Key Points and Summary: As Donald Trump’s second term unfolds, his ambassadorial choices face scrutiny, especially for pivotal roles in Asia. With Beijing’s assertiveness rising, strong leadership in Manila is critical. Rumors of Yuri Kim, criticized for her handling of crises in Nagorno-Karabakh and Albania, potentially being appointed as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, raise concerns.
Why the U.S. Needs Strong Leadership in Manila to Counter China
Career Foreign Service Officers often complain about political appointees as unqualified ambassadors whose sole credential is raising money. Sometimes, politicians appoint unqualified men and women to positions, but sometimes, appointees shine.
They not only shine and bring prestige to a post and an ability to leapfrog over the ossified Foggy Bottom bureaucracy, but they can also infuse fresh ideas. A. Wess Mitchell, President Donald Trump’s first term appointee to be Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, masterminded a reorientation of Eastern Mediterranean policy to flip Cyprus and cement U.S. strategic interests with the region’s democracies, making Washington less dependent on Turkey’s mercurial dictatorship.
Richard Verma, an Obama appointee, likewise distinguished himself with his leadership as the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi.
Inherent in the careerists’ complaints is the belief that all Foreign Service officers are highly skilled and well-qualified. Some are. Julie Fisher in Cyprus punches far above her weight. So, too, does Peter Vrooman in Mozambique.
Like political appointees, however, others fall short.
The Appointees Who Fail
April Glaspie fairly or not became the poster child for incompetence when, in 1990, she appeared to inadvertently signal a greenlight for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait.
Barbara Bodine fumbled Yemen before and after the U.S.S. Cole investigation.
Prior to the Arab Spring uprising, In 2006, Frank Ricciardone, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, told a gathering of students that “President Mubarak is well known in the United States. He is respected. If he had to run for office in the United States, my guess is he could win elections in the United States as a leader who is a giant on the world stage,” a statement not only cringe-worthy in its sycophancy at the time, but one that reflected both incompetence given the Arab Spring that was just around the corner as well as deliberate subversion of President George W. Bush’s democracy agenda.
The Office of the Inspector General was brutal to Thomas Krajeski’s management of the U.S. embassy in Bahrain.
The Real Problem
As with any bureaucracy, while some ambassadors shine and others fail, most are mediocre. The problem within the State Department is that bureaucratic interests and processes often trump real acknowledgement of a candidate’s strengths and weaknesses. As ambassadors attach themselves to more senior patrons, internal politics also trump honest consideration of national security. The result is the tendency of many diplomats to fail upwards and the State Department to places others in posts which they may desire but for which they are the wrong person.
What Donald Trump and Marco Rubio Need to Do
If President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are serious about countering China, they need to place their best ambassadors, be they political appointees or career Foreign Service, both in Beijing and Taipei, as well as in the frontline states with China. Trump is off to a good start nominating David Purdue, a former senator with a record of hawkishness toward China. The same is true with George Glass, Trump’s nominee to be U.S. ambassador to Japan. The State Department traditionally sends career officers to other frontline states like the Philippines, Vietnam, Mongolia.
The Philippines are arguably the most important state in the South China Sea for U.S. national security. China’s “nine-dash line” may be historical fiction, but the People’s Republic of China has used to it justify decades of aggression against littoral states and island nations. China claims islands and atolls that have always been Filipino from the time the United States took possession of the territory from the Spanish in 1898 and then granted the Philippines independence in 1946.
Alas, rumors within the State Department suggest that one of its weakest and most unsuccessful ambassadors may soon get the nod as U.S. ambassador to Manila as a consolation prize after failing both to win approval to be assistant secretary of State for European Affairs or to get the nod for the ambassadorship to Turkey due to that country’s switch to receive a political rather than career appointee.
A Mistake Trump Needs to Avoid
Yuri Kim became infamous when, on September 14, 2023, she faced tough questioning about the State Department’s policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh after remaining passive during Azerbaijan’s illicit ten-month blockade of the Armenian populated region. “We will not tolerate any military action. We will not tolerate any attack on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is very clear,” she told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Five days later, Azerbaijani forces invaded Nagorno-Karabakh and ethnically cleansed its 1,700-year-old Armenian Christian population. Far from “not tolerating,” Kim and colleagues did nothing, failing even in its aftermath to label what happened “ethnic cleansing,” preferring instead to speak of “depopulation” in the passive voice.
If there was any ambassador that personified paper tiger, Kim is it. After her Senate debacle, if she had to deliver a statement threatening dire consequences to Chinese actions, no one in Beijing would believe her. This could be exceedingly dangerous as Kim’s perceived weakness could encourage Beijing to military action.
More Problems
The problem, though, was not just her tenure as acting assistant secretary. Kim also flubbed her ambassadorial experience in Albania. Normally, a posting in Tirana should be smooth sailing. Albanians are pro-American and consider the guidance of the U.S. ambassador more than many other European countries do. Not all is well in Albanian democracy, though. Prime Minister Edi Rama is following the populist path hewn by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to hollow out Albanian democracy.
Like Erdoğan, Rama targets ethnic minorities and seeks to leverage political power into personal profit. It was in this context and because of his desire to develop the Albanian Riviera—a region where Albania’s ethnic Greek minority lives—that he imprisoned Fredi Beleri, the elected mayor of one of the Riviera’s most picturesque towns. Kim downplayed the incident; she did not want to upset her personal relationship with Rama. Kim’s decision to ignore and allow Rama’s corrupt scheme to fester, however, snowballed into a diplomatic crisis between Albania and Greece that derailed Balkan integration and cooperation as the Ukraine crisis unfolded. That Kim was openly lobbying the State Department for the ambassador to Turkey post at the same time she was weighing in against Greece in a dispute was unseemly at best.
J-20 Fighter from PLAAF China.
There is also a security component to the potential Kim nomination. South Korean sources told me in 2023 that they captured indiscretions on tape while Kim was an aide to Assistant Secretary Chris Hill and a member of the American delegation to Six-Party Talks focused on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. If the Korean security officials are willing to gossip openly about such things at a time when Kim was in Albania and not slated for another Asia position, it is unlikely they were simply making the charges up. Vulnerability to blackmail should be a major concern for anyone on the frontlines with China.
Trump has made clear his second term should not be about business as usual. He also seeks a dream team dedicated to checking and rolling back China’s rise after Beijing for too long lied, cheated, and deceived American officials from across the political spectrum about its intentions. While Rubio has yet to take the helm as secretary, the State Department appears in auto-drive in a way that could undermine U.S. success.
The United States does not need another Glaspie, nor should diplomats who fail twice get a third opportunity on the frontlines of U.S. policy. If tenure is a concern, the consulates in Canada provide an answer; Manila should not.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The author’s views are his own.
