Ukraine won’t Stop Fighting without Russian Concessions: U.S. President Donald Trump insisted repeatedly while running for office that he would end the Russo-Ukraine war on day one of his presidency.
This always seemed unrealistic, but to his credit, Trump has tried. Unfortunately, he has used most of America’s substantial leverage to push against the weaker of the two war parties—the side that is the victim in this conflict.
Indeed, Trump has pushed Ukraine far harder than he has Russia. Just this week, Ukraine agreed to a minerals development deal that does not include a U.S. security guarantee and looks suspiciously like Washington arm-twisting Kyiv to score its own easy gains.
There is some room for pressure on Ukraine. For example, even the most pro-Ukrainian Western leaders are unlikely to support its stance that it must retake Crimea. That region is a concession Ukraine likely will have to make under any peace deal.
But Kyiv is unlikely to sign onto any agreement unless Russia makes concessions, too. Even if Trump rejects the justice of Ukraine’s claims, he must still recognize that without mutual concessions, there is no reason for Ukraine to stop fighting. The peace terms Trump has suggested have been so one-sided that they are tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender—a condition Russia has not earned on the battlefield.
Potential Russian Concessions in Ukraine
Because the war is stalemated, Russia is unlikely to agree to major concessions. But if Russian President Vladimir Putin is seriously about ending the war—rather than just pausing it so that Russia can re-fit and try again—here are three obvious concessions he should make and Trump should demand:
Accept Western Peacekeepers
A Russian agreement to not attack Ukraine is not good enough anymore. Russia has repeatedly committed to respecting Ukraine’s borders, and has always broken that commitment. Russia will likely demand control of the territory it has conquered thus far, and will likely receive much of it in a deal.
That is approximately 18% of Ukraine—a substantial loss for Kyiv. Such a concession must be balanced by acceptance of the presence of a Western force along the line of control to ensure that it is a meaningful border, and not a continuing, violent frontline that Putin can cross again at will.
Trump will not commit U.S. troops to police that line, but some Western force is necessary.
Compensate Ukraine
Russia has done enormous damage to Ukraine. Its cities have been devastated by years of terror bombing, and civilians in the occupied territories have suffered terribly. Russia has foreign assets in Western banks that have been frozen for the duration of the war.
It has long been suggested that Ukraine be given these funds as compensation. That should happen.
Ukraine needs a lot of reconstruction assistance, but lenders like the World Bank may hesitate, given the tense regional relationship with Russia. Funding taken directly from Russia gets around that problem and places the burden on the party responsible.
Humanitarian Concessions
Trump should pressure Russia to release all Ukrainian hostages, prisoners, prisoners of war, and kidnapped children. Russia’s behavior toward non-combatants in the war has been appalling. This has stoked Ukrainian nationalism and ensured the country’s willingness to fight on despite tough odds.
One easy concession for Putin to make is to halt such harsh treatment. Ukrainians in occupied Russian territories also must be allowed to leave.
Population transfers often follow the end of a conflict. If Ukraine is going to be pressed into accepting the line of control as a de-facto border, then its citizens should have full freedom to go to their own country.
Russian Concessions are a Test of Whether Putin Really Wants to End the War
The concessions Trump demands of Ukraine are painful. They include accepting territorial losses. If the line of control becomes the de-facto border, it will become harder and harder over time for Ukraine to insist on its rollback. As we have seen in places like Korea or the Indian subcontinent, temporary lines of control often harden into real borders. Thus, Putin’s war will have netted him meaningful gains: recognition of his 2014 Crimea landgrab, and annexation of a substantial amount of the Donbas.
Against these gains, the Russian counter-concessions suggested above are not very costly. Russia will come out as a winner, although not with the major victory Putin expected in 2022.
Ukraine TOW Missile Attack. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The above-suggested counter-concessions are, then, a test. Does Putin actually want peace? If so, these concessions are a low price to pay for Russia’s decent gains. This is a good deal for Russia and roughly reflects its battlefield success. If Putin rejects any concessions at all, though, then we know he is still the unrepentant imperialist of 2022. In such circumstances, Ukraine will not stop fighting.
Trump claims to have a relationship with Putin. Now is the time to use that influence and pull counter-concessions from Putin to incentivize Ukraine to agree to a cease-fire. Putin, not Ukraine, needs to be the target of Trump’s pressure.
About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.
