Key Points and Summary: The recent India-Pakistan crisis (April-May 2025), which saw a ceasefire after a terror attack and retaliatory strikes, demonstrates that nuclear weapons primarily serve to deter other nuclear-armed states from using their nuclear weapons, rather than preventing conventional conflict or being useful for “escalate to de-escalate” tactics.
-True nuclear stability arises not from the bombs themselves, but from robust conventional deterrence, a strong offense/defense mix (including missile defense), diligent non-proliferation efforts (especially concerning Iran), and addressing underlying geopolitical issues like state-sponsored terrorism.
-Nuclear weapons do not solve these fundamental problems between nations.
Will India and Pakistan Ever Hit the Nuclear Button?
India and Pakistan are humanity’s lab rats for future nuclear conflict. Their behavior tells a good deal about the dynamics of nuclear-armed states in the modern world.
Without question, if a nation wants to stumble into a nuclear holocaust, the best way to do that is to assume such an Armageddon would never happen—not remain a responsible steward of their nation’s nuclear arms, forget both the terrible power and fundamental limitations of atomic weapons, ignore the tasks required to present a credible deterrent, and deliver responsible security and foreign policies. That said, Pakistan and India have reminded us, again, that when nuclear-armed states butt heads with other states, that does not make nuclear war more likely. In practice, nuclear arms are only good for one mission—deterring nuclear war with other nuclear-armed countries.
South Asia’s OK Corral
No adversaries in the modern world (since the Soviet Union has gone goodbye) have more experience in nuclear face-offs than India and Pakistan. Yet, what has been witnessed as the decades drag on is that when confrontation heats up, the likelihood of escalating to trading mushroom clouds does not.
If there was a provocation that ought to have led to unrestrained violence, the unprovoked and brutal terrorist pogrom near Pahalgam in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was it. This was India’s October 7. Twenty-six innocent people and tourists (including honeymooning newlyweds) were slaughtered like cattle. There are only two plausible scenarios for how this could have happened. One is that the Pakistani government was unable to prevent Pakistani territory from being used as a launching platform for terrorists—an unforgivable act of neglect. The only other possibility is that elements of the ISI/military sanctioned the attack—an unspeakable crime. Either way, India was entitled to righteous anger.
Smack Attack
Immediately, in the wake of the terrorist attack, the two sides traded words, and then, soon after, the real shooting began. From the start, however, both adversaries portrayed their campaigns as retaliatory, defensive, and proportional. Neither side demonstrated the intent to “escalate to de-escalate,” a strategy often discussed as a rationale for the first use of nuclear weapons—inflicting devasting violence on the enemy to humble them into backing off.
There is a good reason: neither adversary tried the nuclear tactic of “escalate to de-escalate,” in fact, a theory, not a tactic. A practice that has never been tried. The idea of popping a few nukes to scare the bejesus out of the enemy is like starting a campfire in a fireworks factory to see what happens. Some nations have threatened this action. Some have had this game plan in their war plans. None has pulled the trigger in the real world since we have had wars in the nuclear age.
A reluctance to be reckless is not confined to competition between nuclear-armed states. In its war against Ukraine, Russia hasn’t employed nuclear weapons even after the Ukrainians invaded Russian territory. Moscow’s reticence is not a one-off. The Soviets didn’t use nukes in Afghanistan even when they were losing; neither did the US during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In practice, escalating to de-escalate is the cosplay of nuclear strategy.
Blindside Battle
The other tactic touted for nuclear combat is “first strike,” decapitating an enemy before they attack. As a tactic, the first strike is a strikeout. In practice, even with nuclear weapons, incapacitating an adversary is not as easy as the task might seem. In addition, if the other side starts fielding nuclear weapons, the possibility of a retaliatory strike is a serious threat. The arsenals of India and Pakistan are way past the point where a decisive first strike would be an assured success. Preemptive wars are destructive. Preemptive nuclear are playing Russian roulette with humanity.
Practical War
Another problem with these big bombs is that even tactical nuclear weapons are not that useful in actual combat. Every form of “fire” employed on the battlefield, from bayonets to nukes, is used to conduct “fire and maneuver.” Bombs and bullets suppress, damage, or destroy a target, allowing a maneuver force to reach an objective or position of advantage. Nuclear weapons are not great for that. They produce a lot of destructive side effects that impact both sides, so a military needs very competent, trained, and equipped forces to operate in their wake. There are also many weapons available today that can deliver long-range, precise, and significant destruction without a nuclear blast. Armed forces don’t need a sledgehammer to crack a watermelon. If enemies want to just fight each other, there are way better ways than lobbying atomic bombs at each other’s territory.
