Key Points and Summary – The MiG-35 was sold as Russia’s affordable, export-ready answer to the F-16 and Gripen—a “4++” bridge between aging MiG-29s and modern air combat.
-In reality, it never delivered.
MiG-35UB pre-series at the MAKS 2017 International Aviation and Space Salon.
-The promised AESA radar and advanced engines failed to materialize in operational jets, leaving a warmed-over MiG-29 in a fifth-generation world.
-Moscow itself bought only a token handful, signaling to foreign customers that the jet wasn’t worth the risk. India, Egypt, Malaysia, and others walked away.
-With no scale, no stealth, and no clear role, the MiG-35 has exposed Russia’s shrinking aerospace base and hastened the MiG brand’s decline.
MiG-35: Russia’s ‘Fourth-Gen Plus’ Fighter That Went Nowhere
The Mikoyan MiG-35 was supposed to be Russia’s fourth-generation-plus multirole fighter, a modernized, export-ready successor to the MiG-29 family that was cheaper than the Su-30 or Su-35, and could compete directly with the F-16 and Gripen.
Promising cutting-edge features, like an AESA radar, advanced EQW suites, and new engines, the MiG-35 was marketed as a market-friendly aircraft geared towards 21st-century warfare.
But the MiG-35 has been an abject failure—commercially, technologically, and strategically.
Hard Times
MiG was once the Soviet Union’s premier fighter house.
But in the decades since the 1991 Soviet collapse, when aerospace funding was gutted, Mikoyan has faltered while competitor Sukhoi has endured, earning the bulk of Russian aerospace investment.
The MiG-35 was supposed to be the company’s comeback, the brand-saver—a lightweight, affordable, multirole fighter for domestic and foreign customers.
Designed as a bridge between the MiG-29 and modern avionics and weaponry, the MiG-35 was envisioned as a counterweight to Western fourth-generation-plus fighters (and China’s increasingly sophisticated aircraft).
MiG-35. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
MiG envisioned placing the MiG-35 with international customers who could not afford the Su-35, Rafale, or F-35 but still needed a reliable, relatively advanced fighter.
But the promised technology was never delivered. The AESA radar was advertised, but never fielded in operational models. The RD-33 derivative engines underperformed, offering no real progress in thrust, fuel economy, or reliability. The sensor fusion and cockpit displays were decades behind Western counterparts. In reality, the finished product was just a refined version of the MiG-29—not a true next-generation platform.
The export scheme fell apart when the Russian Air Force, expected initially to buy upwards of 40 airframes, purchased just six MiG-35s.
Naturally, the Russian Air Force’s lack of confidence signaled to prospective foreign buyers that the MiG-35 was a lousy investment. Meanwhile, Russia backed the Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57.
The foreign buyers who did consider the MiG-35 were universally unimpressed. India’s MMRCA competition pitted the MiG-35 against the French-built Rafale; the MiG-35 failed reliability trials, weapons trials, and performance benchmarks, and the Rafale ultimately earned the contract.
Egypt, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Algeria also evaluated the MiG-35. All passed. The MiG-35, it turned out, filled an undesirable market niche—it was too expensive for poor nations, but too primitive for rich countries.
The platform was eventually boxed out, with platforms like the F-16, Gripen, and JF-17 coming to dominate the export market.
JAS 39 Gripen. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
So what happened?
Part of the problem was internal. Industrial weaknesses at Mikoyan (i.e., shrinking engineering base, loss of talent to Sukhoi, outdated facilities) prevented the delivery of the MiG-35 on a timeline or with the technical capabilities that had been promised. And part of the problem was external.
Aerial combat has changed, but the MiG-35 failed to account for those changes. Namely, air power has shifted towards stealth, long-range weapons, sensor fusion, EQ, and network-centric operations. But the MiG-35 offered none of that.
It’s a non-stealth, short-range fighter, out of place in the 21st century.
The failure of the MiG-35 likely signals the end of the MiG brand as a frontline fighter. MiG now survives off export maintenance and drones, while the future of the Russian fighter industry lies overwhelmingly with Sukhoi.
The failure also has implications for Russia’s export influence.
Russia once dominated the low-cost fighter export market with products like the MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29. But today, China’s JF-17 dominates the low-cost market, the US and Sweden dominate the mid-tier market, and the F-35 dominates the high-end market. Russia has been boxed out, a stunning market collapse that the MiG-35’s failure accelerated.
A crew chief assigned to the 158th Fighter Wing, taxis an F-35A Lightning II fifth generation aircraft assigned to the wing at the Vermont Air National Guard Base, South Burlington, Vermont, May 2, 2022. The aircraft departed to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, to continue NATO’s Enhanced Air Policing mission along the Eastern Flank. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Richard Mekkri)
Without the MiG-35, Russia will suffer strategic consequences. The lack of a modern lightweight fighter means that Russia will be forced to rely on more expensive Su-30/35 units.
Russia will suffer from a reduced ability to field massed squadrons and won’t have the ability to field a high-low mix platform, the way the US perfected with the F-15 and F-16, and the way China is working towards with the J-20 and J-35.
The Sad Fighter Reality
The MiG was supposed to revive the MiG brand and give Russia a modern export fighter. Instead, the program exposed weaknesses in Russia’s aerospace sector. By every metric—commercial, technological, strategic—the MiG-35 has been a failure.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer, candidate, and a US Air Force pilot select. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.
