Dirty Work: Iran and its Development of a Regional Network of Militant Groups – Sometimes, an effective lesson is learned the hard way. We draw immediate conclusions, but they are incorrect. Later we make course corrections and generally benefit from the blunders. This is precisely what occurred to Iran.
Between 1980 and 1988, Iran fought Iraq in what became known as the Iran-Iraq War. This war was attritional in nature and relied heavily upon large infantry formations, artillery, and tanks. In many of the battles, Iran launched vast, crude frontal charges in an attempt to overwhelm and overrun Iraqi positions. The result was heaps of corpses left to be scorched under the sun.
When hostilities finally ceased in 1988, both sides had suffered greatly, with Iran losing approximately 750,000 service personnel, while Iraq lost roughly 500,000.
The lesson for Iran was crystal clear: A sustained conventional war is both brutal and demanding in terms of material, sustainment, and manpower. Therefore, going forward, Iran would support and enhance the capabilities of regional militant groups. These groups would in turn place pressure on Iran’s enemies (namely Israel and Saudi Arabia) and expand its influence throughout the region.
When the need for military confrontation arose, Iran’s proxy groups would do the fighting and the dying. The principal groups that Iran has funded and trained are Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and various Iraqi militias. Now, Iran seeks to make the Houthis in Yemen their southern anchor in the region.
A Look at the Houthis and the Reasons Behind Iran’s Interest in Them
The Houthis, one of numerous Yemeni tribes, seized control of large swaths of the country’s western territory, including the capital city, Sana’a. This occurred in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the Houthis have fought a bloody civil war since March 2015 against Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Their goal is to maintain an autonomous state in the country’s mountainous north, where they are the ethnic majority.
Iran has several motivations for its direct investment in the Houthis. The primary purpose for Iran to involve itself in the Yemeni civil war is its desire to maintain instability along the Saudi/Yemeni border. This increases the possibility that transnational terrorist elements will infiltrate Saudi Arabia from Yemen and strike targets of opportunity within the Kingdom.
Riyadh must allocate military, monetary, and logistical resources in order to ensure that this challenge doesn’t become a crisis. This all plays into Iran’s favor. Riyadh is expending valuable resources on a militant group, rather than staying focused on challenging Iran’s influence across the Arabian Peninsula.
The Houthis are also keeping the U.S. Navy occupied. In an effort to confront the Houthis, the U.S. Navy has fired 400 munitions at inbound Houthi weapon systems, including missiles and drones. Of that number, 200 are vertically launched missiles that cost roughly $1 million per unit. This bleeds U.S. weapon stocks, a net benefit for Iran and China, which is now attempting to exert control of the South China Sea.
Finally, Iran seeks to increase its control over the Red Sea via the Bab El Mandeb Strait, between Southwest Yemen and Djibouti. According to the Abaad Studies and Research Center:
“On March 6, 2024, General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior military advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, stated that the Naval and Air Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps should focus on the Red and Mediterranean Seas. Safavi described these two seas as essential parts of Iran’s strategic depth, empathizing Tehran’s intention to “expand its strategic depth by 5,000 kilometers.”
With increased control over this vital waterway, Iran, via the Houthis, can exact economic costs on Western nations that have placed sanctions upon it. According to the International Transport Forum, approximately 14 percent of global maritime trade and 30 percent of global containerized trade transits through the Red Sea.
In an attempt to avoid being targeted by the Houthis, 75 percent of commercial vessels now travel around southern Africa. This extended route adds an extra 20 days on any vessel’s journey to its port of call.
The Pipeline: How Iran Keeps the Houthi Arsenals Stocked to the Ceiling
Given the numerous benefits of sponsoring the Houthis, Tehran ensures that they have the armaments they need to carry out their destructive and disruptive actions near the southern end of the Red Sea.
The primary means of transporting munitions and other associated material to the Houthis is by boat, specifically the ubiquitous and humble dhow, a traditional wooden cargo ship. These vessels ply the waters around the Horn of Africa, within the Persian Gulf, and across the Arabian sea to the Indian subcontinent. Dhows range in size from diminutive fishing boats, to larger bulk transport vessels capable of displacing several hundred tons.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there are 4,300 dhows operating in the Arabian Sea, largely in an unregulated environment. These vessels are ideal for smuggling weapons in dry bulk, because they generally sail without Automatic Identification System transponders, making it nearly impossible to track them. Dhows can transship materials to smaller boats that have the ability to clandestinely land on beaches that are lightly patrolled.
Weapons In Transit
Those transshipments are one of the first steps in moving weapons to Yemen. In order to make it more difficult to detect, shipments of weapons are broken up prior to leaving the Persian Gulf. Outbound vessels from Iran anchor near the Kuwaiti or Omani coast, then proceed to transfer their cargo to smaller ships, which then move on to Yemen.
