Can Donald Trump Really Contain China’s Rise to Power?

Nascent great power China is seeking greater strategic influence within its neighborhood. Although Beijing attempts to cloak its agenda with benevolent-sounding gobbledygook such as Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the PRC government has two clear objectives. The first is to gain ownership, acknowledged by the international community, over all the disputed territory that China claims. That includes a large swath of the earth’s surface stretching from the Yellow Sea through the East China Sea and Taiwan to encompass most of the South China Sea.

Second, Beijing aims to establish such leverage over the governments of nearby countries that none implements any major policy that Beijing opposes–such as security cooperation with the US or anything that reflects negatively on the Chinese Communist Party leadership.

Some of Beijing’s aspirations are irreconcilable with US strategic primacy in the western Pacific. As China keeps pushing, what kind of resistance is it likely to meet from the new US government?  Due to several factors, Trump II will be prone to presiding over significant slippage in America’s position of strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Some of these factors are beyond Trump’s control.  The circumstances underlying the bilateral competition have evolved unfavorably toward the US prior to Trump re-taking office. China’s global economic centrality is more deeply entrenched than ever, with China’s total trade surplus reaching a record high of nearly $1 trillion in 2024. Much of the world accepts China’s interpretation of major political events, viewing China positively and the US negatively. The governments of Muslim-majority countries even ignore Beijing’s systematic mistreatment of China’s Muslim Uyghurs. 

More pertinently, China has become a more formidable potential opponent. Power stems from the ability of a state to militarily impose its will.  China is not only a technological near-peer of the US, it has established superiority over the US in many important kinds of military manufacturing. Perhaps the most striking is shipbuilding, in which China reportedly enjoys 232 times the US capacity.  The PRC navy and coast guards are already numerically larger, and add more new ships annually, than their US counterparts. China can also outproduce the US in other weapons systems such as  military aircraft and cruise missiles. While the Pentagon is trying to organize the production of thousands of drones for battlefield use, a Chinese company reportedly received an order from its government for a million kamikaze drones. The US would be in danger of running out of munitions in a Taiwan Strait war.

In addition to these structural disadvantages vis-à-vis China, Trump’s commitment to “containing” China is questionable. 

Perhaps the best way a great power can prolong its primacy is to win the support of other countries by persuading them they will benefit from the rules sponsored and enforced by the hegemon.  This requires the hegemon to occasionally take a loss—by providing international public goods, for example, or by demonstrating willingness to be constrained by international law. The longer term intangible benefits of prestige and influence arguably compensate for the losses.

Trump, however, favors American unilateralism and is skeptical of international organizations. He insists that US global engagement should be immediately and visibly profitable for Americans.  For him, US alliances in the Asia-Pacific do not have value as “force multipliers” in a coalition designed to counter aggressive behavior by China. Rather, he sees allies such as Japan and South Korea as wealthy defense free riders. 

In 2020, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte cancelled the Visiting Forces Agreement between the US and the Philippines.  Trump’s Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called the move “unfortunate.”  Trump, however, said, “I don’t really mind if they would like to do that. It will save a lot of money.”

The returning president also opposes multilateral trade deals, which is why during his first term he quickly withdrew the US from participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  Joining the institutions that set the terms of international trade would help America maintain international leadership, but Trump seems to think the downsides are greater.

Based on his public statements, Trump seems very interested in pressuring China into leveling its trade surplus with the US, but not very interested in the geostrategic project of blunting a Chinese bid for regional hegemony. The most salient points of a possible hegemonic conflict between China and the US are the South China Sea and Taiwan. According to the searchable Trump Twitter archive, which logs 80,000 tweets, Trump mentioned the South China Sea only once: “build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so!” And that was in December 2016, after his first election but before he took office.

Trump has said much more about Taiwan, but his comments are not about how failing to defend Taiwan from forcible unification with China would doom US strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Rather, Trump has said that he resents Taiwan for allegedly taking America’s semiconductor business and for failing to pay the US for protection (both illegitimate complaints), that Taiwan is insignificant compared to China, and that Taiwan is indefensible.

Nominees for senior positions in the Trump II Administration include several people, such as Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, who are very interested in preventing China from subjugating its neighbors. But there will be a persistent danger that Trump will overrule his China hardliners in the hope of getting a trade agreement with Xi Jinping that Trump can trumpet as a win for the American people. 

In the past, Trump has not always backed up senior staff who took tough positions toward China. In April 2018 the Trump Administration forbade US firms from selling components to the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE because it had violated US sanctions against Iran and North Korea. The US ban probably would have killed ZTE.  In May 2018, however, Trump said he was letting ZTE off with a fine as a favor to Xi to facilitate a US-China trade deal. Three days previously, the Chinese government had reportedly agreed to provide $500 million in loans to a theme park in Indonesia affiliated with the Trump Organization.

While Trump’s State Department was “staunch in our support for freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly in Hong Kong” in 2019, Trump conspicuously avoided criticizing the PRC, saying instead it was a “very tough situation” and “I hope it works out for everybody, including China.”

The Trump White House labelled China’s Uyghur policy “genocide” in January 2021, probably at the urging of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. But asked a year later by New York Times interviewers if China was mistreating Uyghurs, Trump said “I would rather not say at this moment.”

Trump’s first administration called for a US ban on TikTok on national security grounds. In 2024, however, Trump abruptly flipped to opposing restrictions on TikTok.  Media reports suggested Trump’s change of heart stemmed from a large donation from billionaire Jeff Yass, who is heavily invested in TikTok.

Former President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with supporters at a “Save America” rally at Country Thunder Arizona in Florence, Arizona. By Gage Skidmore.

Furthermore, members of the administration who favor a consistent, national security-centered policy toward China will need to compete for Trump’s ear with other advisors who are likely to counsel against confronting China. “Kind of pro-China” Elon Musk has a Tesla factory in Shanghai and depends on Chinese supply chains. Not coincidentally, he has repeated Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and made Twitter more friendly to PRC propaganda. Vivek Ramaswamy, co-leader of the proposed “Department of Government Efficiency” along with Musk, has said Washington should abandon Taiwan once the US ramps up its own semiconductor production.

At least part of the incoming administration, including the man in charge, appears inclined to reduce America’s commitment to supporting its own liberal world order, relatively disinterested in nurturing US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and unenthusiastic about defending Taiwan. Beijing will not miss any opportunities to expand China’s strategic space at low cost.  

About the Author: Denny Roy

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, who specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues.