In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, unrivaled in conventional and nuclear military might. This unparalleled dominance, however, inadvertently paved the way for a new era of conflict—one that operates in the shadows between peace and war, challenging traditional notions of warfare and national security. As we stand at this strategic crossroads, it becomes imperative to reassess our approach to global competition and conflict.
The “gray zone” warfare concept has gained prominence as adversaries like China and Russia have developed strategies to compete with the US without triggering large-scale military responses. China’s “Unrestricted Warfare” and Russia’s “New Generation” or “Non-linear Warfare” (also called hybrid warfare) exemplify these asymmetric approaches, designed to exploit vulnerabilities while remaining below the threshold of conventional war.
Today, we see two visions of war. The traditional Clausewitzian vision of war is “an extension of politics by other means” to which the US adheres. The revisionist and rogue powers believe that politics is war by other means. To quote Mao: “War is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed.” America’s adversaries believe they are in a war with the US and the free world. This is an example of political warfare.
The Problem
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has tried to apply conventional and nuclear deterrence concepts to asymmetric threats. By definition, asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, and gray zone activities cannot be deterred because they take place below the threshold of conventional war. They must be addressed with offensive political warfare capabilities that attack the adversaries’ strategies, create dilemmas, and exploit inherent weaknesses and contradictions of totalitarian regimes. The US has been unable to effectively execute such a strategy in the 21st Century because of a deterrence mindset, a fear of escalation, and being constantly in a defensive and reactive posture. The US has not yet adopted a winning mindset for activities in the gray zone.
The American Paradox: Strength and Vulnerability
While the United States has maintained its relative conventional and nuclear superiority, it has adopted a largely defensive and reactive stance in the gray zone. This approach stems from the assumption that forces optimized for high-intensity conflict can easily “scale down” to address asymmetric threats. However, this perspective has left America vulnerable to adversaries actively and offensively competing in this ambiguous space.
The “Dark Quad” of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny – have been creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and undermine US national security strengths. In contrast, the US has struggled to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for operations in the gray zone.
The US must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so, it neutralizes these threats, allowing the US to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to offensively and proactively compete and win in the gray zone.
A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier, assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), qualifies at a stress shoot range at Ft. Carson, Colorado, Mar. 3, 2016. The stress shoot was designed to test these soldiers for actions seen in combat operations. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Connor Mendez)
Historical Foundations
The concept of political warfare is not new to American statecraft. In 1948, George F. Kennan, head of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, articulated the need for a more assertive and coordinated approach to advancing American interests. Kennan recognized that a nuanced strategy beyond traditional diplomacy and military action was necessary in a world where the United States held significant economic advantages but faced ideological challenges.
Paul Smith’s seminal work, “On Political War,” further developed this concept, defining political warfare as the use of “political means to compel an opponent to do one’s will, based on hostile intent.” This approach encompasses a range of tools, from propaganda and psychological operations to economic pressure and covert action.
Organizational Model: The Office of Strategic Services
A new US organization should draw inspiration from the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS, established in 1942, was a multifaceted agency that combined intelligence gathering, special operations, and psychological warfare. Its structure included:
1. Secret Intelligence Branch
2. Counter-Intelligence Branch
3. Research and Analysis Branch
4. Special Operations Branch
5. Morale Operations Branch
This comprehensive approach allowed the OSS to conduct various activities, from sabotage operations and support to resistance, intelligence collection and analysis, covert and clandestine activities, and psychological warfare, all in support of broader US strategic objectives.
Lessons from the Past: Kennedy’s Vision
This stance was the vision of President John F. Kennedy when he created the US Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps, authorized the Green Beret for US Army Special Forces, and established the US Navy SEALs. He significantly expanded the scope and capabilities of the US Information Agency that President Eisenhower established. He sought to develop national security tools and concepts that would allow the US to proactively and offensively compete below the threshold of large-scale combat operations. Sadly, he could not fully implement his vision, and his successors never fully embraced his concepts because they did not have his strategic foresight. However, Kennedy might be described as the father of the idea of harnessing the power of 3D – diplomacy, development, and defense.
Swedish soldiers fire their Stridsvagn 122 main battle tank gun while conducting offensive lane operations during the Strong Europe Tank Challenge, Grafenwoehr, Germany, June 7, 2018. The Swedish soldiers are assigned to the Wartofta Tank Company, Skaraborg Regiment. U.S. Army Europe and the German Army co-host the third Strong Europe Tank Challenge at Grafenwoehr Training Area, June 3-8, 2018. The Strong Europe Tank Challenge is an annual training event designed to give participating nations a dynamic, productive military partnerships, form soldier-level relationships and share tactics, techniques and procedures. Army photo by Gertrud Zach
Although the following quote from President Kennedy is often referred to, it is remarkably prescient with eerie parallels for today. It should be thoroughly analyzed, understood, and compared to the conditions of the 21st Century. The real question we should ask is if we have leaders (or speechwriters) today who have this depth of understanding of the strategic problems we face and the vision to develop a way ahead:
We now see another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins: war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called “wars of liberation” to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. In those situations where we must counter it, these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.
It was not until 1986, and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act’s Nunn Cohen Amendment, that there was an attempt to create a capability to compete in the gray zone effectively, or what was called at the time “low intensity conflict.” However, the vision of creating an organization responsible for all US national security operations in the gray zone of low intensity conflict was never fully realized despite the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the US Special Operations Command.
Reimagining National Security: A Call for Strategic Disruption
No US government agency currently can harness all elements of national power to conduct proactive offensive operations in the gray zone.
To effectively compete in the gray zone, the United States must consider a fundamental restructuring of its national security apparatus. While maintaining conventional and nuclear superiority to deter large-scale conflicts, America needs to develop offensive capabilities tailored for gray zone competition.
Creating an Office of Strategic Disruption (OSD) could provide a framework for orchestrating whole-of-government operations below the threshold of large-scale combat. This office would harness the 3D approach – diplomacy, development, and defense – along with information and intelligence operations to proactively engage adversaries in the gray zone.
Key Components of the Office of Strategic Disruption
The proposed OSD should integrate several critical components:
1. Intelligence and Analysis: A robust intelligence gathering and analysis capability is essential.
2. Information Operations: Developing and implementing strategies for countering disinformation and conducting influence operations.
3. Economic Warfare: Coordinating economic pressure and incentives to achieve political objectives.
4. Cyber Operations: Integrating cyber capabilities into broader political warfare strategies.
5. Special Activities: Conducting covert and clandestine operations supporting political objectives.
6. Interagency Coordination: Serving as a central hub for coordinating political warfare efforts across government agencies.
7. An integrated professional education structure to develop US government personnel to be experts in the gray zone.
Conclusion: Adapting to the New Battlefield
As we navigate the complexities of 21st-century warfare, the United States stands at a critical juncture. The challenge lies not in abandoning our strengths but in complementing them with new capabilities. By learning from historical examples and embracing innovative strategies, America can reclaim the initiative in the gray zone.
1st Lt. Ryan Rogers assigned to 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), fires the Javelin shoulder-fired anti-tank missile during platoon live fire exercise at Fort Campbell, Ky. Jan. 30, 2019. (U.S. Army Photo by Capt. Justin Wright)
The path forward requires a delicate balance: maintaining the military might that deters conventional warfare while developing the ability and agility to compete effectively in the shadows and gap between peace and war. Only by adapting to this new reality can the United States ensure its security in an increasingly complex global landscape.
And yes, the acronym “OSD” conflicts with the one for the Office of Secretary of Defense. To reduce confusion, perhaps DOD should return to its original name: The War Department. The pesident-elect is known as a disruptor who plays to win. Let’s give him the tools to win wars (a War Department) and create the tools to strategically disrupt our adversaries: an office of Strategic Disruption.
About the Author: David Maxwell
David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.
