A Turkey With No Elections?

On March 19, Turkish authorities arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most serious political challenger. Imamoglu has served as mayor since 2019 and has defeated Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in three consecutive elections. Following his detention on unsubstantiated charges of corruption and aiding terrorism, Imamoglu declared himself a “political prisoner,” noting that more than 100 people, including his senior advisers and municipal colleagues, were arrested alongside him.

Put plainly, Erdogan ordered the imprisonment of the man he probably fears most—a rival with a credible path to unseating him in the next presidential election.

Imamoglu’s arrest sparked widespread protests across Turkey. Demonstrators are demanding his release and defending one of democracy’s most basic principles: the right of voters to choose their leaders. In defiance of the regime’s tactics, members of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) overwhelmingly elected Imamoglu as their presidential candidate, even while he sat behind bars.

These developments point to an alarming reality: Erdogan and the AKP may no longer be willing to transfer power peacefully through elections.

In the weeks since Imamoglu’s incarceration, Turkey’s international standing has further deteriorated. Germany suspended the sale of Eurofighter jets to Turkey, citing concerns over the country’s crumbling democratic institutions. This was not a mere symbolic gesture. Europe is on heightened alert due to Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and doubts about Washington’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance. Germany took a clear stance: Democratic norms, not transactional security deals, are the bedrock of European defense. Erdogan’s claim that Turkey’s military strength makes it an indispensable partner is now being weighed against his government’s autocratic trajectory—and found wanting.

The economic consequences of Imamoglu’s arrest have also been severe. The Turkish lira plunged against the U.S. dollar and the euro, prompting the central bank to deploy tens of billions of dollars in reserves to stabilize the currency. Major financial institutions took notice. Morgan Stanley, one of the world’s largest clearinghouses, announced it would cease operations in Turkey, citing a total collapse in confidence in the country’s legal and regulatory environment. Erdogan’s decision to imprison Imamoglu has come at extraordinary cost to the Turkish economy.

This is far from the first undemocratic act of Erdogan’s presidency. The international community has grown accustomed to watching as Turkey drifts further from the rule of law, its partners often responding with muted concern. Yet Imamoglu’s imprisonment might be an escalation—a signal that Erdogan is willing to forgo elections altogether, or at least to bar any viable opponent from running. Either scenario amounts to the end of electoral democracy in Turkey.

There is no credible legal basis for Imamoglu’s incarceration. The charging documents lack substantive evidence, and no conviction has been rendered. The arrest was ordered by a prosecutor loyal to Erdogan’s Ministry of Justice, which has long been accused of acting as a political tool rather than an impartial legal institution. Making matters worse, authorities also arrested Imamoglu’s legal counsel, as well as several senior municipal officials. This is not a good-faith investigation into local corruption—it is a brazen attempt to dismantle the political apparatus of a credible challenger.

Erdogan might now feel emboldened to preemptively disqualify or imprison any individual with the potential to defeat him. If he is bolder still, Turkey might abandon competitive elections altogether. In either case, the Turkish public has effectively been stripped of its right to choose its leaders—a first in the 101-year history of the Republic.

The financial burden of Erdogan’s authoritarian maneuvering is being passed directly to the Turkish people. The government’s use of central bank reserves to stabilize the lira in the wake of Imamoglu’s arrest has severely undermined long-term investor confidence. Capital flight is accelerating, and Turkey’s reputation as an investable economy is in free fall.

Yet Erdogan’s government continues to project a façade of normalcy. Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek has been traveling globally, most recently to Washington, in an effort to woo investors. His message is simple and dangerously naïve: Political disruptions in Turkey, he argues, should not deter foreign capital. This is a denial of reality. Simsek’s appeal presumes that global investors will overlook the dismantling of democratic institutions and the collapse of legal protections. That assumption is unrealistic.

Ultimately, Erdogan’s objective is no longer to tend to a functioning democracy or manage a healthy, rules-based economy. His sole aim is regime preservation. Everything else—Turkey’s institutions, its economy, its place in the world—is expendable.

Imamoglu’s arrest is not just a domestic issue. It is a test of how far a NATO member can stray from democratic norms before the international community meaningfully responds. If left unchallenged, Erdogan’s actions risk setting a precedent for other autocratic-leaning governments, which may conclude democratic elections are optional, and political rivals can be eliminated without consequence.

The international community must recognize this is a decisive turning point for Turkey’s future as a democracy. Silence will only embolden further repression. And the cost of inaction—for Turkey, for the region, and for the transatlantic alliance—will be far greater in the long run.

About the Author: Sinan Ciddi 

Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at FDD and an expert on Turkish politics. He is also an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at Marine Corps University (MCU). Prior to joining MCU, Sinan was the Executive Director of the Institute of Turkish Studies, based at Georgetown University (2011-2020). He continues to serve as an Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Sinan is the author of Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party: Secularism and Nationalism (Routledge, January 2009) a book which explains the electoral weakness of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party. He obtained his Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 2007 in the field of Political Science.