China has amassed a hulking arsenal of long-range ballistic weaponry that boasts significant destructive potential. In addition to sheer firepower, China’s ballistic missiles also offer operational flexibility.
China’s ballistic-missile strategy reflects its overall anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) goal. Essentially, China is honing potent missile systems to serve both as deterrents to Western intervention and as strategic tools for power projection in the region.
China’s missiles are absolutely central to its A2/AD framework, which is explicitly designed to deny or at the least complicate the ability of China’s enemies—essentially the United States and its allies—from operating freely in the Indo-Pacific region.
By threatening important military assets, China wants to raise the costs of potential military intervention in Asia.
China’s strategic goal is not necessarily just to hit specific platforms such as aircraft carriers or bases (although having the ability to do so is certainly important), but also to complicate the planning of China’s adversaries, namely the United States, by creating uncertainty about how effective and survivable American forces would be in the event of widespread ballistic-missile launches. Ballistic missiles, therefore, are part of a broader deterrence strategy—one with particular emphasis on China’s littoral waters.
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
China has invested heavily in its antiship ballistic missiles, or ASMBs, which are powerful, long-range missiles that aim to sink high-value surface ships.
Often called “carrier killer” weapons, they are defined by a large explosive warhead, as well as the ability to penetrate carrier strike group (CSG) air defenses and kinetically penetrate ship hulls, detonating internally and sinking large ships.
The goal of these ASBMs is to push American CSGs back from China’s shore and littoral waters, reducing their effectiveness and forcing a significant investment in missile and air-defense countermeasures.
Although the ability of a single ASBM to sink a well-defended aircraft carrier is debatable, the class of weapons does pose a credible risk to surface vessels and complicates power projection into the Western Pacific.
Land-Attack Ballistic Missiles
However, China’s missile stocks are not just laser-focused on an antiship role. Weapons such as China’s DF-26 missile are thought to have both an antiship and a land-attack role.
This gives these kinds of weapons the ability to threaten both ships at sea and fixed bases on land. In a word, they offer flexibility.
“With its range of 4,000 km, it is China’s first conventionally-armed ballistic missile capable of striking Guam.” the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains. “The missile…can be armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead. An antiship variant, the DF-26B, was tested in 2020.”
Goals and Capabilities
“The People’s Republic of China is in the process of building and deploying a sophisticated and modern missile arsenal, though one shrouded in secrecy due to intentional ambiguity and unwillingness to enter arms control or other transparency agreements,” reads a dropdown from CSIS. “Beijing features its missiles most prominently in its developing anti-access/area denial doctrines, which use a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air, land and sea to target U.S. and U.S. allied military assets in the Asia-Pacific theater.
“China is also developing a number of advanced capabilities such as maneuverable anti-ship ballistic missiles, MIRVs, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The combination of these trends degrade the survivability of foundational elements of American power projection like the aircraft carrier and forward air bases. China also has a relatively small but developing contingent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. homeland, as well as a growing fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines.”
Part of China’s strategy may also involve saturation tactics, where multiple missiles are launched at a single target to overwhelm its defenses.
This strategy places a premium on volume, betting that even if a single missile strike would not be enough to sink an aircraft carrier or other large surface vessel—or a base—multiple hits would knock out the targeted platform.
What Happens Next? Aircraft Carriers in Trouble?
China’s ballistic-missile strategy in Asia is centered around deterrence and regional power projection.
A significant amount of the weaponry in China’s arsenal possesses dual capabilities, that is, the ability to target U.S. Navy CSGs and fixed bases on land.
Not only does this give China a great degree of operational flexibility, but it also complicates the operational environment for the United States and its allies.
The damage potential of weapons like China’s “carrier-killer” weaponry, though indeed significant, could be best understood not only as a decisive weapon to sink carriers or wipe out American military bases, but also as a way to complicate or degrade Chinese adversaries’ ability to operate in a contested environment.
This strategy fits within China’s doctrine of using advanced technology to create an environment in which the costs to the West of intervention in a potential conflict are very high.
The U.S. Navy At Sea: A Photo Essay
(Oct. 17, 2021) Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Bay of Bengal as part of Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX), Oct. 16, 2021. MPX 2021 is a multilateral maritime exercise between the Royal Australian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, U.K. Royal Navy, and U.S. maritime forces, focused on naval cooperation, interoperability and regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific and is an example of the enduring partnership between Australian, Japanese, U.K. and U.S. maritime forces, who routinely operate together in the Indo-Pacific, fostering a cooperative approach toward regional security and stability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Russell Lindsey)
The Ford-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) transit the Atlantic Ocean June 4, 2020, marking the first time a Ford-class and a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier operated together underway. Ford is underway conducting integrated air wing operations, and the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group remains at sea in the Atlantic as a certified carrier strike group force ready for tasking in order to protect the crew from the risks posed by COVID-19, following their successful deployment to the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of operation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Riley McDowell)
(Feb. 5, 2021) An F/A-18E Super Hornet, from the “Kestrels” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 137, rests on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) during a strait transit. Nimitz is part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group and is deployed conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Elliot Schaudt/Released)
NORFOLK (Aug. 16, 2019) The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), left, and USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) moored at Naval station Norfolk. Making port at Naval station Norfolk is a routine activity for aircraft carriers.
An EA-6B Prowler, assigned to the “Shadowhawks” of Electronic Attack Squadron 141 prepares to launch from a catapult during flight operations aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt during carrier qualifications.
The Ford-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) transit the Atlantic Ocean June 4, 2020, marking the first time a Ford-class and a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier operated together underway. Ford is underway conducting integrated air wing operations, and the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group remains at sea in the Atlantic as a certified carrier strike group force ready for tasking in order to protect the crew from the risks posed by COVID-19, following their successful deployment to the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of operation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Riley McDowell)
About the Author: Caleb Larson
Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.
