’s goal of 2 percent for members of the alliance, though far from Trump’s demand that NATO’s benchmark should be 5 percent.
After 75 years of having America take the lead for European defense, Europe’s newfound resolve to defend itself is stirring and overdue. It should also be feasible: with more than 13 percent of global GDP, and some of the advanced economies on the planet, Europe doesn’t lack for money, technology or talent.
The question is whether Europe has the capacity – political and economic — to really rearm.
Where does the money come from?
With $840 billion in EU defense funding just announced by European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen, Europe seems to be putting its Euros where its mouth is.
Perhaps not coincidentally, that’s about the same amount as the 2024 U.S. defense budget. However, that U.S. budget figure is for one year of defense spending. It’s not clear for how many years the EU’s $840 billion – assuming that proposal is even implemented – is supposed to cover.
The EU has also proposed floating around $158 billion in debt in order to issue loans to member nations for artillery, missiles and other weapons. In addition, the EU may waive strict fiscal rules that limit the ability of members to run deficits.
These are not insignificant changes. The EU has been more about European economic and political integration than security (which is what NATO is for). Actively funding defense procurement sounds like a precursor for the EU becoming a military bloc with an integrated pan-European military.
But the U.S. has a major advantage in defense spending: there is only one defense budget to be devised and approved by one president and one legislature. The EU is comprised of 27 nations, each with its leader, legislature, armed forces and interest groups. For example, Germany has constitutional restrictions on running budget deficits, and was less than sympathetic when EU members such as Greece racked up debts.
Where do the weapons and ammunition come from?
It is understandable that after two world wars and nearly 50 years of cold war, Europe allowed its defense industrial base to lapse after the demise of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Europe needs to replenish its neglected armed forces while supplying those of Ukraine.
Even in World War II, when weapons were far simpler to mass produce, it took the United States at least two years after Pearl Harbor to reach peak production.
America is hardly an exemplar of efficient defense procurement (see F-35). But European defense firms – whose stock prices are skyrocketing — warn that it will take years for them to ramp up production (Russia is already at full-scale war production) All amid potential trade wars and competition for resources with China and the United States, and even Europe if nations vie for raw materials and lucrative contracts to boost their defense manufacturers.
Where does the political willpower come from?
Defense production is a long-term process. Even if Germany and other European nations are willing to run deficits in pursuit of security, every Euro spent on weapons is one less Euro available for social programs. Europe already faces challenges such as anemic economic growth, aging populations and low birth rates, and a generous welfare state in the more developed nations on the continent.
Challenger 3 Tank. Image Credit: British Government.
Were this 1943, perhaps the European public would be more than willing to endure hardships for the sake of security. But the economy is flat, and there is the rise of populist and right-wing parties who don’t support Ukraine nor even consider Russia a threat.
Will Europeans be willing to accept cuts in their standard of living, and will governments be willing to demand those sacrifices?
About the Author: Defense Expert Michael Peck
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
