For Europe’s Right, Ukraine Has Become the Defining Test: The war in Ukraine exposed the faultlines that divide Europe’s right-wing populist parties, primarily over whether to fully support Ukraine’s resistance or push for a negotiated peace with Russia. These faultlines are still visible after three years of war and amidst sweeping right-wing electoral gains across the continent. What was once a quiet split on Ukraine policy is now a defining question for Europe’s right. Now, Trump is accelerating the need for a decision.
On one side of the right-wing divide are leaders like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Dutch populist Geert Wilders, and France’s National Rally under Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella. Despite their anti-establishment origins, these politicians have embraced Ukraine’s fight as a patriotic defense of national sovereignty.
Meloni, elected in 2022 as the head of “Italy’s most right-wing government since World War II,” has consistently pledged full support for Ukraine. Her position is motivated by a sense of justice, and she has gone so far as to propose NATO-like security guarantees for Kyiv without immediate membership in the transatlantic alliance.
Similarly, Wilders, long a fixture of Europe’s populist right, has taken a pro-Ukraine stance following his party’s recent electoral success.
Le Pen, once skeptical of sanctions and arms shipments, now condemns Russian aggression and criticized Trump’s freeze on U.S. aid as “cruel.” Le Pen was recently convicted of embezzlement and barred from running for office for five years. Her successor, Jordan Bardella, has doubled down on Le Pen’s attempt to turn the party away from its “Russophilic” past and support Ukraine.
Supporting Ukrainians’ fight to preserve an independent existence for their nation resonates with core values held up by the populist right. Yet, critics argue that this pro-Ukraine turn is as much about political expediency as principle. For parties seeking to shed their pariah status, aligning with the transatlantic consensus offers a path to legitimacy within the European establishment.
Today, Meloni is largely accepted by her establishment counterparts as someone who has been tamed by political office. Le Pen and Bardella have similarly been trying to appeal to the centre in an attempt to mainstream their party.
Opposing them are parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Hungary’s ruling Fidesz. Leading figures in these parties advocate for a negotiated settlement to end the war in Ukraine, if necessary by making concessions to Russia. They do so not necessarily out of affection for the Kremlin, but as a realist rejection of what they see as a costly, interminable war that ultimately doesn’t serve the aspirations of any involved party.
Russian officials and commentators portray the conflict as similar to the Second World War, invoking “denazification” rhetoric and dreams of a Yalta Conference 2.0 to overhaul the international balance of power. The pro-settlement right-wing counters that the Russo-Ukrainian war more closely resembles the First World War—an unmitigated, bloody disaster that drains resources and destabilizes Europe without delivering strategic gains.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has consistently called for negotiations, defying the Western consensus. Just before last year’s NATO summit, he met with Zelensky and Putin to gauge how ready they were for talks.
Similarly, Romania’s George Simion, leader of a rising populist right which just faced an electoral setback, has vowed to consult with the US on Ukraine, which may entail ceasing military aid. Simion has criticized Ukraine for alleged mistreatment of its Romanian minority, saying that “we have our own problems with Ukrainians because they are behaving like Russians in many ways.”
The divergence over foreign policy on Europe’s populist right must be put into focus, especially if it continues its electoral sweep and becomes more of a dominant political force. Indeed, the split over Ukraine has already had tangible political consequences.
Last year, Europe elected more right-wing populists and conservatives to the European Parliament than ever before. Far from being a coup de grâce, these results were immediately followed up by a scandalous falling out between the French National Rally and German AfD. These right-wing parties went on to form competing political groups in the EU parliament.
When Maximilian Krah, a leading politician of the AfD, was asked about what happened, he said that one key area of disagreement was foreign policy.
Within the AfD, there were discussions about whether the party should “also now shift, like Meloni and Le Pen, to a pro-Ukraine transatlantic stance.” Krah disagreed, believing the AfD should stick to its “more multipolar approach,” which means that “Germany and Europe should be open to all sides.”
The split was confirmed by Carlo Fidanza, leader of Meloni’s party in the EU parliament, who said that the “main difference” between his party and others on Europe’s right is Ukraine policy.
Trump’s resurgence has further raised the stakes. If U.S. military support dries up, Europe will face the prospect of either shouldering the financial and military burden of Ukraine’s defense or pushing Kyiv toward a settlement that requires concessions to Russia.
The question faced by Europe’s right-wing populists is whether they will follow Meloni and Le Pen in moving toward the establishment consensus or champion a “realist” alternative.
About the Author: Julian Fisher
Julian Fisher is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. Fisher is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. His research focuses on issues in Law and 21st-century great power competition. Julian is a native of Vienna, Austria.
