‘Ferrari’ F-35D Could Mean ’80 Percent’ NGAD Fighter at Half the Cost

In a quarterly earnings call on April 22, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet laid out a dramatic proposal for a so-called “Ferrari” variant of its commercially successful F-35 stealth fighter. 

Even as the U.S. government plans to spend $20 billion completing the development of Boeing’s F-47 over the next decade, Taiclet argued that Lockheed Martin would leverage “knowledge and technology development gained from our investments in the (Next Generation Air Dominance [NGAD]) competition,” and critiques from an Air Force debrief, to develop an evolved “fifth-gen plus” version of the F-35 with “80 percent of sixth-gen capability at 50 percent the cost.” 

This would be a “super F-35,” or an F-35D, costing possibly as much as $150 million per aircraft. It would be exportable to, and more readily adoptable by, the many operators of F-35A jets. 

How the F-35D Could Fly

Taiclet also doubled down on the F-35’s original concept, arguing that detecting and shooting at the enemy first, while remaining undetected, was more important than dogfighting agility within visual-range combat. He then highlighted three related NGAD technologies he believed were portable to the F-35:

-Improved radar, and especially passive infrared sensors, to discreetly detect enemies first without exposing oneself to detection in return.

-Tracking systems and weapons that extend attack ranges (possibly referring to Lockheed’s AIM-260 missile, currently under testing).

-“Materials, geometries and countermeasures” to further reduce visibility to enemy sensors.

The skeptical reception by many aerospace observers is understandable. Taiclet wants his corporation to prosper, and though Lockheed completely dominates the Western market for fifth-generation stealth fighters, obviously he would like a foothold in the sixth-generation market.

Between 2018-2023 the company ran 60 percent over budget on its Block 4 upgrade for the F-35, which is described as being an 80-percent software upgrade. So if Block 4 is such an expensive and heavy lift, how could a more ambitious F-35, with still more physical alterations, be developed more quickly and economically?

But one need not be invested in Lockheed’s financial future (this author is not) to see the underlying case: The F-35 will likely long remain the most extensively produced 21st-century fighter, with 1,100 already built, and projected total sales exceeding 3,500. 

The jet’s massive user base and the economy of scale of its production create a market for an evolved F-35 model, much as these factors have for nearly every other successful U.S. jet fighter (with the notable exception of the F-22)—if, of course, a super F-35 can be developed at reasonable price and speed. 

That is a big if, judging by the Block 4, but it perhaps does not deserve peremptory dismissal. Lockheed Martin’s NGAD prototype was reportedly an evolution of the F-35, meaning substantial amounts of R&D may be directly transferrable. 

Furthermore, F-35D development could be channeled toward a single land-based design, rather than the trifecta of land-based F-35As, jump-jet F-35Bs and catapult-takeoff F-35Cs. The need to triplicate upgrades for subvariants with only 20-percent parts commonality lies behind many F-35 delays and cost overruns, but it need not afflict a notional F-35D.

Super Lighting to match the Super Hornet?

The Air Force’s priorities for sixth-generation fighters include drone control and increased range—vital when preparing for a potential conflict with China in the Pacific. Secondarily, there is interest in improved stealth and kinematic performance margins, the latter entailing increased acceleration, higher service ceiling, Mach-2 capability, and possibly even supercruise (sustained supersonic speed without using afterburner).

A successful F-35D program might parallel the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet—a derivative of the effective but short-ranged F/A-18 Hornet multi-role fighter that was enlarged to carry more fuel while boosted by more powerful engines and greater stealth. The result was different enough to effectively be a new plane, but it was sold to Congress as if it were a subvariant.

Control of multiple loyal-wingman drones is already planned for existing F-35 models, so that box seems to be checked, even if it can be further optimized. But like the Super Hornet, a super F-35D could be stretched to carry more fuel, and ideally to increase internal weapons stowage. Hypothetically, Lockheed Martin could aerodynamically reoptimize the F-35 airframe without needing to accommodate a jump-jet subvariant—but the more radical the change, the more expensive and risky it is, and the benefits of commonality with the existing F-35 rapidly vanish. Conversely, Lockheed could hulk out the base F-35A airframe by attaching stealth-optimized conformal fuel tanks, similar to those on conventional fighters.

