Lifting Sanctions on the Syrian Regime is a Grave Mistake

At a future point, many will ask an obvious question: why did the United States and Europe lift sanctions on Syria? The question will come after the likely fall of the Ahmed al Sharaa regime when the mirage of a unified Syria governed by a central government gives way to renewed civil war by competing jihadist factions and militias. 

At the highest levels of European and American governance, decision-makers want world audiences to believe that Syria’s new government must be given all the support it can get if Syria has a chance of succeeding following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024. Without lifting sanctions, the logic goes that Syria has no hope of economically recovering and risks becoming a failed state. 

Syria was designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979, which was further compounded by Congress’ Caeser Act of 2019, which economically ruined the Baathist regime’s economy. The argument by proponents of Sharaa states that the sanctions in place were directed against Syria’s old regime, which is now gone, and to keep them in place is not only wrong, but maintaining them would be the practice of collective punishment against the Syrian people.

Syria’s New Leadership

Questioning this logic should not be frowned upon. To be clear, sanctions are not being lifted on a state governed by benign rulers who value the sanctity of human life. Syria is now led by Ahmed al Sharaa, a jihadist with previous ties to Al Qaeda, presiding over a cabinet, most of whom also had ties to violent extremist organizations, including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Many, including al Sharaa, had bounties on their heads. 

Since Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—the Al Qaeda entity he led that toppled the Assad regime—Europe and Washington have been willing to take Sharaa (and his followers) at his word that he has abandoned his lifelong violent quest to pursue jihadist causes. 

Verifying his word or intention is not part of the West’s calculation in dealing with Sharaa for one simple reason: both the Trump administration and Europe do not want to explore more direct or alternative ways to stabilize Syria’s unified future. The West does not want to commit any resources. There simply is no resolve or patience. The Assad regime was overthrown, and one must simply make do with what there is, and that is a self-avowed ‘former’ terrorist and his alleged transitional government.

To ensure that Sharaa’s government succeeds, the West has accepted the enthusiastic support of Turkey and the Gulf monarchies, which are keen to shape and influence Syria in their own image. Since 2011, Ankara has been determined to overthrow the Assad regime and install a new government that is directly affiliated or ideologically adjacent to the Muslim Brotherhood. Its support of the Mohammed Morsi regime in Egypt and Hamas in Gaza is clear proof of Erdogan’s ideological desires for the region. Ankara greenlit HTS’ military campaign to topple the Assad regime in December 2024, as seen when HTS fighters draped Turkish flags on the walls of Aleppo following the city’s capture. 

A New Syria, or Puppet State

Having displaced Iran’s influence and presence in Syria, Erdogan now intends to expand Turkey’s power throughout the region. Turkey seeks to utilize Syrian territory to establish a permanent military presence through bases, forward positioning its military, and playing a primary role in building Syria’s military capability under Sharaa. Turkey also seeks to gain economically out of Syria: Turkish construction, manufacturing, infrastructure, and service firms stand ready to rebuild the war-torn state, all to be financed with capital flowing from the Gulf.

But these lofty goals are dangerous and unlikely to succeed.

By lifting sanctions on the Sharaa government, Western powers are providing the basis of empowering future jihadist pursuits. At present, Sharaa has professed moderation. He has visited Western capitals, shaken hands with United States President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron, and promised to build an inclusive Syria for all Syrians. 

Institutionally speaking, it is unclear if the new regime is interested in providing a governance structure that will satisfy the needs and wants of the country’s heterogeneous population. We simply have no idea if elections and participation by Syrians in Syria’s future will ever be witnessed. Sharaa has already declared that elections will not be held for at least five years. 

Rule in Syria

This is not the sign of a leader interested in building an inclusive rule but rather amassing personal power. There have been strong expressions that Sharia law will be the basis of Syrian law, which is unlikely to sit well with the country’s minority components, especially its sizeable Kurdish population, which are both militarily well equipped, capable of resisting Sharaa, and abundantly skeptical of Sharaa’s ability to preside over a central government for a meaningful length of time. Representatives of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), have made little secret of their desire to push for a decentralized government in Syria. They do not trust Sharaa.

The biggest threat to Syrian unity comes from the jihadist factions/militias, now being mobilized to supposedly create the new Syrian Army, Syrian law enforcement, and staff institutions of the new Syrian state. Succeeding in this area is the greatest challenge, and it may be a bridge too far. Asking jihadist militias to renounce their ambitions for holy jihad, to support and defend the creation of a Weberian administrative state, is simply a fantasy. 

There is a credible concern that Sharaa may struggle to convince the various components of this governing coalition to support his moderate intentions. Take the multiple militias that comprise the so-called “Syrian National Army.” An umbrella organization consisting of numerous opposition Syrian jihadist groups formed by Turkey in 2011, dedicated to the overthrow of the Assad regime. 

They are largely responsible for the violence against Syrian Alawites following the overthrow of the regime. They are not entirely under the control of the so-called central government of Sharaa. Turkey has mobilized them to attack SDF forces, which Turkey wants to be disbanded and dissolved into the new Syrian army. Ankara has been providing material support to the SNA in terms of weapons, salaries, training, and equipment for years. It is difficult to gauge whether the SNA would now be willing to take orders from the Sharaa government, or from the hand that feeds it: Turkey. 

Suppose Sharaa fails to reach a negotiated settlement with the SDF or continues to elicit the SNA’s obedience. In that case, it is conceivable that its constituent militias could begin fighting anyone they deem to be their enemies: the Sharaa government, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, or Christians, and threaten the security of all states that bordering Syria. Even if Sharaa is sincere and pragmatic in intent, there is little guarantee that those in government around him will support his program of moderation.

For years, violent militias have been armed and supported by a number of state actors, including Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Sharaa’s HTS was one such entity, likely receiving support from Turkey. The likelihood of building an inclusive and stable Syrian government for all Syrians, presided over by a jihadist-Salafist leader, is more likely to come to a terrible end than not. And this is not because doubters are pessimistic detractors who do not want to see peace and stability reign in post-Assad Syria. It’s because this is the most likely scenario. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio couldn’t have been clearer when stating Syria’s government “maybe weeks, not many months, away from potential collapse.” The most troubling aspect of the West’s championing of the Sharaa government rests in the fact that in the event of its collapse, whom does Europe and Washington after Sharaa?

About the Author: Sinan Ciddi 

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at FDD and an expert on Turkish politics. He is also an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at Marine Corps University (MCU). Prior to joining MCU, Sinan was the Executive Director of the Institute of Turkish Studies, based at Georgetown University (2011-2020). He continues to serve as an Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Sinan is the author of Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party: Secularism and Nationalism (Routledge, January 2009) a book which explains the electoral weakness of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party. He obtained his Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 2007 in the field of Political Science.