Both India and Pakistan are well-armed states with advanced weaponry that are more than capable of punishing one another without nukes. They, in fact, demonstrated that during the crisis.
Lessons Learned
By the end of the crisis, it was pretty clear that India and Pakistan intended to use nuclear weapons in the same manner as the US and Russia have since Stalin gave the middle finger to Truman. Nuclear weapons are there to deter nuclear war with other nuclear powers. Nations have to, in practice, find other ways to assert their aggression.
This is not to say that any nation should be sanguine about the threat of nuclear arms or living with a nuclear-armed enemy. The crisis in Kasmir reminds us of proven steps to take.
Field an Offense/Defense mix
The more nations can demonstrate the capacity to both strike an enemy and defend against the enemy’s attack, the more strategic stability there is. Don’t be surprised in India and Pakistan in the wake of this dust-up; both countries will likely invest a lot more in air and missile defense. Trump already had this figured out. That is why, to dramatically increase deterrence against China, North Korea, and Russia, he is not only modernizing the nuclear arsenal but fielding a “Golden Dome” to defend against all kinds of missiles and drones, and probably balloons as well.
Ramp-Up Conventional Deterrence
Adversaries that can’t win conventional wars don’t start nuclear ones. Conventional deterrence significantly enhances nuclear deterrence. Expect both India and Pakistan to conduct a thorough review of their conventional capabilities. Pakistan, for example, shipped off vast stocks of conventional artillery and then realized if it got sucked into a shooting war, there would not be much shooting from its side. India has to take a hard look at how it employs airpower. Conventional deterrence is more than just buying things—training, readiness, logistics, and defense production all matter significantly. It’s no surprise, for example, that when Trump said he wanted more peace through strength, he started putting a lot more emphasis on the enablers that make military forces competent, lethal, and resilient.
Proliferation is Bad for Your Health
Stand-offs between India and Pakistan deal with two competitors. Managing conflict becomes significantly more difficult when there are multiple independent parties threatening to engage in conflict simultaneously. China, for instance, which has a massive nuclear arsenal and a defense relationship with Pakistan, was not part of this stand-off. Beijing probably had no problem with Pakistan drawing India’s attention away from China. Still, Xi had no interest in seeing nuclear combat—that would be detrimental to China’s interest (as a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine is not something Beijing has encouraged).
The Pakistan-India stand-off is notable for how it differs from concerns over Iran becoming a nuclear power. A nuclear Iran is not just a problem for Israel but a strategic challenge for Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well. In a world where all of them are armed, it would be like the showdown at the OK Corral, where everyone in town had a gun aimed at everyone. Preventing more global proliferation—starting with Iran in particular, is just smart for the world’s health.
Reducing the number of nuclear sides makes the world safer. That is why, for example, an independent European atomic force outside the context of the transatlantic nuclear umbrella would make for a more, not less, dangerous world.
Nuclear Weapons Don’t Solve Geopolitics
India’s problem is that it has a neighbor committed to using terrorism and terrorists as an instrument of foreign policy. Pakistan is also slipping close to being a client state of India’s chief adversary—China. In addition, from trade to water resources, the environment, ethnic conflict, and so much more, India and Pakistan have more problems than a Kardashian marriage. India needs to continue focusing on the China threat and figure out how to insulate itself from a troublesome neighbor that will always pose a challenge. None of those problems, however, will be solved by nukes.
A member of the Indian air force marshals in a Sukhoi Su-30 MKI on the flight line, July 13, here at Lajes Field. The Indian air force is passing through Lajes on their way to participate in Red Flag at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. It is the first time the Indian air force has ever participated at Red Flag or deployed this aircraft to the United States.
The “it’s not all about nukes” problem is an issue that has also emerged in other contexts. Trump was exactly right when he declared that a deal with Iran not to have nuclear weapons is not enough. Iran must also end its support for terrorism and threaten its neighbors.
Homework
Rather than breathe a sigh of relief that Pakistan and India did not go nuclear, realize that that was not the problem. The real issue is performing all the essential tasks of security and foreign policy that ensure the problem never becomes the problem.
About the Author: Dr. James Jay Carafano
Dr. James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy affairs. Carafano previously served as the Vice President of Heritage Foundation’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and served in the US Army for 25 years. He is an accomplished historian and teacher as well as a prolific writer and researcher. Follow him on X: @JJCarafano.
