During his 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump had vowed to settle the Russia-Ukraine war in a day. Following the election, the President-elect and his team pushed back the war termination deadline to a longer time horizon.
At the same time, Trump-nominated special envoy for Russia and Ukraine – Keith Kellogg – proposed a shorter timetable of 100 days for ending the conflict.
As Russia’s ill-conceived invasion reaches the end of its third year, overshadowed by the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail, can the Trump administration bring an end to the bloodiest European conflict since the Second World War?
Those who share a narrow and negative conception of peace – as the absence of large-scale violence – may be cautiously optimistic about the Trump administration’s possible approach to the conflict. Trump’s threat to withhold American assistance to Ukraine at a time when it is struggling in multiple battlefield locations may strongarm the embattled Kyiv into a peace agreement with Moscow.
A maximum pressure strategy may be less effective for Putin, emboldened by the military gains throughout 2024. Still, the prospect of America’s increased assistance to Ukraine and the growing support for peace negotiations among the Russian people may bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table.
Such a “peace” agreement brokered by the Trump team may see a reduction in hostilities and stabilization of the frontline. However, “freezing” the conflict, as envisioned in the special envoy’s peace plan, does not directly address the underlying core issues – viable security guarantees to Ukraine and its membership in NATO, war reparations, and justice for war crimes committed by the Russian military and leaders. Accepting such a negative peace for a conflict resolution will earn political dividends for the President-elect. However, it will be counterproductive for achieving enduring and positive peace in Ukraine.
Beyond the risk of renewed fighting, a peace strategy that narrowly emphasizes the end of hostilities may have several harmful effects. It gives a false impression of achieving a major goal – resolving a violent dispute – that prompts redirecting political, diplomatic, and other resources to other issues.
Reducing political, military, and other forms of assistance may be detrimental to Ukraine’s expeditious and complete integration into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Support for demobilization, disarmament, demining, and rehabilitation efforts, rebuilding economic infrastructure, protecting human rights, and political reforms might be compromised by how the end of hostilities is achieved.
To be fair to President-elect Trump and his team, no administration can resolve intractable differences in values, interests, and positions that fuel a violent dispute. President George W. Bush’s announcement of the end of the US war with Iraq did not forestall the rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. Neither did the 2020 “agreement for bringing peace” between the US and the Taliban result in stability and security for the Afghan people.
Decades of research on war termination suggest that interstate wars, including those ending in ceasefire agreements, rarely end. Instead, a decline in hostilities typically follows the stage of the “hot” conflict. Furthermore, wars give rise to new types and forms of violence that shoot up with war termination. Interpersonal and domestic violence, for example, spikes in societies afflicted with the post-traumatic stress of violent conflict. The proliferation of arms trafficking in the “trophy” weapons risk stoking up hostilities in remote locations. Individuals from different countries often join conflicts abroad. Susceptible to radicalization and excluded from reintegration programs, foreign fighters can also pose unforeseen security challenges post-war.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin. Image Credit: Russian Government.
Resolving the violent conflict initiated by Russia against Ukraine requires admitting that the lines between war and peace are often blurred, and negotiations are the beginning of a problematic non-linear process away from armed confrontation. Building a positive peace that restores the territorial integrity of Ukraine, significantly minimizes the threat of future invasion by Russia, and supplies security for all Ukrainian people will require a long-term commitment from the US that is likely to extend beyond the political window of the Trump administration.
Washington has greater chances of success if it does not act alone but coordinates its strategy with allies and partners.
About the Author:
Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva is a Professor of Strategy at National War College. She holds a PhD (2007) in Political Science from Purdue University and JD in International Law (2000) from Moscow National Law Academy. Dr. Omelicheva’s research and teaching interests include international and Eurasian security, counterterrorism and human rights, democracy promotion in the post-Soviet territory, Russia’s foreign and security policy, gender and security, and crime-terror nexus in Eurasia.