The Competition Must Falter

The Super Hornet’s success was made possible by the cancellation of the ambitious A-12 stealth bomber, which left the Navy looking for a more readily available and less technically risky substitute. Likewise, for an F-35D to flourish, it must avoid being crowded out by Western sixth-generation rivals: Boeing’s F-47, of course, followed abroad by the British-Japanese-Italian GCAP/Tempest fighter and the French-German-Spanish FCAS jet. 

BAE Systems artist image of Tempest Stealth Fighter. Image Credit: BAE.

These programs all face varying risks of falling behind schedule and overrunning costs—and in the worst case, cancellation should problems spiral out of control. Any of these problems could create force-structure gaps as old aircraft are retired without new ones ready to replace them—gaps a super F-35 could help fill if it looks genuinely more readily available, low-risk, cost-effective and affordable. Wars or geopolitical crises also might create surges in demand for such an aircraft before sixth-generation designs are ready. 

Next-gen Engines for the F-35 Airframe: Just How Ambitious?

A significantly evolved F-35D would likely incorporate adaptive-cycle turbofans, with which the engine can adjust the ratio of air bypassing the compressor midflight to optimize for fuel efficiency or maximum performance, as needed. This capability would improve range and performance. 

There’s already an off-the-shelf solution tailored for the F-35, the General Electric XA100  proposed for the Block 4 upgrade, which is projected to increase range by 30-35 percent, and thrust by 10-20 percent. Though the Air Force chose a more conservative engine upgrade to reduce cost and risk, the F-35D could integrate the XA100—or something more powerful still, though pursuing a more beastly engine could require costly airframe modifications.

Either way, if the “Ferrari F-35” boasts more powerful long-range sensors, as Taiclet indicates, its engine must generate much more electricity and exhibit improved heat management, potentially through airflow-cooling technology. Already, the Block 4 upgrades required upgrades to both power and cooling. 

Next-gen Stealth—Too Expensive?

Taiclet’s mention of “materials, geometries and countermeasures” shows he believes a super F-35 can improve on stealth as well—particularly in terms of reducing radar cross-section (RCS)—through three broad approaches:

-Optimizing aircraft geometry; both in “big-picture,” non-reflective airframe shaping, but also down to millimeter-level shaving of groove-lines and exposed screws.

Tempest 6th Generation Stealth Fighter. Image Credit/Artist Rendering from BAE Systems.

-Improving radar absorbent materials (RAM) baked into the airplane’s skin, or coated on top, to reduce RCS, but with improved cost efficiency and sustainability.

-Active measures such as jamming to fog or mislead hostile radars. 

While RAM improvements seem possible, altering geometry could mean extensive, expensive, and technically challenging airframe changes that remove the cost efficiencies of using an existing chassis. However, stealth might be improved by removing the F-35’s tail stabilizers at cost to maneuverability, which, recall, Taiclet argued is of lesser importance.

Lockheed Needs to Self-fund Development Initially

For now, the Pentagon is unlikely to pay Lockheed to develop a rival to the F-47 fighter it just anointed for future service. Perhaps if Air Force leadership sours on Boeing’s performance while developing the F-47, or changes its procurement strategy, the opportunity may arise. But Lockheed Martin needs to capitalize on any opening that presents itself.

Aerospace corporations do sometimes develop new aircraft on their own dime, hoping to seduce procurers with promising prototypes. Of course, that means taking on the R&D costs and assuming the risks of moving forward without the safety net of government funding.

F-15EX Eagle II. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

That strategy can pay off—sometimes. Boeing on its own initiative developed a stealthed-up F-15 “Silent Eagle” jet in the 2000s that failed to attract buyers. But later its proposed F-15EX won a small-scale Air Force order. In China, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s self-funded FC-31 stealth fighter didn’t garner government orders on its unveiling. But over the following decade, it won over China’s navy and air force to enter service as the J-35.

Overall, the success of Taiclet’s “Ferrari F-35” will depend on a mix of luck and engineering prowess. Prowess to successfully develop an attractive yet cost-favorable new stealth fighter on its own dime; and luck that aligns political, industrial, and geopolitical circumstances with Lockheed’s proposed solution, despite competing sixth-generation programs.

About the Author: Sebastien A. Roblin

Sébastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com, War is Boring and 19FortyFive, where he is Defense-in-Depth editor.  He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter.