Summary and Key Points: Russia’s armored forces in Ukraine are described as nearing a breaking point after years of punishing losses.
-Thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are cited as destroyed or captured, pushing Moscow toward older T-62s and even T-54/55-era armor.
T-14 Armata Tank from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
T-14 Armata Tank.
Russian T-14 Armata Tank. Image Credit: Social Media Screenshot.
T-14 Armata Tank from Russia
-Design choices—especially autoloaders storing ammunition in a turret carousel—are blamed for frequent catastrophic “jack-in-the-box” explosions.
-Drones and anti-tank missiles are portrayed as making massed armor tactics brutally expensive.
-With battalion tactical groups faltering and command reverting to rigid top-down control, Russia is depicted as trading manpower and metal for marginal gains.
-The core question: can production and refurbishment keep pace into 2026?
Russia’s Tanks and Armor Are Getting Wiped Out in the Ukraine War
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is nearing its fourth year and has dragged on with no end in sight. Russia, under President Putin, has refused to negotiate a ceasefire or any peace initiative with any serious effort.
To do so would be to admit that the Russian military has performed poorly, and, regardless of ongoing rosy proclamations about how well the “special military operation” is going, it has become a meat grinder.
Russia has suffered 1.2 million casualties since the “special military operation” began, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026, and the minimal gains they are producing are coming at an exorbitant price in terms of men, equipment, and especially their armored vehicles.
Russian Army Modernization Was a Myth
The much-ballyhooed Russian “modernization” of its military was nowhere to be found. Despite widespread reporting that Russia had totally revamped its armed forces and that Junior leaders and NCOs would now resemble US and NATO forces. It was a total fabrication. Russia itself contradicted the “Gerasimov Doctrine.”
Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) (an idea from the 1990s) were introduced in 2012 to generate effective combat power from brigades by concentrating contract personnel into a battalion-sized grouping.
Russian T-72 tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Russian T-72 tank from Ukraine War. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The factor that is supposed to make this work is that Battalion commanders, company commanders, and lower-level officers show initiative and react dynamically to the evolving battlefield situation.
Instead, very little initiative has been demonstrated, and command has reverted to a traditional top-down structure. There also appears to have been a reversion to the more negative characteristics of the Soviet military system, with rigid adherence to an operational plan, even when circumstances on the ground render the plan invalid.
BTGs generally comprise a tank or infantry battalion reinforced with armor or infantry and with artillery, air defence, electronic warfare, and other combat support assets. They failed, and as losses mounted, the Russians began to resemble their Soviet predecessors.
But the question is whether Russia can sustain these heavy losses and continue the fighting indefinitely.
Armor Losses Are Reaching Unsustainable Levels
During the initial invasion, Russia’s armored vehicle losses outnumbered Ukraine’s by a 4:1 margin. It increased to 5:1 when Russia captured Avdiivka. It has gradually declined, dropping to 2:1 in May of 2025.
As of mid-2025, Russia has lost over 4,000 main battle tanks (MBTs) in Ukraine, with some estimates ranging far higher, severely depleting their armored forces and forcing the use of older, 1970s-era models.
Open-source analysis by the highly reputable site Oryx indicates 4,308 tanks were documented as destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured, with high losses among T-80 and T-90 models.
Russia has lost its entire active T-80 fleet—approximately 1,200 tanks—within 43 months of the conflict, prompting efforts to restart production lines.
T-80 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Russia has lost 8,735 armored infantry fighting vehicles and 722 armored personnel carriers. They’ve also lost 993 self-propelled artillery pieces and 545 mobile multiple rocket launchers.
Technological Regression, Moscow Dusting Off T-62s And T-54/55s
Due to high losses of modern, expensive tanks, Russia has increasingly relied on older equipment, such as T-62s and T-54/55s.
High losses are attributed to poor logistics, changing battlefield tactics, and effective Ukrainian defense strategies.
Design Flaw In Russian Armored Vehicles
The design flaw of Russian armored vehicles is causing a “jack-in-the-box” type of scenario where the turrets blow off after a tank suffers even an indirect hit, killing the crew. Photos and videos from Ukraine are chock full of images of burnt-out Russian vehicles with their turrets blown off, littering the landscape.
Sam Bendett, an adviser with the Russia Studies Program at CNA, told CNN that “Any successful hit quickly ignites the ammo, causing a massive explosion, and the turret is literally blown off.”
It is an issue that also affects the Russian armored fighting vehicles, such as the BMD-4. Many defense officials and analysts argue that Moscow should have anticipated this issue decades ago.
Why Are Russian Tanks “Blowing Their Top”?
The flaw in Russia’s armor stems from the design of the turret’s internal workings and the placement of the ammunition. And back in 1991, the US-led coalition was having similar success destroying Russian-built Iraqi T-72s in the desert.
Western tanks store their ammunition in a sealed compartment with additional ballistic protection, and the loader opens and closes a door through which the ammunition is loaded. He then transfers the tank round into the main gun for firing. That loader is the fourth member of the crew, and if the turret were hit, there would be only one round inside the turret, within the gun.
Russian tanks, however, have an autoloader, cutting the crew down to three. However, the ammunition in Russian tank design is stored in a carousel located at the base of the turret. While the design gives the tank a lower profile, making it harder to hit, it also means that up to 40 rounds of main-gun ammunition are stored within the turret. Any hit, even an indirect one, will cause the ammunition to explode.
The results have been deadly. When the turret and its ammunition explode, the turret can be launched to a height of up to two stories. One Russian tank exploded in Mariupol, and the turret landed on the roof of a five-story apartment building.
The flaws aren’t limited to older T-72 tanks; the newer T-80 and T-90 series also use a similar autoloading system in which ammunition is stored inside the turret. While the armor surrounding the tanks has been improved, this flaw persists, and Western analysts point to the Russian military’s refusal to learn from the hard lessons of the Gulf War.
Nicholas Drummond, a former British Army officer and now a defense analyst, said to CNN that the Russian tank crews are basically “sitting ducks” if they are hit by an anti-tank missile.
“If you don’t get out within the first second, you’re toast,” he said.
“Western militaries all learned from the Gulf War, and from seeing tanks killed during that time, that you have to compartmentalize the ammunition,” Drummond added, stating the Russian armored vehicles were “mobile coffins”.
Production Can’t Keep Up With Battlefield Losses
CIT and other OSINT intelligence analysts estimate more than 3,000 Russian tanks have been lost since the invasion began in 2022, with around 1,100 lost in 2024 alone. Although losses remain high, the reduced deployment of tanks may allow Russia to maintain a stable armored force over the next several years, assuming current production rates are maintained.
“Limiting Russia’s military production must become a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence strategy in Europe,” CIT added. “Targeted restrictions on equipment and enforcement of secondary sanctions remain essential to slowing the growth of Russia’s defense capacity.”
Interestingly, Russia seems intent on re-establishing an armored force of numerical superiority over the West, when its armor is taking a beating in Ukraine. Tanks in Ukraine on both sides are taking heavy losses due to improved drone usage and anti-tank missiles.
At the current monthly rate of advance in Ukraine, it would take Russian forces over 152 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, if Russia can sustain massive personnel losses indefinitely.
CSIS posted that, “For comparison, it took the Red Army 1,394 days after Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the Soviet Union) to make it to Berlin during World War II. Russia hit that mark (1,394 days) on December 19, 2025, but had barely made it to Pokrovsk, over 500 kilometers from Kyiv.”
And the situation for their armored forces, by dusting off obsolete T-62/T-54 tanks, isn’t boding well for future prospects.
About the Author: Steve Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