According to the United Nations, following the transfer, “illicit cargo is then moved to secluded beaches on the Southern coast of Yemen, in earlier years primarily to the governorates of Shabwah and Hadramawt, and more recently to Mahra, where they are then smuggled across the desert to Houthi- controlled areas of the country.”
To highlight this continual illicit flow, between May 2021 and January 2023 alone, the U.S. Navy confiscated a vast sum of weapons and ammunition while conducting security operations in and around the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
According to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, this combined haul included more than “ 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, approximately 194 rocket launchers, more than 70 anti-tank guided missiles, and more than 700,000 rounds of ammunition.”
The movement of strategic weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles requires much greater effort, as these weapons are too large (and conspicuous) to be transported as a single unit. Therefore, they are semi-disassembled and shipped in sections, then reassembled at their final location.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies states that between November 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Navy, operating in the Gulf of Aden, seized cargo including:
“[P]arts for Quds (Project 351/ Paveh)-type cruise missiles, the C802 anti-ship cruise missile and the Saqr (Project 358) surface-to-air missile. It also included various other components for UAVs and USVs, almost 14,000 non-electric detonators and 21 anti tank [sic] guided missiles, which UN experts assessed to be the Iranian version of the 9M133 Kornet.”
Evidence of this shipping method has been observed via the recovery of ballistic missile debris used in attacks on Saudi Arabia. Recovered sections of the missiles seemed to have been crudely welded together, indicating they had been smuggled into Yemen in parts, rather than being manufactured at a facility in Yemen.
Expert Guidance
Prior to 2015, (when Saudi Arabia began targeting the Houthis), the Houthis had already established themselves as a capable insurgent group, excelling at irregular warfare operations.
Yet around that same year, with the involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Quds Force (QF), and Hezbollah, the Houthis further improved their capabilities.
The IRGC and the QF are instrumental in furthering Iran’s foreign policy by dispatching cadres to regions in which Iran seeks to further its influence and control. Cadres from these groups have been active in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and, for the last 10 years, Yemen—embedded within Houthi combat units.
The group has received financing, training, and shipments of smuggled weapons via IRGC-QF units 400 and 190. These operations are overseen by Abdolreza Shahlaei, a senior commander of Unit 400, a subset of the Quds Force tasked with clandestine, direct-action, and support missions in foreign countries.
The IRGC and QF instruct the Houthis in such areas as guerilla warfare, naval warfare, intelligence gathering, ballistic-missile operations, and UAV and drone boat operation.
The presence of Hezbollah, under the direction of the IRGC, is corroborated by the testimonies of Houthi POWs. According to Arab News, a Houthi prisoner detailed that he and his platoon had received theoretical training in the Yemeni capital of Sana’a, with practical training occurring in the field. The latter was directed by a Hezbollah rocket and artillery expert, who gained combat experience in Iraq.
Finally, the standardized production of land mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including Explosively Formed Penetrators (capable of penetrating several inches of armor) and radio-controlled IEDs, indicates that Hezbollah has transferred this capability to the Houthis. Additionally, Hezbollah agents have aided the Houthis in procuring electronics and other requisite materials for the manufacture of IEDs.
A Way Forward?
The Houthis have proven themselves as capable combatants while operating against Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Army. Now, they are a menace to global commerce.
The ability of the Houthis to maintain their continual assaults both on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia is a testament to Iran’s ability to supply them with the needed munitions. While the weapons shipments are pivotal, so too is the training that the Houthis receive either by Iranian or Hezbollah operatives.
Given that the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman are the earliest transit routes for vessels departing Iran laden with munitions, focusing on this area is of crucial importance.
While this is a radical idea, and surely it has been pondered, could the U.S. government employ private military companies to augment its military operations, aimed at disrupting the Iranian pipeline of weapons to the Houthis?
Under such a program, only highly qualified former U.S. military personnel, with emphasis placed on combat experience, would be accepted into such roles.
Once underway, this program would be coordinated and directed by U.S. naval commanders in that area of operations. This would ensure strict operational oversight and bolster U.S. military operations in the area with highly qualified operators, while freeing up active-duty personnel for other critical missions.
About the Author: Christian P. Martin
Christian P. Martin is a Michigan-based writer; he earned a Master’s degree in Defense & Strategic Studies (Summa cum laude) from the University of Texas, El Paso. Currently, he is a research assistant at the Asia Pacific Security Innovation Forum. Concerning writing, he has published several dozen articles in places like Simple Flying, SOFREP, SOF News, and The Collector.
