Finland’s Defense Against the Soviet Union in “The Winter War”: The world stood ready to explode in 1939. Japan invaded China and committed atrocities against the Chinese. Italy moved into Africa and conquered Ethiopia. Hitler’s Nazi Germany annexed Austria and was threatening Czechoslovakia.
The Finnish people mistrusted the Soviet Union, knowing that Stalin wanted their territory, including the nickel mines. In August 1939, the Germans and Russians signed a famous non-aggression pact. It was a piece of paper that was largely symbolic, and neither thought it would last.
After Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the Germans and Russians split the country into two parts. Josef Stalin immediately began attempts to negotiate with Finland.
Stalin sought to expand his influence over Eastern Europe. Citing concerns about a potential attack by the Germans, Stalin demanded that the Finns move Russian troops to specific areas around the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga 20 miles northwest to create a buffer zone to protect the Russian city of Leningrad better. He also wanted the Finns to hand over several islands in the Gulf of Finland and lease territory to Stalin on the Hanko Peninsula to construct a naval base.
Stalin offered up some worthless wilderness land in eastern Karelia in return. The Finns naturally rejected this idea. Determined to preserve their hard-won independence, achieved from Russia in 1917, and misled by the delusion that the Western democracies would step in to deter any Communist attack, they were soon to be abandoned.
Stalin’s Huge Army Is Ill-trained and Equipped For Winter Warfare
Stalin was shocked that the Finnish government would turn down his “offer,” which he felt was fair. He ordered the Red Army to prepare to invade Finland. The Soviet Army was enormous, with hundreds of divisions and thousands of aircraft and tanks, but its equipment was old and obsolete.
The Soviet Army of 1939 was a paper tiger with little experience in conventional warfare. It had issues supplying and equipping such a considerable army, even in peacetime. The Soviets had an army of 1,800,000 men, a quarter of which were stationed in the Far East.
The ordinary Russian soldier was not that bad. Some units were better trained than others, but none were adequately prepared for the challenge of extreme winter warfare.
Only a quarter of the Soviet Army’s entire strength could be devoted to the Finnish war effort, at least at the start. Garrisons in Poland, Romania, the Baltic States, and the Far East tied up some of its finest fighting formations. Initial Soviet forces committed to battle would be around half a million men.
On paper, it was a complete mismatch. The Soviet Red Army had considerable men, tanks, aircraft, and artillery advantages. Stalin and his generals believed the war would be over very quickly. However, the Soviets had leadership problems.
Stalin’s Great Purge of 1937
Stalin was always suspicious of anyone with independent, creative thought. He was paranoid of the ex-Czarist officers in the military and saw a plot to overthrow him at every turn. Finally, in 1937, his paranoia turned to bloodthirsty, brutal tactics.
Hundreds of officers were systemically liquidated during the ensuing Great Purge. Stalin’s aim was the utter destruction of the Red Army’s leadership. In this, he succeeded totally.
Anyone who demonstrated the least amount of initiative or creative thought was disposed of in an NKVD prison cellar by a bullet to the back of the head. The dozens shot marshals, generals, colonels, and even junior officers and NCOs.
Mikhail Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army commanders were charged with conspiracy with Germany. All eight were convicted and executed. All told, 30,000 members of the armed forces were executed. This elimination included fifty percent of all army officers.
Officers were rapidly promoted to fill the gaps before being adequately trained for their new and higher responsibilities. It was common to find colonels in charge of divisions and majors heading up regiments.
Stalin implemented a dual command system to watch the new, inexperienced leaders. Political commissars were appointed at the regimental level to ensure the reliability of field-grade officers.
This oversight also allowed for divided command, which would help control potential enemies inside the Army. But the commissars were more than mere political advisers; they had actual authority over the conduct of military operations. This arrangement was ineffective because nearly all of the political commissars from the NKVD didn’t have practical command experience.
This lack of experience, as much as anything else, caused the Russians to suffer massive losses in the coming months.
The Finnish Army Was Professional, Well-Trained, and Led
The Finnish Army of 1939 was much smaller than the Russians’, but it was well-trained, had intimate knowledge of the terrain, and had the added incentive of fighting for its homeland.
The Finnish National Army consisted of 33,000 men grouped in three infantry divisions, a light infantry brigade and a cavalry brigade, supported by about 15 artillery battalions, fewer than 70 aircraft, and a dozen French World War I-era Renault tanks.
The mobilized territorial force increased the Finnish Army to 127,000 men in nine infantry divisions. The Army Reserve had another 100,000 men, as did the paramilitary Civic Guard, allowing the Finns to field an army of more than 400,000 troops in 12 divisions of 14,200 men each.
T-35. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The Finns also had small numbers of cavalry and Jaegers, acting as elite light infantry, the latter moving by bicycle. Field artillery was chiefly 77mm field guns supplemented by 122mm howitzers. Heavy artillery consisted of 105mm and 107mm pieces, but there were few of these in the Finnish Army. All artillery was horse-drawn, and each battery held between four and six pieces.
The Finnish officer corps was a professional, virulently anti-Communist group from the aristocracy. They led from the front. The Finnish soldiers were well-trained and expert marksmen. They knew the landscape and were comfortable living and working in the cold.
Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim was a Swedish-Finnish nobleman and career soldier. He was well-respected by his troops and officers and would lead the Army in the upcoming fight.
Russia Attacks Finland on November 30, 1939
At the outset of the war, the Russians attacked on three fronts, but the most important was the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad. The open fields and partly cultivated woodlands were conducive to large-scale mechanized maneuvers.
The isthmus, a sprawling network of lakes, was initially an obstacle, but once the lakes froze in mid-December, they became clear terrain. The isthmus, 65 miles across at its widest point, was protected by a Finnish defensive position known as the Mannerheim Line.
T-35. Image: Creative Commons.
Lieutenant General Kirill Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad Military District since 1938, had operational control of the Soviet forces at the start of the war. He was not a professional soldier, so he survived the purges. He estimated that the struggle with Finland would be concluded in 12 days.
The Winter War began with Soviet bombers conducting air raids on Helsinki, Viipuri, and other Finnish cities and towns.
Finnish Army Mounts Inspired Defense
Despite the Soviets attacking in large numbers of men, tanks, and equipment, the Finnish Army hunkered down behind a network of trenches, concrete bunkers, and field fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and beat back repeated Soviet tank assaults.
A poor road network, snowstorms, and Finnish snipers who took a toll on the Russians hampered the invading force. The Finns had few anti-tank weapons but improvised ways to knock out Soviet armor. Here is where the term “Molotov Cocktail” came into being.
The Finns believed Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was responsible for the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish War and named an improvised incendiary grenade after him. The ‘Molotov Cocktail’ proved to be a primitive but effective anti-tank weapon against Soviet armor.
The Soviets attacked the Mannerheim Line time and again, only to be beaten back with heavy casualties.
Seven infantry divisions and two armored brigades, supported by 600 guns and 1,000 planes, were blunted in the Mannerheim Line. The cost to the Russians was enormous—thousands killed, many more wounded or unable to function in the bitter winter conditions that even the Soviets were not equipped to contend with. More than 250 Russian tanks were destroyed.
The Soviets attacked Suomussalmi, a provincial town of 4,000 inhabitants in Finland’s midsection. The Soviet 44th and 163rd Divisions of the Ninth Army were tasked with capturing it.
Finnish ski troops expertly attacked Soviet supply lines and rear guards, slowing the advance. The Finns surrounded the 44th Division and wiped out the 163rd in three days after the arrival of reinforcements. The Soviet 44th Division was then chopped up. The battle cost the Soviets two divisions, over 30,000 dead, 43 captured tanks, and 270 other vehicles lost. The Finns tallied 900 dead and 1,770 wounded in the no-holds-barred battle.
The Soviets Break Through As The Finnish Army Wears Down
Soviet forces were bulked up with fresh troops and new leadership. Marshal Timoshenko and General Zhukov took over and pounded Finnish positions with concentrated artillery fire and armor assaults.
In March 1940, the Finns requested a ceasefire and were forced to cede 11 percent of their territory, including the Karelian Isthmus. They also had to allow Soviet basing rights at the port of Hangö.
However, the incredible result of the war was that the Finns retained their independence.
But they inflicted horrendous casualties on the Soviet Army, with the number of Russian dead ranging from 230,000 to 270,000 and an additional 200,000 to 300,000 wounded. The Russians lost 2,300 tanks, armored vehicles, and 700 aircraft. The Finns suffered 25,000 dead and 50,000 wounded.
Despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned, the Finnish Army, with their knowledge of the terrain and winter conditions, put up fierce resistance, utilizing tactics like ski troops moving quickly from place to place and conducting fierce ambushes.
Finland employed a tactic called “motti,” where they would draw Soviet troops into a pocket and then encircle and destroy Soviet units, often with devastating results.
About the Author: Steve Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a 19FortyFive National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing for 19FortyFive, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications
